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“While significantly improving the status quo, 
the amended Merger Regulation will continue to raise 
important issues o f interpretation with regard to joint ventures.
However,
the relatively limited Commission decisional practice under Article 2(4) to date appears
to show that
the adoption o f the Regulation 1310/97 
may constitute a new and welcome point o f departure 
fo r  a more economically driven analysis 
of the possible anti-competitive spill-over effect 
resulting from the setting up o f a join t venture. ”
F.E. Gonzalez-Diaz, 1999,
“Joint Ventures Under EC Competition Law: The New Boundaries”, 
not yet published.
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INTRODUCTION
Background To The Research Question
Progressively, literature on, and review of, European Competition Law has 
been witnessed to express an interest in taking firms* strategic behaviour seriously 
when examining competition issues. Juan Briones, in examining the treatment of 
mergers in oligopoly markets under European Competition law, concludes that "the 
approach to oligopolies now takes into account more explicitly elements related to the 
strategies o f the market players as well as conduct-related information, which are 
factors that perhaps played a lesser role under a purely structural approach based on 
a rigid interpretation o f the paradigm structure-conduct-performance"J He 
emphasizes that this approach to competition issues makes sense since, under 
oligopoly conditions, firms recognise their interdependence and the need to take into 
account other firms* reactions when making their decisions.
A ‘structuralist* approach to competition essentially incorporates a static, one­
dimensional model where structure determines conduct, which, in turn, leads to 
certain levels of performance. The Chicago School of economists rejects that causality 
from structure to conduct to performance as too simple. They argue that the linkages 
are much more diverse: the iterative or dynamic process by which firms implement 
their decisions, taking into account their rivals’ assessments and responses to their 
actions, is an integral part o f the competitive fabric. “7b ignore this crucial 
adjustment process, as the structuralist approach tends to do, is to ignore much that 
is relevant, especially fo r  interpreting the conduct",1 2
Rhonda Smith and David Round pick up this theme and extend it further in the 
context of an issue within the ambit of Article 82 (ex Article 86) of the Treaty of 
Rome, hereinafter “the EC Treaty”,3 namely the unilateral firm conduct o f predatory
1 “Oligopolistic Dominance: Is There A Common Approach In Different Jurisdictions? A Review Of 
Decisions Adopted By The Commission Under The Merger Regulation”, [1995] ECLR 334-347 at 334.
2 See Rhonda Smith & David Round, "Competition Assessment And Strategic Behaviour” [1998] 
ECLR 225 at 227.
3 The Treaty of Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 2nd October 1997) amended the Treaty on European Union, 
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related Treaties. In doing so, it
1
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pricing causing the abuse of a dominant position.* 4 They start from setting out the 
factors, which are considered in order to determine whether a firm has market power 
under a “structuralist” approach to the assessment of dominance, namely (1) market 
concentration, (2) height of barriers to entry, (3) extent of product differentiation, (4) 
extent of vertical integration. They highlight that such a “structuralist” approach does 
not take into account “behavioural”, strategic or dynamic factors, except by 
implication and that “where it does consider whether the conduct investigated is likely 
to raise entry barriers, it is less likely to look more broadly at the firm ’s conduct 
especially in other markets".5 They conclude their work by urging for greater 
consideration o f strategic behaviour in future competition analysis.
From the European Commission’s side, Alexander Schaub has admitted, while 
explaining that u(competition policy dictates that we allow normal 'performance- 
based* competitive behaviour on the part o f the dominant companies, whilst 
preventing ‘defensive ’ and anti-competitive behaviour ”, that “the distinction between 
the two is both complex and dynamic".6
M. E. Porter accepts that the starting point for competition analysis ought to be 
the “industry”. He explains that in any industry whether it is domestic or international, 
whether it produces products or provides services, the rules of competition are 
embodied in five competitive forces: (a) the entry of new competitors; (b) the threat of 
substitutes; (c) the bargaining power of buyers; (d) the bargaining power of suppliers; 
(e) the rivalry of existing competitors.7 The strength of the five forces varies from 
industry to industry and can change as an industry evolves; that is, the strength of each 
of the five competitive forces is a function of industry structure - the underlying 
economic and technical characteristics of an industry.
renumbered the Articles of the Treaty of Rome, and Article 14(2) of the Treaty of Amsterdam required 
that since its entry into force ( Is* May 1999) the new numbering shall be employed. Hence reference to 
Articles of the Treaty of Rome in this thesis will be in compliance with Article 14(2). For reasons of 
clarity, the old number may at times be mentioned in parallel.
4 ibid, at p. 225
5 ibid, at p. 227
61996, “Competition Policy In The Telecommunications Sector”, Competition Policy Newsletter,
Spring 1996, No. 1, Vol.2
2
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Yet, he points out that, if  the five competitive forces and their structural 
determinants were solely a function of the intrinsic industry characteristics, then 
competitive strategy would rest heavily on picking the right industry and 
understanding the five forces better than competitors. “In fact ", he highlights, "a firm  
is not a prisoner o f an industry1s structure; firms through their strategies can 
influence the five forces“.8 Often firms make strategic choices without considering the 
long-term consequences for industry structure. He emhasizes that “the ability o f firms 
to shape industry structure places a particular burden on industry leaders, since their 
actions may have a disproportionate impact on structure, because o f their size and 
influence over buyers, suppliers and other competitors ”. 9
He warns that the competitive strategies adopted by firms vary, and should 
vary, according to the nature of the industry they compete in. In this context, he 
describes two models of industry: on the one hand, the “multidomestic” industry, 
where competition in one country is essentially independent of competition in other 
countries, and hence the competitive advantage of a firm is largely specific to each 
country; on the other hand, the “global” industry, where a firm’s competitive position 
in one country is significantly impacted by its position in other countries in which the 
rivals compete.
Research Question A nd Methodology
Intrigued by the above stream of thought, this thesis intends to examine 
whether European Competition Law adopts a ‘structuralist’ approach to competition, 
and therefore tends to disregard the strategic behaviour of firms, when it comes down 
to the very assessment of Strategic Alliances (“SA”). Hence, the primary objective of 
the thesis is to identify those features which are peculiar to a SA - as distinct from a 
common form of alliance - and to which features European Competition law should 
be, unless it is already, adapted.
8 "Competitive Advantage: Creating And Sustaining Superior Performance", 1985, The Free Press, 
New York, at pp.4-7
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One would think that the words Strategic Alliance (“SAs”) - are as widely and 
clearly understood as broadly and frequently they are used. The difficulty to define 
with precision what a SA is, from a legal point of view, is acknowledged. In fact, 
literature on European Competition law appears to use the term SA as a generic one, 
encompassing a variety of corporate transactions ranging from collaboration 
agreements with no equity participation to full function joint ventures - whether 
cooperative or concentrative, as the distinction used to be - to acquisitions9 10. In Part 
[ I ] of the thesis, the author will make an attempt at throwing some light on what 
exactly a SA is. It is submitted that, at best, we can derive guidance on the concept of 
SAs from management science.
In the author’s opinion, it would be rather unfortunate to advocate for the 
introduction of the pragmatic, strategic reasoning of firms into the legal reasoning, 
whilst failing to demonstrate that certain strategic behaviour can reasonably be 
foreseen. For the same reason, Part [ II ] seeks to put in context that which is argued in 
Part [ I ]. The author identifies the telecommunications sector as an attractive playing 
field for SAs. It is a sector, which has experienced rapidly evolving technological 
changes, which have urged the firms to exploit new capabilities.11 Besides, the sector- 
specific regulatory framework, which was prescribed by the European Union for its 
Member States, posed a strategic challenge for the leading firms: to deploy certain 
strategies before regulation-induced competition was injected into the monopolistic 
structure of the sector; and, to formulate other strategies to maintain their leadership, 
after the market would have officially ceased to be monopolistic. The reader is 
addressed to this strategic challenge. Drawing from these sector-specific 
developments, a model is suggested in Section 3.5 for the purposes of the "strategic
9 ibid.
10 See M. A. Pena- Castellot, ‘The Application Of Competition Rules In The Telecommunications 
Sector: Strategic Alliances", EC Competition Policy Newsletter, Spring 1995, Vol.l, p.l at p.2: "Some 
alliances include acquisitions either o f unilateral stakes or of cross-shareholdings in the capital o f the 
participating companies, as in the BT-MCI case[...J, ’’
11 The author wishes to clarify that, albeit technological developments stifled both the phenomena of 
globalisation and convergence, only SAs which have been concluded in response to convergence will 
be analysed.
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analysis” of S As in this sector. In essence, this model expands on the model which 
was set out in Section 1.6.
Part [ III ] aspires at describing the legal instruments, which are available 
within the European Competition Law regime and can be implemented for the 
purposes of controlling SAs. The author is particularly interested in SAs which are set 
up in the form of full-function joint ventures, because, first, SAs are most frequently 
set up like that; secondly, they are more durable than SAs set up as partial-function 
joint ventures, and therefore their effects are likely to be felt to a greater extent; 
finally, they do bring into question the structure of the industry and their parents’ 
position therein, hence raising the issue of whether the SA executes a defensive 
strategy of the parents targeted at reinforcing their leading position, and consequently 
influencing the structure of the industry. Having said that, the legal instruments which 
are relevant for our purposes, and thus will be discussed in Part [ III ], comprise the 
EC Merger Regulation, Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 On The 
Control Of Concentrations Between Undertakings as amended by Council Regulation 
1310/97 of 7 July 1997, and Article 81 (ex Articles 85) EC Treaty.
The author wishes to bring to the surface several aspects of the methodology 
of the European Commission which indicate that a ‘structuralist’ approach to 
competition is adopted, and at the same time to suggest in what respects such practice 
may be modified to capture the strategic behaviour of firms. It is submitted that there 
is room within the wording of the legal instruments for such modification. In 
particular, the author submits that the concept of ‘market power’ may be reinterpreted 
to take into account the strategies of firms aimed at giving themselves an exclusive 
position on the market: it is argued that the concept of ‘dominance’ which the ECMR 
prohibits, justifies such reinterpretation. Further, the author suggests a different way of 
looking at the likelihood of co-ordination of the parents’ behaviour. Always focused 
on the strategic intent o f the parents, the author commends on the relationship 
between the ancillary restraints (non-competition clauses) attached to the joint-venture 
agreement, the competitive behaviour of the parents and, in turn, their market power. 
The themes discussed are extricated from a case study in the telecommunications 
sector.
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PA R T[ I ]
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: ANALYSING TH E PHENOMENON 
1. The Concept of Strategic Alliances
1.1 What is the rationale fo r  alliances
Generally speaking, alliances are sought to be concluded in the following 
circumstances: (a) where a company can no longer afford the risks of "bet your 
company" investment opportunities (risk sharing); (b) where the industry has high 
fixed costs, and therefore the company needs greater scale to compete globally 
(economies o f scale); (c) where the company lacks a basic understanding of customers 
and applications, as well as the infrastructure to distribute its product to such 
customers (market segment access); (d) where the company faces critical technology 
gaps and cannot afford the time and / or the resources to build it itself (technology 
access); (e) where the company has a viable product but the opportunity of supplying 
it is attractive only in a foreign market which it is difficult for it to penetrate 
(geographical access); (0  where the company is facing ever-increasing development 
costs (funding constraints); (g) the company needs an infusion of top-quality 
management (management skills); (h) the company wants to strengthen value-added 
(value-added barriers). In the aforesaid circumstances, concluding an alliance will be 
preferred to making an acquisition, provided that there are acquisition barriers. Such 
barriers may arise due to the following factors: (a) the massive size of the prospective 
ally who controls the desired capability renders it unlikely to consider seriously an 
acquisition; (b) geographical distance causes cultural differences; (c) the owner is 
reluctant to lose control; (d) it may be desirable to accede a subset of the partner’s 
capabilities rather than all, i.e. even less relevant, capabilities. Albeit alliances are 
seen as precursors to a broader relationship, which may entail a full legal merger, both 
parties acknowledge that trust building and strategy formation demand to be evolved 
gradually and thus a less rigid form of integration is chosen.
6
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It is important to clarify that these drivers for alliances may not be the same for 
both /  each partner; in fact, their relevance will vary by industry as well as by 
company within an industry. Thus, (a) in capital intensive industries, the key driver is 
risk sharing and economies of scale, whereas in labour intensive industries there are 
few drivers to ally; (b) where the products of the industry are differentiable, market 
access and technology access are the key drivers, whereas in industries for 
commodity-like products, economies of scale trigger an incentive to ally; (c) where 
the rate of change within, or of, the industry involves high technological complexity, 
technology access will be the driver whereas in industries where the rate of change 
involves low technological complexity, economies of scale may drive the desire to 
ally; (d) interestingly, in young industries with embryonic structure, risk sharing and 
funding constraints will be reasons to ally by contrast to mature industries with well 
established structures where market access will be the determinant; (e) emphasis 
added, in global industries, geographic access will be the key driver for concluding 
alliances and the same will apply to a strategic industry - that is where the industry 
carries a political significance.
1,2 What is a SA
John R. Harbison & Peter Pekar, JR.12 define a SA as a cooperative 
arrangement between two or more companies in which (a) a common strategy is 
developed in unison and a win-win attitude is adopted by all parties; (b) the 
relationship is reciprocal with each partner prepared to share specific strengths with 
the other, thus lending power to the enterprise; (c) a pooling of resources, investment 
and risks occurs for mutual gain.
What distinguishes an alliance from a 'strategic’ alliance is the existence of 
'strategic intent\ which ought to be discerned.13 The existence of different strategic
12 "A Practical Guide To Alliances: Leapfrogging The Learning Curve. A Perspective For U.S. 
Companies", 1993, Booz-AHcn & Hamilton, p.3
13 Source: Peter Lorangc & Johan Roos, Strategic Alliances: Formation, Implementation And 
Evolution", 1992, Blackwell, at Ch. 2: "The Formation Process", p.27.
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intents among SA partners is healthy.14 A proviso to this is necessary: different 
strategic intents ought to be revealed by each side at the very initial stage of the 
formation of the alliance and must be reconcilable and compatible so that there is 
room for cooperation. As a common denominator, though, strategic intent envisions a 
desired leadership position and establishes the criterion the alliance will use to chart 
its progress. Strategic intent provides consistency to short-term action while leaving 
room for reinterpretation as new opportunities emerge; while strategic intent is clear 
about ends, it is flexible as to means. Strategic intent assures consistency in resource 
allocation over the long term. Clearly articulated corporate challenges focus the efforts 
of individuals in the medium term. Competitive innovation helps reduce the 
competitive risk in the short term. This consistency in the long term, focus in the 
medium term and inventiveness in the short term provide the key to leveraging limited 
resources in pursuit of ambitious goals. Strategic intent implies a sizeable stretch for 
an organisation; current capabilities and resources will not suffice.15 Hence a strategic 
ally adopts a different approach to competitor analysis than a sole competitor does. 
Typically, competitor analysis focuses on the existing resources (human, technical, 
financial) of current competitors; the only companies seen as a threat are those with 
resources to erode margins and market share in the next planning period; the pace at 
which new competitive advantages are being built rarely enters in.
1.3 Why are alliances increasingly strategic
The 1970s was the era of product performance, in which, albeit alliances 
generally focused on getting access to the latest technology and selling the product 
internationally, the key selling point was product performance. In most cases the 
boundaries between industries were very clear-cut, so a broader set of capabilities did 
not need to be assessed. In the 1980s, the emphasis shifted to positional focus: 
companies sought to build industry stature, consolidate position and often gain
14 see Ohmae, K., "The Global Logic Of Strategic Alliances", 1989, Harvard Business Review, 67, 2, 
March-April, pp. 143-54.
15 Gary Hamel & C. K. Prahalad, "Strategic Intent” in "Global Strategies: Insights From The Worlds 
Leading Thinkers", 1994, Harvard Business Law Review (ed.)
8
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economies of scale and scope. Nowadays, the emphasis is on capabilities. Industry 
lines are blurring and competitive boundaries are also blurring: the trend towards 
global markets links together formerly disparate products, markets and geographical 
regions. In these newly defined arenas, positional assets are not enough, and new 
capabilities are required to succeed. The name of the game is to maximise delivered 
value, to minimise total cost and to gain advantage. Rapid technology shifts and 
tailoring to accommodate rapid product innovation both put pressure on management 
to act faster and smarter with fewer resources. In this environment, companies need to 
select, build and deploy the critical capabilities that will enable them to gain 
competitive advantage, enhance customer value and drive their markets. The emphasis 
should be on future differentiates, not historical ones. The competitive focus must 
switch from how to compete better with current capabilities to how to select and build 
better future capabilities. Competition is no longer fo r  position itself but fo r  change in 
position. Positional assets, such as facilities, market share and brand franchise are 
transitory, while capabilities are not. The goal is to focus on the capabilities that the 
firm can use to constantly renew and extend its position.
1.4 Capabilities And Competitive Advantage
What is 1competitive advantage ? A firm may possess two types of competitive 
advantage: low relative cost - its ability to perform the activities in its value chain at 
lower cost - and /  or differentiation - performing in a unique way relative to its 
competitors. The ultimate value that a firm creates is what buyers are willing to pay 
for what the firm provides, which includes the physical product as well as any other 
services or benefits. Hence, competitive advantage is a function of either providing 
comparable buyer value to competitors but performing activities efficiently (low cost) 
or of performing activities at comparable cost but in unique ways that create greater 
buyer value than competitors and hence command a premium price (differentiation). 
What are ’capabilities?  They are know-how leveraged by cost-effective, responsive 
business processes and systems for innovation and delivery of enhanced customer 
value. They are intrinsically cross-functional. They are based on horizontally 
organised teams working together according to well-designed, pre-engineered 
processes, and empowered by policy to make decisions within an established
9

framework of rules. Competitive advantage in capabilities demands sharp focus on 
supply chain management, internal capability management and customer relationship 
management.
J. R. Harbison & P. Pekar JR .16 contend that no company alone can afford to 
build advantaged capabilities against all aspects of its innovation and delivery activity. 
A SA is, accordingly, instrumental to achieving competitive advantage in capabilities 
in four respects: (a) by combining efforts relative to suppliers in order to create a 
stronger bargaining power and developing favourable long term contracts; (b) by 
combining efforts vis-à-vis customers in order to offer a fuller range of products and 
maintaining a stronger sales force; (c) by combining efforts to develop and exploit 
new and /  or complementary technology in order to leapfrog the competitors; (d) by 
combining efforts to achieve a size that preempts new entrants.
1.5 What institutional form  a SA may take.
What determines a SA’s institutional form -  in other words, its organisational 
structure - is how much of its resources a company is willing to put into and to 
retrieve from a SA.17 Four archetypes of SAs may be depicted on this basis. If the 
parents put in merely a minimum set of resources, often on a temporary basis, which 
are plowed back to the parents in their entirety, an ad hoc pool type of SA makes most 
sense. If the parties are willing to put in more resources but the values created within 
the SA are still disbursed back to the partners, a consortium type of SA is appropriate. 
Where the parents put in a minimum of strategic resources, entering an arrangement to 
jointly create strategic value through a common organisation and the resources 
generated are not distributed to the parents except as financial results (dividends etc), 
the archetype is the so called project-based joint venture. The full-blown joint venture 
archetype occurs where both parties put in resources in ambudance, allowing the 
resources that are generated in the strategic alliance to be retained in the alliance itself.
16 see n. 1 above, at p.4
17 see n.6 above at p. 10
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This type of SA can be characterised by the creation of a free-standing organisational 
entity with a more self-determined strategic life.
Hence, the institutional form with which a strategic alliance may be endowed 
depends on the variables of duration o f commitment that is made by the parents and 
the content o f  commitment. The diagram that follows illustrates the relationship 
between these two variables. It demonstrates that at the end of the day, the parties to 
an alliance may be partners or owners. Further, the diagram enables the reader to 
distinguish between transactional relationships or mergers and strategic alliances.
C
a . t
o  ▼ Strategic Strategic Merger
Alliance Alliance
i
Xjf
k Long term Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic
IVI Sourcing Sourcing Alliance Alliance Alliance Alliance
b. Agreemen : Relationship
M ' r
i k Annual Strategic Cross- R&D
I Purchase Sourcing Licensing Partnership
Agreemen : Transaction Collaboration Purchase
Advertising Agreement
T c. + Upfront
Fronting
M
F. ’ f
No Shared Shared Shared Cross- Shared- Wholly
N
T
Linkage Information 
■«---------------------------------
Resource Funding Equity Equity Owned 
------------- ►
OWNERSHIP
(a) represents permanent commitment
(b) " long-term
(c) " transactional "
The author invites the reader to refer back to subsection 1.2: it was therein 
explained that the strategic intent o f the SA itself normally envisages a long term plan
18 Source: http://smaitalliances.coin/chartofweck002.html
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for the SA, over and above its short term plan.19 It is for this reason that, more often 
than not, the organisational set up chosen for a SA is that of a full-blown joint 
venture.
1.6 SAs are the means, not the end.
The author shares and superimposes the view expressed by P. Lorange & J. 
Roos that the institutional form for a SA is chosen “regardless o f  the underlying 
strategic intents o f the parents”. 20 P. Lorange & Johan Roos submit that a SA is the 
means to an end, not the end per se; it is not a phenomenon of its own, with its own 
strategic life and value. That is to say, a SA should always be seen from the 
perspective of the parents. A two dimensional test is employed to this end. First, what 
is the strategic importance of the particular business within which the SA is being 
contemplated - how does it fit the overall portfolio of a partner? Is the business of the 
prospective SA part of the core activities of the prospective partner, or can it be seen 
as more peripheral? Secondly, what is the firm’s relative position in the business: is it 
a leader or a follower? What is its market share, technology etc.? Applying the test, 
four scenarios are conceivable, as illustrated by the table below.
Strategic M arket Position
Im portance Leader Follower
In Portfolio
Core Defend Catch up
Peripheral Remain Restructure
First, when the business of the SA is core within the parent company’s overall 
portfolio, and the firm enjoys a relative leadership in this business, the typical motive 
to enter into SA is defensive. The major rationale is to impede access to market and/or
19 The author attaches emphasis in order to keep the concept of ‘strategic intent' of the SA distinguished 
from the concept of the ‘strategic intents’ of the parents / partners.
20 see n. 2, Ch. I: "Strategic Alliances In International Business - Conceptual Framework of Strategic 
Alliances".
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technology, as well as to secure resources. Many firms in this situation enter into a 
small SA with an entrepreneurial embryonic organisation in order to keep track of a 
new technology or a particular state-of-the-art development in the field. Secondly, 
when the business still falls within the core area of a firm’s portfolio, but the firm is 
more of a follower in the business segment, the primary motive for a SA is often to 
catch up. Thirdly, when the business plays a relatively peripheral role in the overall 
portfolio but the firm is a leader, the main rationale is to remain, that is to get the 
maximum efficiency out of the firm’s position. Fourthly, if the firm is more of a 
follower in the business area and if the particular business plays a relatively peripheral 
role in the parents’ portfolio, the main motive for cooperative strategies is to 
restructure the business with an eye toward creating some strength and value which 
might enable the parent company eventually to unload the business.
The author o f this thesis highlights that it may he inferred from the aforesaid 
that to control the phenomenon o f  SAs, it is necessary to comprehend the parents' 
strategic intents, rather than the strategic intent o f the SA itself Thus, albeit a SA 
may be set up in the name of, for instance, "promoting technical and economic 
progress ”, it is necessary to look into the underlying strategic intents of the parents 
before we are convinced that “the end justifies the means” (where “means” is how 
they name it, and “end” what they pursue)!
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2. SA and Parents* Strategies
Drawing from the aforesaid, this section aims at putting a SA in the 
perspective of its parents’ strategies. It is submitted that, for the purposes of assessing 
whether a SA is pro-competitive or anti-competitive, only a defensive strategic intent 
entertained by the parents should raise concerns. Hence, only those business strategies 
that may serve a defensive strategic intent will hereinafter be discussed.
2.1 Defensive Strategy
For every firm the challenge derives from two sources: new entrants and 
established competitors which are repositioning. The single best defence to such 
challenge rests with a competitive strategy: seeking to increase one's competitive 
advantage. However, more often than not, a leading firm may decide to resort to a 
Defensive Strategy ("DS"), instead: seeking to sustain its competitive advantage. DS 
aims at influencing a challenger's calculations of the expected return from entry or 
repositioning, causing the challenger to conclude that the move is unattractive. Thus, 
DS rests with an acute understanding of, on the one hand, how a challenger views the 
leading firm and, on the other hand, how the challenger organises its entry or 
repositioning.
It is suggested that the process of entry or repositioning essentially consists of 
four periods: (a) pre-entry / repositioning; (b) entering / repositioning; (c) sequencing; 
(d) post-entry / repositioning.21 Pre-entry is the period before an entrant has 
commenced its entry, during which it examines the industry by market studies and 
contacts with investment banks. Entering is the period when the challenger actually 
invests in establishing a base in the industry. Sequencing is the period during which an 
entrant's strategy evolves into its long-run target strategy. During this period an entrant 
may take such actions as broadening its product /  services line, vertically integrating, 
or widening its geographic coverage. Post-entry is the stage when investment by the 
entrant has shifted to that needed in order to maintain or defend its position within the
21 scc M. E. Porter, "Competitive Advantagc", 1985, The Free Press, NY, al p.482
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industry. By analogy, repositioning involves the same actions on the part of the 
repositioner.
An important principle of DS is "to take defensive action before exit barriers 
have arisen”. Exit barriers are reflected in the level of commitment (investment) that 
a challenger puts to its entry or repositioning. Such barriers tend to arise as the 
challenger commits to specialised assets, long-term contracts, horizontal strategies 
and investments in technology. The goal is therefore to cast a shadow on the 
challenger’s decision making as regards the viability of such commitment. Another 
principle of DS is ”to shape a challenger’s information and assumptions". This 
principle is based on the assumption that the challenger learns about the market 
during the pre-entry / repositioning stage from the leading firm. The last but not the 
least, DS is premised on the principle that "there is a high payout to anticipating 
which firms represent the most likely challengers and what their logical avenues o f  
attack might be". On this premise, a leading firm is prepared to reduce short-term 
profitability in order to raise the long-term sustainability of a firm’s position.
How is DS implemented? There are several tactics. First and foremost, there 
is the tactic of "raising structural barriers": Tactic (A). Secondly, the tactic of 
"increasing expected retaliation": Tactic (B). Thirdly, the tactic of "lowering 
inducement fo r  attack": Tactic (C). In turn, each of these tactics varies in the way it is 
implemented. Such actions as will be described hereinafter do not constitute an 
exhaustive list. For the purposes of this thesis, and due to the word limit, only Tactic 
A will be analysed.
Tactic (A) may take the form of "blocking channel access". This is when a 
firm makes it more difficult for a challenger to gain access to distribution channels: 
not only the target firm’s own channels but also other channels that may be a substitute 
or a springboard for the challenger’s entry in the market. In this respect bundling or 
unbundling may be appropriate to reduce vulnerability to challengers. Similarly, 
developing attractive after-sales service support of the firm’s products / services may 
prompt a challenger to forego investment in the relevant channel. Besides, Tactic (A) 
may take the form of "defensively increasing scale economies". This occurs when a
15

firm boosts its spending rate on technology development, thereby speeding up the rate 
of technological change, and hence increases the challenger’s required technology 
development requirement, which is amortised over a smaller base of sales. Further, 
Tactic (A) may take the form of ''’foreclosing alternative technologies" For instance, 
it may maintain a participation in alternative technologies by forming alliances with 
other firms, which possess expertise in alternative technologies, or it may license good 
competitors to employ alternative technologies.22 Moreover, Tactic (A) can consist in 
"tying up suppliers". Structural barriers increase, if a firm forecloses or limits a 
challenger’s access to the best sources of raw material or other inputs, whether this is 
brought about by backward integration or partial or complete ownership of such 
suppliers, or encouraging suppliers to customise their value chain to meet a firm’s 
needs. Finally, a firm may pursue Tactic (A) by "defensively pursuing 
interrelationships with competitors that a challenger may not match".
2.2 Complementary Products Strategy
The demand for a complementary product increases as the demand for the basic 
product increases. The demand for the complementary product increases as the selling 
price of the basic product decreases, and opposite. The same market rules apply to 
complementary services. In this respect, complementary products /  services may 
interrelate distinct industry segments. Strategically important complements are those 
that possess the following two characteristics: (a) they are or could be associated with 
each other by the buyer; and (b) they have a significant impact on each other’s 
competitive position. Thus if the buyer needs divert from the basic product, demand 
for its highly associated complement will drop. Such a complement may be a single 
product or service or a group of products or services. A complement will not be 
strategically important for a firm unless it has a material effect on the overall cost or 
differentiation of the group of related products or services.
Once strategically important complements are identified, the strategic issue 
arises for a firm to choose, first, whether it should supply complementary products 
itself or allow outside suppliers to provide some of them, and, secondly, how to
22 As regards what constitutes a “good” competitor, see M. E. Porter, ante. At p.212
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compete in the complementary products. In response to these questions, three 
important strategic practices have been developed: (a) control over complementary 
products -  offering a full range of complementary products rather than leaving some 
of them to be supplied by others; (b) bundling - selling a group of distinct but 
complementary products together only as a bundle, at a single price; (c) cross­
subsidisation -  selling one product at terms that deliberately promote the sale of 
complementary products.
2,2,1 Bundling
In simple words bundling means that all buyers are provided with the same 
package of products and services, regardless of differences in their needs. Therefore, it 
is not desirable unless it has some countervailing benefits that overcome the fact that 
it is sub-optimal for some buyers. In particular, bundling may be necessary when the 
interface among complementary products is not standardised. Compatibility among 
items in the bundle is facilitated, if the same firm provides the whole package of items 
needed jointly to meet the buyers’ needs. Besides, bundling may simplify the buyers’ 
shopping task by offering them a single point of responsibility for any defects, 
servicing and payment. One the other hand, bundling enhances the opportunity for a 
firm to exercise price discrimination and increase its total profits where different 
buyers have different price sensitivities for the individual parts of the bundle. “Mixed” 
bundling causes buyers to buy the whole bundle even though they would not buy all 
the parts individually, simply because the firm offers the whole bundle at a total price 
which is lower than the sum of prices of the individual items. Also, bundling carries 
the implication o f raising or increasing entry and mobility barriers by way o f forcing 
a competitor to develop capabilities in all parts o f the bundle rather than being able 
to specialise in one item. Moreover, there is not much incentive for competition 
among a group of bundled competitors since, if all competitors offer the same bundle 
and the only industry price is the bundle price, the ability to recognise mutual 
dependence among firms is higher. Notwithstanding the above, a bundled competitor 23
23 M. E. Porter, ante, at p.429
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will be vulnerable, if the advantages of bundling can be duplicated by focused 
competitors who form alliances among themselves.24
2.4.2 Cross-subsidisation
The underlying idea is to deliberately sell one product at a low profit or even a 
loss in order to sell more profitable complements and thus increase total profit. Cross­
subsidisation may also involve misallocating costs of less regulated businesses to the 
regulated one, where higher costs can be used to "justify" requests for higher rates. 
Hence, cross-subsidies pose anti-competitive effects whenever a regulated firm also 
operates in unregulated markets; but it is more likely to escape regulatory detection 
when markets are closely related.25
Conditions favouring cross-subsidisation include the existence of: (a) 
sufficient price sensitivity in the basic good so that discounting the basic good will 
increase its sales volume, and thereby more than recoup profit through the induced 
sales of the profitable, complementary good; (b) sufficient price insensitivity in the 
profitable good so that raising its price does not greatly reduce its sales volume, and 
thereby recoup profits lost from discounting the basic good; (c) strong connection 
between the profitable and basic good so that buyers cannot cherry-pick by purchasing 
only the low-priced basic good; (d) barriers to entry into the market for the profitable 
good. It is noted that insensitivity of demand to price in the profitable good is a 
function of the price it creates for the buyer and the threat of substitution for it; 
perceived or actual compatibility may connect the goods; the connection between the 
goods depends on the possibility of substituting for the profitable good.
For the purposes o f this thesis, it is important that the reader is aware o f the 
possibility that the object or the effect o f the SA is to facilitate the parents with 
exercising the practices o f bundling and cross-subsidisation.
24 see M. E. Porter, ante, at p. 430.
2i quoting from P.J.J. Wclfens & G. Yarrow, ante, at p.231

2 3  Technology Strategy
It is common ground that technological developments are one of the prominent 
drivers of competition and structural change in an industry. In turn, it is important to 
understand the Technology Strategy (“TS”) of competitors. TS is concerned with 
choices about which technologies to invest in, whether to seek technological 
leadership in them, and how to license technology. It is crucial for a firm to be in the 
position to forecast the path of technological change as an industry evolves. The 
technology in different value activities can be related: this underlies a major source of 
linkages within the value chain. Such linkages may exist with suppliers’ technology 
and buyer’s channels, too. A firm’s technologies may also be interdependent with its 
buyers’ technologies.
From a TS point of view, the crucial question is “when does technology affect 
a firm’s competitive advantage?’’. Competitive advantage will be affected if 
technology significantly determines the firm 's relative cost position or differentiation. 
For instance, this occurs where technological change itself lowers cost or enhances 
differentiation and the firm’s technological lead is sustainable. Pioneering the 
technological change may lead to a variety of advantages in cost or differentiation that 
remain even after its technological lead is gone. If the technological change is 
diffused, it can potentially improve the overall industry structure, and therefore, albeit 
it may not yield competitive advantage to any firm, it may affect the profit potential of 
all firms.
Firms often confront a choice between attempting to improve an established 
technology for performing a value activity or investing in a new one. Technologies 
seem to go through a life-cycle in which early major breakthroughs or improvements 
give way to later incremental ones. In fact, modest improvements to several 
technologies or sub-technologies involved in a value activity may add up greater 
competitive advantage than breakthroughs. It is not in the interests o f this thesis to 
elaborate any further on this, albeit it, admittedly, is an important issue. More 
important fo r  the purposes o f this thesis is to consider the reasoning underlying the 
choice-making o f a firm as to whether to seek technological leadership.
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Technological leadership basically refers to a firm seeking to be the First to 
introduce technological changes that support its generic strategies. Technological 
followership is taken to refer to the conscious and active strategy in which a firm 
explicitly chooses not to be the first on innovations.“6 It is suggested hy the author o f 
this thesis that this question should he examined in a wider context: the link between 
TS and DS o f  a finn. In Section 1.7 of this thesis, “foreclosure of alternative 
technologies” was cited as a form of the defensive tactic of “raising structural barriers 
to an industry”. It is submitted that “foreclosure of complimentary technologies" may 
serve equally defensive objectives. Finally, it is contended by the author of this thesis 
that the strategic choice between technological leadership and followership may 
trigger an alliance between firms where one firm decides to become a leader but lack 
the funds or capabilities to do so alone. It was already stated (in Section 1.7) that 
"concluding technology interrelationships between competitors” may have the 
defensive objective of raising entry barriers to potential competitors that cannot match 
such interrelationships.
In principle, the choice between technological leadership or followership is 
determined by the interaction of three factors: (a) the sustainability o f  the 
technological lead -  the degree to which a firm can sustain its lead over competitors 
in a technology; (b) the first-mover advantages -  the advantages a firm reaps from 
being the first to adopt a new technology; (c) the first-mover disadvantages -  the 
disadvantages a firm faces by moving first than waiting for others.
Arguably, technological lead can be sustained, if either competitors cannot 
duplicate the technology, or the firm innovates as fast or faster than competitors can 
catch up with. More precisely, the sustainability of technological lead can be 
described as a function of four factors: (1) whether the particular technology is being 
developed inside the industry or is coming from outside it; (2) whether the firm has a 
cost or differentiation advantage in performing technology development; (3) whether 
the firm has unique technological skills vis-à-vis competitors; (4) the rate at which the 
leader’s technology diffuses.
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First, where important sources of technology are external to an industry, for 
instance, where they come from suppliers, buyers, or completely unrelated industries, 
sustaining a technological lead is generally more difficult. External technology 
sources disassociates a firm’s access to technology from its technological skills and 
R&D spending rate, because getting access to such external developments is open to 
many other companies. “Technological leaders in industries with key external sources 
o f technology must capture the best o f those sources through coalitions or exclusive 
arrangements in order to sustain their lead, or have a superior ability to adapt 
externally developed technology to the industry. ” Secondly, a firm is more likely to 
sustain a technological lead, if it has a cost or differentiation advantage in performing 
technology development. Scale economies or learning effects give large-share firms a 
relative R&D cost advantage. A firm’s relative cost advantage may also be strongly 
influenced by the transference of skills or sharing of cost of R&D; hence, 
“technological leaders often aggressively pursue technological interrelationships, 
entering new businesses with related technologies. Thirdly, a firm with unique 
technological skills vis-à-vis competitors is more likely to sustain its technological 
lead. Technological skills are a function of, inter alia, management, culture, 
organisational structure and systems, company reputation with scientific personnel. 
Such skills influence the output from a given rate of spending on technology, 
regardless of scale, learning or interrelationship effects. Nevertheless, superior 
technological skills or cost advantages in performing R&D can be nullified, if 
competitors can easily copy what a firm develops. Diffusion may occur by way of 
direct observation by competitors o f a leader’s products and methods of operating; or 
by way of technology transfer through buyers, suppliers or vendors; or by personnel 
losses to competitors. The rate o f  technological diffusion is partly intrinsic to an 
industry and partly under a f ìn ti’s control. Successful technological leaders are thus 
aggressive in trying to slow down diffusion. To this end they often vertically integrate, 
building new or modifying old technology in-house.26 789
26 See M. E. Porter, ante, at p. 181
27 M, E. Porter, ante. p. 183
28 ibid, at p. 184
2I> ibid, at p. 186
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If a technological lead cannot be sustained, technological leadership can only 
be justified, if the initial lead translates into first-mover advantages. These allow a 
leader to translate a technology gap into other competitive advantages. They rest on 
the role of timing in improving a Firm’s position vis-à-vis sustainable sources of cost 
advantages or differentiation. The first mover grubs the opportunity to define the 
competitive rules. In particular, a first mover will be the first to serve buyers and thus 
establish a relationship of loyalty, enhancing the brand name and creating switching 
costs, thereby locking in later sales. Besides, a first-mover will define the standards 
for technology, forcing followers to adopt them. It will enjoy at least a temporary 
advantage in access to purchased inputs or other resources before the market forces 
reflect the full impact of the change it is pioneering. In any event, the first mover will 
preempt the ability of competitors to reposition or expand. Of course, the above 
mentioned advantages need be balanced against the first-mover disadvantages of 
uncertainty of demand, changing buyer needs, technological discontinuities and the 
cost of obtaining regulatory approval.
2 A  Horizontal Strategy
DS may be part of a broader Horizontal Strategy ("IIS") of a firm. HS 
coordinates the goals and strategies of distinct but interrelated business units 
competing in different industries; by analogy, it coordinates the goals and strategies of 
distinct but interrelated segments within an industry. It is founded on the assessment 
of a firm's competitive advantage in existing business units /  industry segments and its 
sustainability by selecting new industries / segments of industries to enter based on 
interrelationships with existing business units / industry segments. The formulation of 
a HS is nowadays becoming a must for firms as technology is breaking down barriers 
between industries and driving them together. At the same time that technology is 
creating interrelationships, it is also reducing the costs of exploiting them.
As more and more firms seek out, or are forced to, pursue interrelationships, 
there is an increasing presence of multipoint competitors. The latter comprise firms 
that compete with each other not only in one business unit or industry segment but
22
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rather in a number of related business units or segments. Where a firm has multipoint 
competitors, it ought to view its competitors across the board rather that at the distinct 
business unit or industry segment level because competitive advantage will be 
determined across the board. Most significantly, firms pursuing a HS identify 
potential competitors /  entrants in an industry with “those firms fo r  which that 
industry is: (a) a logical way to create or extend an important interrelationship; (h) a 
necessary extension to match the interrelationship o f competitors". 30
2.4.I  Segment interrelationships & Synergies
Industry segmentation is the division of an industry into sub-units for purposes 
of developing competitive strategy. Industry segmentation will be taken, for the 
purposes of the following analysis, to be broader than the familiar notion of market 
segmentation. The latter concept is concerned with identifying differences in buyer 
needs and purchasing behaviour, allowing a firm to serve segments that match its 
capabilities with distinct marketing programs. On the other hand, industry 
segmentation combines buyer purchasing behaviour with the behaviour of costs, both 
production costs and costs of serving different buyers. It addresses the question, 
"what segments o f an industry a firm  should serve and how it should serve them". 
Attention to segmentation from a strategic perspective is increasingly important as 
technology developments are altering the old rules of segmentation with implications 
for both firms adopting focus strategies to competition and those adopting broadly- 
targeted competitors strategies.
Defining an industry as a function of the range of products or services supplied 
and the range of buyers served, industry segmentation is an imperative, if one takes 
into account that differences amongst the products / services as well as amongst 
buyers may affect the weight of the competitive forces carried by each distinct 
combination of products / services and buyers. The competitive forces in issue are (a) 
supplier power, (b) buyer power, (c) threat of substitution, (d) threat of new entrants 
and (e) rivalry between existing competitors. Hence, industry segments stem from 
structural differences within an industry, whether these have been perceived by
30 sec M. E. Porter, ante. At p. 363.
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existing competitors or not. Thus, industry segmentation should include potential 
combinations of products / services and buyers as well as those combinations that 
already exist. To illustrate the aforesaid, the diagram that follows is employed:
Buyer
Variety
(b)
Product Variety (p)
Where S(b,p)
a segment of the industry, 
and ------ a competitive force.
Fig. Industry Segmentation
Identifying a new way of segmenting an industry can be a major opportunity. 
A Firm can design a focus strategy around a product variety, buyer group, channel or 
geographic subdivision that has not been previously recognized. A Firm that 
recognizes such a new segment, whether narrower or broader than the existing ones, 
can often gain a sustainable competitive advantage preemptively.
The attractiveness of a segment is a function of its structural attractiveness - its 
size and growth - and the match between a Firm’s capabilities and the segment’s needs. 
Rivalry in a segment involves both firms focusing exclusively on the segment and 
Firms that serve other segments as well. The structural analysis of a segment is usually 
influenced heavily by conditions in other segments, more so than the structural 
analysis of an industry is affected by other industries.
Segments are related where activities in the value chain can be shared in 
competing in them: hence, the concept of segment interrelationships.3! In simple 
words, strong interrelationships exist, if all competitors in one segment also compete 
in another. In other words, strongly related segments are those where the shared value 
activities represent a significant fraction of total cost or have an important impact on 
differentiation. It is noted that in most industries, the pattern of segment
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interrelationships is not symmetric: that is to say, some segments have stronger 
interrelationships than others. Strong interrelationships among segments define the 
cluster o f  segments a firm should serve. Besides, they may define the logical paths o f 
mobility fo r  firms in the industry from one segment to another.
Segment interrelationships may produce synergies where "the benefits of 
sharing value activities exceed the cost of sharing".31 2 Sharing value activities leads to 
the greatest benefit, if the cost of a value activity is subject to significant economies of 
scale or learning, or where sharing allows a firm to improve the pattern of capacity 
utilisation of the value activity. Sharing activities among segments is also beneficial 
where it increases differentiation in the value activity or lowers the cost of 
differentiation. The benefits of interrelationships amongst segments are offset by the 
costs of co-ordination, compromise and inflexibility in jointly serving segments with 
shared activities. The net competitive advantage of competing in multiple segments 
versus focusing on one or a few is a function of the balance between the advantages of 
sharing value activities and the costs.
Hence, the author o f  this thesis submits that when we appraise SAx which are 
conclude between competitors with strong segment interrelationships, it is important 
to look into whether any genuine synergies arise out o f sharing such 
interrelationships before dismissing the risk that they constitute pure tools to a 
defensive strategy.
2.4.2 Business Unit Interrelationships
There are three possible types of interrelationships among business units: 
tangible interrelationships; intangible interrelationships; and competitor 
interrelationships. Tangible interrelationships arise from opportunities to share 
activities in the value chain among related business units due to the presence of 
common buyers, channels, technologies and other commonalities. Intangible 
interrelationships involve the transference of management know-how among separate
31 this concept was enunciated by M.E. Porter, ante., at p.258
32 ibid.
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business units. Businesses that cannot share activities may nevertheless be similar in 
generic terms, such as in the type o f buyer, type of purchases, type of production 
process, etc. Competitor interrelationships stem from the existence of rivals that 
actually or potentially compete with a firm in more than one industry. These 
multipoint competitors necessarily link industries together because actions toward 
them in one industry may have implications in another. Competitor interrelationships 
may exist even in the absence of tangible and /  or intangible interrelationships, but 
they may also co-exist. A multipoint competitor may compel a firm to match a 
tangible / intangible interrelationship to avoid facing a competitive disadvantage. M. 
E. Porter clarifies that, bearing the aforesaid in mind, "synergy" is not only one idea, 
but three fundamentally different ideas -  thus, it is mistaken to refer to it as 
synonymous with, and to test it on the basis of, the competitive advantage accruing 
from intangible interrelationships, only.33 For the purposes o f this thesis, it is material 
to examine Competitor interrelationships and the synergies that may accrue from 
them. The other two types of interrelationships arc exposited in order to cover for the 
possibility that all three co-exist.
2.4.2.1 Synergy From Competitor Interrelationships
a. Multipoint Competitors In Related Industries
In examining the potential for synergy accruing from competitor 
interrelationships, it is material to distinguish between multipoint competitors in 
related industries and multipoint competitors in unrelated industries. The presence of 
four or more firms competing in two or more distinct industries is a strong, though not 
a perfect, indication that the industries are related.34 A firm's competitive advantage in 
any business unit that faces a multipoint competitor is more a function of its overall 
position in a group of related industries than its market share in any one industry 
because of interrelationships. This is so because competitive advantage in one 
business unit can be strongly affected by the extent of potential interrelationships with 
other business units in the competitor’s portfolio. Yet, the extent to which
33 ante., at p. 325
34 see M. E. Porter, ante, at p. 354.
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interrelationships are actually achieved is what determines their effect on competitive 
advantage, not the potential to share. Besides, when the related industries that are 
jointly contested do not overlap exactly, the comparison between a firm and a 
competitor must centre on the firm’s whole range of interrelationships relative to the 
competitor’s. Each shared activity must be analysed for the competitor as a whole, and 
compared to the firm’s cost or differentiation in that activity. Hence, the most 
strategic implication o f multipoint competition in related industries is that competitor 
analysis must encompass the competitor’s entire portfolio o f business units instead o f  
examining each business unit in isolation/ 5
b. Multipoint Competitors In  Unrelated Industries
Where a firm faces a multipoint competitor in industries that are unrelated, the 
strategic issues revolve around how actions in one business unit can lead to reactions 
in another and how equilibrium with the competitor can be reached in several 
contested industries. Multipoint competitors need more information about each other 
to avoid mistaken interpretations of moves. Destabilising events in one industry can 
spread to others. Competing in a number of industries opens up greater possibilities 
for signalling, making threats, establishing blocking positions, and taking reciprocal 
actions. For instance, a firm threatened in one industry might retaliate in another 
industry where its response will be more cost-effective; this may be the case where its 
market share in the industry wherein it retaliates is small. Apparently, it is wrong to 
assume, as between multipoint competitors, that each industry is a separate 
battlefield. In fact, the threat that a competitor can retaliate in several industries (and 
inflict a higher cost on a competitor) may also tend to deter a competitor from making 
a threatening move in the first place. A further stabilising factor in multipoint 
competition can be the asymmetry of positions of the competitors in the different 
industries. Such asymmetry reduces the risk that the high-share competitor in one 
industry will seek an even greater share, since it remains vulnerable to retaliation in 
the industry wherein it has a smaller share. Hence, multipoint competitors are viewed 
in their totality for the purposes o f formulating a corporate strategy vis-à-vis them. 35
35 See M.E. Porter, ante. At p.361; the emphasis is added by the author of this thesis.
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From a competitive advantage point of view, it is equally important to 
consider single-point competitors with different patterns of interrelationships. A 
competitor with a different pattern of interrelationships is both an opportunity and a 
threat. It is a threat because the competitive advantage gained through 
interrelationships cannot be easily replicated, since a firm may be not in the same 
appropriate group of industries or be able to match the interrelationships. A smart 
competitor with different interrelationships will attempt to shift the nature of 
competition in each industry in the direction that makes its interrelationships more 
strategically valuable than the firm’s. A competitor with different interrelationships 
might also attempt to reduce the ability of a firm to achieve its interrelationships. For 
example, a competitor may shift its strategy in a way that raises the cost of 
compromise, as described above, for the firm to achieve its type of interrelationships. 
Hence, the essence o f the competitive game between firm s pursuing different forms of 
interrelationships is a tug o f war to see which firm can shift the basis o f competition 
to compromise the other's interrelationships, or to enhance the value o f its own.
2.4,2,2 Synergy From Intangible Interrelationship
Intangible interrelationships produce competitive advantage if the 
improvement in cost or differentiation in the business unit receiving the know-how 
exceeds the costs of transferring it. But even where the benefits from transferring 
know-how far exceed the cost of transferring it, competitive advantage will not be 
produced unless the transference of know-how does take place, for example through 
interchange between managers or the personnel in the affected business units. It 
appears that more often than not personnel in the receiving business unit may be wary 
or unsure of the value of know-how from a ‘different’ industry and thus openly resist 
to receiving it. Business units with know-how may view it as highly proprietary and 
thus decline to transfer it. This implies that a formal conducive organisational setting 
is needed to sustain commitment to achieving intangible interrelationships. This is the 
reason why synergy may prove to be a disappointment to firms with an eye to this type 
of interrelationships.
c. Single Point Competitor With Diversified Interrelationships
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2.4.2.3 Synergy From Tangible Interrelationship
Tangible interrelationships may be divided into five sub-categories: (a) market 
interrelationships- they involve the sharing of primary value activities in reaching and 
interacting with the buyer, from outbound logistics to service; (b) production 
interrelationships - they involve the sharing of upstream value activities; (c) 
procurement interrelationships - they involve the shared procurement of common 
purchased inputs; (d) technological interrelationships - they involve the sharing of 
technology development activities throughout the value chain; (e) infrastructure 
interrelationships - they involve sharing such activities as financing, legal, accounting 
and human resources management.
Tangible interrelationships lead to synergies, if sharing lowers cost or 
enhances differentiation enough to exceed the costs of sharing. Sharing does not 
necessarily lower cost. It only has the potential to reduce cost, if a value activity is 
driven by economies of scale, learning or the pattern o f capacity utilisation. Sharing 
enhances uniqueness directly, if the shared activity is more valuable to buyers because 
it increases convenience. Whether the products sold to a common buyer are substitutes 
or complements can also affect the advantage of sharing market-related activities. For 
instance, offering substitute products to buyers can reduce the risk of substitution 
because losses in one product can be compensated in the other. Complementary 
products usually have correlated demand that facilitates the efficient utilisation of 
shared value activities and other practices such as bundling. Further, the net 
competitive advantage of a technological interrelationship will differ depending on the 
industry and strategies o f the business units involved.
Some light is thrown hereinafter on what constitute the costs of sharing, 
namely the cost of coordination, the cost of compromise and the cost of inflexibility. 
Coordination is necessary in areas such as scheduling, setting priorities and resolving
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problems. It involves costs in terms of time, personnel and money. Such costs differ 
widely according to the complexity of sharing. For instance, a shared sales force 
requires continual coordination whereas joint procurement may require nothing more 
than periodic communication to determine the quantity of a purchased input required 
per period by each business unit. Further, coordination costs vary in size in 
accordance with the size of the business units: the smaller the business unit, the higher 
the coordination cost is felt. The cost of compromise consists in the cost entailed by 
performing a shared activity in a consistent way, even though that may not be optimal 
for either of the business units involved. For instance, attempting to share a logistical 
system among business units producing products of widely differing sizes, delivery 
frequencies and sensitivities to delivery times may well lead to a logistical system that 
is inappropriate to any of the business unit’s needs. The cost of compromise is 
normally reduced if an activity is designed fo r  sharing than if previously separate 
activities are simply combined or if an activity designed to serve one business unit 
simply takes on another with no change in procedures or technology. The cost of 
inflexibility may take two forms: first, potential difficulty in responding to competitive 
moves and, secondly, exit barriers. Sharing can make it more difficult to respond 
quickly to competitors because attempting to counter a threat in one business unit may 
undermine or reduce the value of the interrelationship for sister business units. In 
addition, exiting from a business unit with no competitive advantage may harm other 
business units sharing an activity with it.
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3. Concluding Remarks: PART [ I  ]
• Competition is no longer for positioning; it is for manoeuvring whilst retaining a 
strong position.
• Hence a SA is all about developing future capabilities by means of sharing one’s 
strengths with another’s.
• X ’s strengths + Y’s strengths + Z’s strengths do not necessarily = Benefit for C 
(where C - Consumer).
• Rather, X + Y + Z may = no P (Potential Competitor of X, Y), no Pi.2 (Product, 
Price Choices that P would offer to C).
• How can we detect whether this is the strategic intent of X, Y,...?
Test: (a) is the activity of the SA, core to X ’s portfolio of activities? If yes, then;
(b) is X leading already in the relevant industry / or industry segment? If yes, then 
X wishes to defend against P (or Y, Z). Same test should be applied to Y, Z. If 
cither of them can be shown to intend to defend, then concerns should be raised. 
But concerns should also be raised, if the activity of the SA is peripheral to X’s or 
Y ’s or Z ’s portfolio of activities, whereas X, Y, Z are leading already in the 
relevant industry / industry segment. In such a case the strategic intent is to 
remain. The means employed to achieve this do not add to C’s welfare.
• Which other factors ought to reinforce the finding of a defensive strategic intent?
(a) the possibility that X, Y, Z may be aided with exercising bundling by means of 
the SA: this is a possible outcome where X, Y, Z have been potential competitors 
and they now decide to offer several products as a bundle and the only industry 
price is that bundle price; they can afford to do so not only because there is no 
competition amongst them any longer but also because they know that P will only 
enter, if P can develop capabilities in all parts of the bundle; this will only be 
possible if P can find other partners! Are there any potential partners left?
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(b) the possibility that X, Y, Z may be aided with exercising the practice of cross- 
subsidisation by means of the SA: this is a possible outcome where the product / 
service to be launched on the market is complementary to the products / services 
that X or Y or Z already offer, and the SA sells it at a low profit in the short term 
in order that the parents can sell their products /  services at higher profits; C is 
most likely to bite the cherry where, for instance, SA offers the infrastructure 
required for C’s enjoyment of the parents’ services!
(c) the possibility that the SA will give to X + Y + Z technological leadership, 
which will be sustainable, and thereby give them the ability to set the standards for 
technology and shape the consumption demand of C; this is problematic where X, 
Y, Z have been potential competitors on technological innovation and now, 
because of the SA, C is denied the opportunity to choose between the independent 
results from X’s, Y’s, Z’s innovation process.
(d) the fact that X, Y, Z operate in the same business unit but in different 
industries, e.g. where X is a TO and Y is a Broadcaster and the relevant business 
unit is that for network operation, i.e. infrastructure provision; or where X, Y, Z 
operate in the same industry but in different industry segments, e.g. where X is a 
fixed-line telephony service provider and Y is a mobile telephony service 
provider; this fact should raise concern where the SA is set up to create an 
economic link (interrelationship) between the industries or industry segments, 
respectively -  that is to say, where the industries or industry segments are not 
already interrelated; also where the SA is set up to increase the link between the 
industries or industry segments by bringing together multipoint competitors who 
enjoy common interrelationships.
(e) The fact that the SA brings together partners who operate in a highly regulated 
industry with partners who operate in a less regulated or non-regulated industry,
e.g. where X is in cable TV network operation, Y is in content creation and Z is in 
software development. This fact may enhance the prospects for X, Y, Z to exercise 
the practices described in paragraphs (a), (b) above.
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PART [ II ]
STRATEGIC CHALLENGES & STRATEGIC INTENTS 
IN TH E TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
4.1 Introduction
The reciprocity in the relationship between industry structure and strategic 
behaviour of the firms participating in that industry is a theme which has been, and is 
still being, replicated in the telecommunications sector. Significant restructuring by 
way of SAs has been witnessed in this sector in the geographic region of the European 
Union over the last ten years. Often academics, politicians, regulators and lawyers 
who commend on it, choose as their starting point the sector-specific regulatory 
package that the European Commission adopted with an eye toward liberalisation and 
hence the opening up of the sector to competition.36 They describe the transition from 
a natural monopoly situation to free and fair competition; also, the change of the 
pattern of the industry from a multi-domestic one to a global one.37 They usually 
depict the influence on this regulatory package of the divestiture of AT&T pursuant to 
the Modified Final Judgement, which was issued by the Department of Justice of the
36 The regulatory package includes the following European Commission Directives: The Terminal 
Equipment Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988, 1998 OJ (L 131) 73; The Telecommunications 
Services Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990, 1990 OJ (L192) 10; The Satellite Communications 
Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994, 1994 OJ <L 268) 15; Cable TV Network Directive 95/51/EC 
of 18 October 1995, 1995 OJ (L256); The Mobile And Personal Communications Directive 96/2/EC of 
16 January 1996, 1996 OJ (L 020) 59; The Full Competition Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996, OJ 
(L 074) 13. The reader should be familiar also with the European Commission Notice on “The Status 
Of Voice Communications On Internet Under Community Law And In Particular Under Directive 
90/388/EEC", in 1998 OJ (C 06) 4.
37 E.g. see Wolf Sauter, 1997, “Competition Law And Industrial Policy In The EU", Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, at p.165. The concepts "multidomcstic" and “global” arc used here in the sense that M. E. 
Porter, ante. Uses them; see section 1.7 of the thesis.
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Supreme Court in the United States back in 1982.38 They indicate that divestiture need 
be included in the European regulatory package.39
However, the author submits that, for the purposes of this thesis, we had better 
go through the developments, which have taken place in this sector, from the 
standpoint offirm s  rather than the regulators’ standpoint. The target is to reveal what 
strategic challenges the firms faced in anticipation of the impact of liberalisation on 
the structure of the industry and consequently on their market power and what 
strategies they could be foreseen to deploy in response. Moreover, it is important to 
keep in track what strategic challenges firms face since the 1st January 1998, the 
official date by which Member States have been directed to introduce full competition 
in their markets for telecommunications services.40
In line with this, it is suggested that the starting point, which is more 
appropriate for the purposes of this thesis, is to analyse convergence as the dynamic 
for industrial restructuring. Convergence as a phenomenon, which still evolves, 
throws light to the significant role that the competition for technological innovation 
plays for the entire telecommunications sector. It presents a challenge for existing and 
potential competitors. Indeed, one should address the question “what has the fear of 
the telecommunications operators (“TOs”) been in the recent years?” With hindsight 
one can say that they did not fear that liberalisation would allow any other firms to 
enter and compete with them, at all, on the provision of the existing markets of 
services, infrastructure or equipment; instead, they feared that liberalisation would
38 Sec further, P.J.J. Welfcns & G. Yarrow (eds.), 1997, ‘Telecommunications And Energy In Systemic 
Transformation. International Dynamics, Deregulation And Adjustment In Network Industries”, 
Springer; David E. M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, 1996, “Designing Incentive Regulation For 
The Telecommunications Industry”, The MIT Press & The AEI Press; Marccllus S. Snow, 1986, 
“Marketplace For Telecommunications: Regulation And Deregulation In Industrialised Democracies”, 
Longman.
39 Sec on this point, Arthur D. Little, “Cable Review -  Study On The Competition Implications In 
Telecommunications and Multi-Media Markets”, cited in Commission Communication Concerning The 
Review Under Competition Rules Of The Joint Provision Of Telecommunications And Cable TV 
Networks By A Single Operator And The Abolition Of Restrictions On The Provision Of Cable TV 
Capacity Over Telecommunications Networks, OJ (C 071) 004, of 07/03/1998.
40 See Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996, 1996 OJ (L 074) 13. Eventually the 
Commission decided that Ireland and Portugal could have the benefit of a derogation from this 
obligation and therefore the deadline for them was extended to the 1*' January 2000; Greece was also 
granted a derogation expiring on the 31st December 2000. The derogation was justified, in each case, on 
the ground that these Member States had less developed networks.
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allow other firms to gain an interest in investing in the development of alternative or 
complementary types o f services, infrastructure and equipment and thereafter in 
competing with them in new segments of the industry.
In fact, good strategic thinking would enable a TO to perceive this challenge 
not only as a threat but also as an opportunity. The factor determining where to draw 
the line proved to be the timing of taking action. If they acted before the completion of 
the liberalisation scheme, then they would enjoy first mover advantages. Any increase 
in capacity flowing from improvements in the existing technologies or the 
introduction of novel technologies would be allocated amongst them and if they 
decided to leave a portion for new entrants, that would still be controlled by them.
This leads us to the following point. How could they turn this challenge into 
an opportunity in the post-liberalisation era? By expanding their activities to “future 
markets”, including the digital pay-TV market, the market for technical and 
administrative services related to the operation of digital pay-TV, the dial-up Internet 
access market. What would be so interesting about these markets? The fact that 
consumers would need to acquire certain facilities that would be, literally speaking, 
essential for them in order to enjoy the services they paid for, albeit those facilities 
would not be legally speaking essential. On the one hand, switching costs would be 
involved on the part of consumers; on the other hand, competition law would not 
police possessing control over those facilities.41
What would be the cost incurred in taking such actions? The cost of 
compromising with the fact that they would need to ally rather than to go ahead alone, 
and consequently the cost of co-ordinating with their allies. Who should be their 
allies? Convergence is the guide!
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4.2 Definition o f “Convergence”
The term “convergence” eludes precise definition, but it is most often cited as 
bearing the following meaning: the ability of different network platforms to carry 
essentially similar kinds of services, or the coming together of consumer devices such 
as the telephone, television and personal computer. However, convergence of 
consumer devices is today much less real than network convergence.41 2 43 Besides, 
technical convergence ought to be distinguished from convergence in relation to 
content, which is less likely to happen.45 The result of technical convergence is the 
shift toward multimedia. Multimedia is taken to refer to services, which provide more 
than two kinds of data such as images, text, video and audio through the same 
apparatus and which allow viewers to interact with the data.
4.3 Convergence A s A Function O f Technological Developments
The Green Paper On Convergence has detected and revealed the technological 
developments that underpin the potential for convergence. The technology in question 
is subdivided in three categories: (a) digital technology; (b) network technology; (c) 
Internet technology.
4.3. I Digital technology
Digital technology supersedes progressively the analogue technology. It is 
admitted, though, that digitalisation will not be completed in the short to medium 
term. There is a not insubstantial number of Member States that still undergo a 
transitory phase. Having said that, crucial remains the potential for development of
41 This point will be elaborated further in Section 3.7 of this Part.
42 sec Green Paper On The Convergence Of The Telecommunications, Media And Information 
Technology Sectors And The Implications For Regulation (henceforth, "the Green Paper On 
Convergence’’), Brussels, 03/12/1997, COM(97) 623 final, at p.l
43 John Temple Lang, “Media, Multimedia And European Community Antitrust Law”, ch. 18 in Journal 
of International Antitrust Law And Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, at p.403, n.46. J. T. Lang 
adds that such type of convergence would be likely to lead to more complicated regulatory questions, 
such as “whether audiovisual content made available through telephone lines should be subject to media 
regulators”.
44 Sec Linsey Me Callum, “EC Competition Law And Digital Pay Television", February 1999 EC
Competition Policy Newsletter, p.4 at p. 10.
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digital source encoding and digital transmission. The ways in which audio-visual 
material is produced, delivered and consumed are evolving. Content is becoming 
"s c a le a b le The basic building block is the Motion Picture Experts Group ("MPEG") 
family of standards. Once encoded in this format, images may be modified, 
manipulated or transmitted in the same way as any other digital information: the 
networks handling such information are indifferent to whether they are image, sound 
or text.
Digital transmission is what opens up the possibility of delivering high-quality 
audio and video signals over a variety of different network infrastructures. Digital 
transmission may be carried over broadcast networks (whether satellite, cable) or over 
terrestrial (whether wired or wireless). When applied to broadcast transmission 
networks, the most significant impact of digitalisation is the immediate expansion of 
capacity in the form of, inter alia, distribution of many more channels, digital 
bouquets and thematic channels, near video on demand (NVOD) and pay-per view. A 
digital channel is inherently more flexible than an analogue channel, and therefore it 
can deliver services in the form of data, graphics, moving pictures or combinations of 
these. It is clarified that digital television shares these developments with digital radio: 
the latter offers exciting possibilities for the combination of radio and images or links 
to Internet sites which advertise and sell CDs.
4.3.2 Network Technologies
There are two main terrestrial network technologies: the wireline and the 
wireless technologies. Wireline technology transmits information across wires of 
various forms, including twisted pairs of copper wire, coaxial cable and fiber optics 
cable. A copper wire pair is considered to be a narrowband technology in that it is 
incapable of carrying a broadband signal in the absence of state-of-the-art 
compression methods. Thus, copper wires are capable of carrying only voice and 
slow-speed data traffic such as facsimile and standard communications software 
programmes. On the other hand, coaxial cable and fiber optics cable are known as 
broadband technologies because they are capable of carrying video signals, high 
resolution facsimile and other messages with high information content. High-speed
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networks based on optical fibres are capable, in combination with modem server 
technology, of operating cost-effectively in a virtual broadcast mode.
There appears to be a great interest in replacing narrowband with broadband 
terrestrial networks just as there is significant interest in replacing voice messages 
with higher data content messages. Already existing network technologies include the 
narrow-band Integrated Services Digital Network ("ISDN"), x-Digital Subscriber 
Loop ("xDSL") and Asynchronous Transfer Mode ("ATM"). The narrow-band version 
of ISDN was standardised over the last 30 years by TOs who wished to digitise the 
customer access network. xDSL refers to the current technology which exploits the 
existing telecommunications network copper-pair cable for high-speed data 
transmission.45 ATM is a high speed switching technology operating at a basic 
transport level and is capable of transporting telecommunications traffic of different 
characteristics (voice, data, video) over the same network.. It has been designated by 
ITU as the basis for broadband ISDN. The capabilities of these technologies are 
enhanced by the compression techniques implicit in the MPEG standards, allowing 
networks of limited transmission capacity to carry services previously considered 
possible only on sophisticated and more costly wide-band infrastructures.
Wireless technologies employ airwaves and transmit information across the 
wirewaves using satellite, microwave radio, cellular radio and, in the not too distant 
future, personal satellite communications services (PSCS). Satellite is known as a 
broadband technology because it can also carry messages with high information 
content, but its technical properties are more conducive to one-way applications, like 
telephone conversations. The geocentric satellite orbit is 22,300 miles above the 
surface of the earth; unavoidably, communications are subject to delays, which are 
problematic for interactive voice and computer applications.
The practical example of how fixed and mobile telephony networks are 
converging is only part of a wider trend towards the full integration of wired and
45 ADSL - where "A" stands for "Asymmetric" - runs typically at 1.5Mbps in the downstream direction; 
HDSL - where "H" stands for "High-Speed" - runs at 6MBps. Both of these arc now superseded by 
higher speed technologies.

wireless technologies, which is the key goal of the next generation of digital mobile 
communications systems.46 This will offer users a platform on which to receive a 
seamless set of voice, data, multimedia and audio-visual services wherever they are. 
Wireless local loop can offer a cost-efficient alternative to the existing copper wire. 
The fixed-mobile network convergence should allow users to access a consistent set 
of services from any fixed or mobile terminal via any compatible access point. In this 
new network environment, roaming agreements will have to be extended to different 
kind of networks, i.e. PSTN, cable TV, mobile networks, etc.47
In addition to mobile communications based on cellular technology, personal 
satellite communications services will be offering increased global mobility. This 
concerns both narrowband services48 and ("Internet in the sky”) broadband services.49 
Geostationary platforms (Astra, Eutelsat) are also moving into these new services. 
These satellite-based systems interworking with existing fixed or mobile networks 
will offer global coverage, particularly in remote or developing regions.
4.3.3 Internet Technologyso
The above mentioned network technologies have been superseded by higher- 
speed technologies, predominantly by the Internet Protocol ("IP") which may ride on 
top of transport protocols such as ATM. IP has developed into the de facto network 
protocol for the Internet. It is able to route and transport all the elements of a 
multimedia service (text, image, motion video and sound). IP is also used in Intranet 
products, providing an infrastructure for multimedia applications within a company or 
other closed user group. The Internet can best be described as a network of networks 
interconnected on an open basis using IP, usually running over transmission links
46 see Green Paper On Convergence at p.6: sec 1994 Mobile Green Paper, COM(94) 145 final, 27/4/94; 
and the Commissions Communications On Universal Mobile Communications, COM(97) 217, 29/5/97 
and COM(97) 513, 15/10/97.
47 sec Robert Verruc, Director General, DGXIII, European Commission in ''Telecoms liberalisation: 
Future Key Issues From The European Point Of View.", speech made at Verband Altcrnativcr Telekom 
- Nctzbclreiber (VAT), Third Forum, Vienna, 27/01/99, at p.9 The seminal shift between mobile and 
fixed has been most obviously borne out by the merger between Vodaphonc / Airtouch.
4!t eg. The services offered by the ICO, Iridium and Globalstar alliances.
4<) eg. the most advanced projects arc Europe-led Skybridge and US-led Tclcdesic.
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leased from TOs. The capacity of the Internet’s infrastructure increases rapidly: for 
instance, from 56kbit/s in 1986, it rose to 45 Mbit/s in 1993, to 155Mbit/s in 1996. 
The open non-proprietary approach to standards for the Internet has made it easy for 
companies to take advantage of, and build on, the advances made by others in the 
industry. For instance, it is argued that the rapid development of WWW ("World 
Wide Web") is due to the open approach to browser development taken by vendors 
such as Netscape, Microsoft and Sun.
Over time, the percentage of data traffic on networks is likely to substantially 
overtake the volume of voice traffic. In the medium term (3-5 years), this points to a 
shift away from circuit-switched services towards packet-switched networks which 
may increase competition in infrastructure services. The Internet has the potential to 
become the competitive platform fo r  many traditional services, be they public voice 
telephony or broadcasting, mainly because the use of the IP allows the integration of 
different services on the same network, which is much cheaper than running in 
parallel several networks (for example, voice telephony and cable-TV networks) and 
brings clear marketing advantages (i.e. package of services, one-stop-shopping, etc.).50 1 52
4.4 The Emerging Value Chain
The following diagram, observed vertically, from top to bottom so that it links 
the end product to the end user, is taken to represent the value chain emerging from 
technological convergence.'* The third ring of the value-chain, namely carriage and 
distribution, depicts technical convergence as it was analysed above.
50 For the purposes of this thesis, explaining why Internet technology is a dynamic for convergence
suffices. For a very detailed analysis of how Internet functions, sec Philip Ruttlcy, “EC Competition 
Law In Cyberspace: An Overview Of Recent Developments”, [1998] ECLR 186 
5tSec Robert Vcrrue, ante, (http://curopa.cu.int/comm/dgl 3/tcIccom!ib.htm)Bcyond traditional services, 
the Internet is also becoming an important platform for electronic commerce. According to OECD, on­
line business done at world-wide level is estimated to be worth close to $22 billion in 1997. It is 
forecasted that this figure could increase up to $270 billion by 2001-02 and $800 billion by 2003-05.
52Sourcc: www.anaIysys.co.uk 
See also the Green Paper on Convergence, at p. 2.
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4.5 Convergence As A Driver fo r  Industrial Restructuring
Gradually, technical convergence has become nearly synonymous with the 
phenomenon of network operators, that is carriers and distributors, tending to expand 
their business activities in one or more rings, along and across the value-chain. Karel 
Van Miert notes that "we have seen some gigantic partnerships, agreements and 
mergers springing up in Europe and the rest o f the world: on the one hand, between 
alternative or complementary networks, on the other hand between the content 
producers and packagers o f information and the carriage networks. The Internet 
could develop into a link between current networks and the digital delivery systems o f 
the future. The issue is to control the gates between the components o f the future 
systems. We must move towards multimedia without creating new communications
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super monopolies".53 At the same time, Paul Knott warns that "if multimedia is the 
future for telecoms, IT and entertainment rolled into one, TOs cannot afford to wait 
and see what the future holds or for other organisations to take the initiative; 
awaiting them is a price estimated to be worth ECU 800 billion in EU alone and by 
capturing 1-2% o f this could double the turnover o f  one of the larger European 
TOs".54 Herbert Ungerer highlights that, progressively, the challenge from 
convergence goes beyond the traditional telecom / media convergence debate: ”(t)he 
new Internet and e-commerce markets will link together telecoms /  logistics /  
distribution and financing, and often supply - he it production of goods, services or o f 
content. One may expect a wave o f new mergers and alliances during the coming 
months in these fields, as customers will want to have fu lly packaged services".55
There is consensus that the telecommunications services that will be provided 
over the next decade extend to an instantaneous combination of voice, data, and image 
services upon reasonable demand. Herbert Ungerer, acknowledging that the 
telecommunications sector is faced with a watershed' ns regards who will lead into 
the future (that is the traditional fixed, mobile or Internet), indicates that the 
marketplace seems to have already decided. According to investment banks nearest to 
the field, it is estimated that within two years the value of mobile assets will account 
for up to 30% of the valuation of telcos, Internet assets up to 28% and only some 40% 
will account for traditional telephone, even if telephone will still account for 60-70% 
of actual turnover. For the purposes o f this thesis, though, it is not as important to 
know who will be the winner but rather how the players along and across the value 
chain will go about winning. In order to give a full picture of the evolving playing 
field, the following diagram is employed.
see sopra., "Mapping The New Open Telecommunications Marketplace”, at p.5
54 see "Multimedia: Strategic Implications For Telecoms Operators", Paul Knott, April 1997, Analysys 
Publications, Cambridge UK
55 This view is expressed in "Local Loop Unbundling”, Keynote Address, London Business School, 
London, 14/6/99; at http://europa.cu.int/comm/dg04/spccch/1999/cn/sp9901 l.htin
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location O f The Major Players In The Value Chain & Interrelationships56 57
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It is suggested that one needs to look into the position of the 
telecommunications organisations (“TOs”) vis-a-vis broadcasters, electronic 
publishers, Internet service providers, content creators and software developers: "the 
horizontal taxonomy"51 At the same time, one needs to look into the capabilities of
56 Source: Squires, Sanders Depsey LLP and Analysys Ltd. This diagram is also exhibited in the Green 
Paper On Convergence, ante, at p.12
57 The author notes that due to the development of optical fibre networks and digitalisation in place of 
analogue signals, other players such as electricity and railway companies have entered the
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each player in content creation, packaging, service provision, infrastructure provision 
and terminal vending: "the vertical taxonomy
It is common ground that in the light of convergence, a firm ought to acquire 
good links to, and knowledge about the needs of, the customer or end- product / 
service user in order to gain a competitive advantage. Three broad alternative modes 
of acquiring the requisite links and knowledge are identified: (a) through pure market 
forces; (b) through inter-firm cooperation; (c) through development / vertical
ro
integration within the firm. ‘ The above diagram, which was cited in the Green Paper 
On Convergence, traces the already existing relationships or contractual links, as well 
as the potential contractual links amongst the players only vertically, for instance, 
Internet service providers and content creators, or TOs and terminal vendors. The 
limitation of what is depicted in the above diagram is, therefore, identified with the 
failure to trace already existing or potential links between players horizontally such as 
links between infrastructure providers, for instance, TOs and broadcasters, or links 
between service providers, for instance, TOs, broadcasters and internet service 
providers. In other words, the links, which are traced in the Green Paper, appear to 
assume that in response to convergence, players will opt for vertical integration or 
development internal to the firm. However, in reality, the mode of horizontal inter- 
firm cooperation has often been chosen as a response to technological convergence.
The author o f this thesis is mostly interested in revealing the strategic thinking 
behind the choice o f how to play the game in response to convergence. It is submitted 
that their choice shall reflect their strengths and weaknesses in the relevant business. It 
is reiterated that in Section 1.6 of Part [ I ] of the thesis, it was demonstrated that 
strategies underlying alliances are a function of (a) the significance of embarking upon 
an activity to the overall business portfolio of the prospective partner and (b) of the 
relative strength or weakness of that actor in the overall business. Thus, the major *58
telecommunications sector in so far as it concenrs network operation. However, mainly for the reason of 
consistency in analysis with the value-chain depicted in subsection 3.4, they are not mentioned in this 
diagram.
58For a detailed strategic analysis of these options on the basis o f real data, see Martin Fransman, 
"AT&T, BT and NTT: vision, strategy, corporate competence, path-dependence, and the role of R&D", 
Ch.14 in "Global Telecommunications Strategies And Technological Changes", 1994, G. Pogorcl (cd.).
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virtue of the above diagram resides in enabling the reader to see the strengths and 
weaknesses of each player and hence to predict possible strategic intentions.
By way of example, content creators may wish to ally with infrastructure 
providers; considering that provision of infrastructure is only peripheral to content 
creators’ business activity, it will prima facie appear that they wish to restructure their 
activities. Yet, it is more likely that their strategic intent is to control distribution and 
have direct contacts with customers: to share a strength possessed by the infrastructure 
providers. On the other hand, TOs may wish to go into content and interactive 
services, a core business activity of broadcasters, prima facie with an eye at generating 
profits for investment in infrastructure development where they arc primarily 
competent. If, to do so, they ally with broadcasters, a careful reading of their 
respective positions will reveal that the underlying strategic intent is defensive: to 
preempt potential competition in infrastructure innovation, and thereby to defend 
potential competition from the provision of new services, which arguably would have 
accrued from alliances of broadcasters with other players.
To conclude, for the purposes of analysing the parents’ strategic intent in cases 
of SAs driven by technological convergence in the telecommunications sector, it is 
important to bear in mind: (a) what is the relevant value-chain like (Section 4.4); (b) 
what is the relevant playing-field like (Diagram in Section 4.5); (c) which is the core 
competence o f each player (this point will be elaborated further from Section 4.6 
onwards). The reader is requested to keep this analytical framework in mind. This Part 
will not proceed with discussing real cases of SAs: this task will be carried out by Part 
[ III ] to this thesis which will seek to demonstrate, simultaneously, the extent to 
which European Competition law detects, and punishes, the defensive strategic intents 
of the partners to an alliance.
4.6 Liberalisation And TOs* Strengths
The diagram in the preceding sub-section illustrates that TOs possess a core 
strength in service provision and infrastructure provision. Apparently, the diagram 
does not distinguish between the incumbent TOs and those TOs who entered the
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market post-liberalisation: there exists an important difference in the size of the 
market power of these two classes of TOs, if the latter possess any market power at 
all! It is crucial to understand that an incumbent TO will tend to expand horizontally, 
for instance, through a SA with a broadcaster in order to eliminate competition 
arising not only from the size of that broadcaster but also from the (actual or potential) 
entry of another TO.
Nor does the diagram distinguish between the types of infrastructure: cable 
TV, satellite, terrestrial fixed or mobile. The competition related to each and every of 
these types of infrastructure is also important to grasp in order to assess realistically 
the “strength” of a TO. It is clarified that the extent to, and ease with, which their 
transmission capacity can be increased by means of digitalisation is not the same: 
hence, their competitiveness is also different.
To fill in the gap of the diagram cited above, one needs to recall why 
liberalisation in the European telecommunications sector was thought desirable. 
Liberalisation was envisaged to aid and enhance the process of convergence by 
introducing competition in the third ring of the value-chain, that is amongst the 
various types of networks for carriage and distribution of content.59
4.6.1 The Death o f Incum bent TOs As Natural Monopolists
The industrial structure that prevailed in the telecommunications sector up to 
the 1990s in the European Union was that of regulated national monopolies.60 This
59 This view is held by the author of this thesis. But the reader should note that “The Results Of The 
Public Consultation On The Green Paper On Divergence” [Com(97)623] were evenly balanced 
between those favouring competition in infrastructure provision and those favouring competition in the 
provision of services. This issue is inextricably linked to whether unbundling access to networks is 
necessary. For instance, Incumbent TOs argued that liberalisation was introduced to increase 
competition in infrastructure provision and thus unbundling the local loop would act as a major 
disincentive to investment in new infrastructure for all parties, incumbents and new entrants alike. On 
the other hand, those-favouring service-based competition argued that opening access to infrastructure 
is essential for the development of a large variety of information society content services. Having said 
that, the author should clarify that she does not share the Incumbent TOs’ argument albeit she shares the 
viepoint that liberalisation aimed at introducing infrastructure competition. .
“ P. J. J. Wei fens & G. Yarrow, ante., at p. 214, explain why state intervention (regulation) is necessary 
in “natural monopoly” markets: “...an unregulated monopolist would set an inefficiently high price, and 
therefore inefficiently low input. Even if competition were viable (if rivalry among firms would not be 
so intense as to reduce price to marginal cost and hence below average cost), competition in a natural
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industrial structure had been justified on the basis of a “natural monopoly " argument. 
A natural monopoly exists when it is less costly for a single firm than for several firms 
to supply any relevant quantity of the service. Therefore, natural monopolies arise in 
industries characterised by fixed costs that are large relative to the relevant market 
demand.* 61 Indeed, the provision of telecommunications services62 63was originally 
based on a stable technology that was developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century: analogue and copperwire. This technology required large investments in 
infrastructure. Besides, the service provided was a basic one and the industry was 
characterised by the positive externalities generated by the large number of 
interconnected users (network effect). Hence, a single network was perceived as 
optimal both from the perspective of the provider and the users of services involved 
on the rationale that with each additional user, the value of the service would increase 
and its cost would be reduced. * In each relevant national market, the TOs held a 
dominant position for the provision of transmission capacity for telecommunications 
services because they were the only ones with a public telecommunications network 
covering the whole territory of the Member State in question.
Alternative infrastructure was necessary for the development of data 
communications, value-added services and new services such as interactive television 
and video-on-demand as well as multimedia services (“the non-reserved services”).64 
In the light of the technological developments - in particular digitalisation, the 
introduction of fabric-optic cables and data-compression systems, alternative
monopoly industry would prevent full exploitation of scale economies. In theory, government 
intervention could increase efficiency: to fully exploit scale economies, the government might allow 
only one firm to operate, and require it to set a lower price and higher output than would obtain under 
no intervention.”
61 See P. J. J. Wei fens & G. Yarrow (eds.), "Telecommunications And Energy In Systemic 
Transformation. International Dynamics, Deregulation And Adjustment In Network Industries", 1997, 
Springer, at p. 214
“ Pursuant to Article 1 of Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28/6/90, "Telecommunications 
services" comprise "services whose provision consists wholly or partly in the transmission and routing 
of signals on the public telecommunications network by means of telecommunications processes, with 
the exception of radio broadcasting and television".
63 see Wolf Sauter for a description of the transition from the 'natural monopoly' situation to the 'open 
market' situation’; in "Competition Law And Industrial Policy In The EU", 1997, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, at p.165
64 By virtue of the Directive 90/388/EC, they were declared services non-reserved to the national 
telecommunications organisations. Member States were required to make the supply of such services 
subject to a licensing or declaration procedure subject to objective, non-discriminatory and transparent 
conditions
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infrastructure, such as cable TV networks and satellite, could be employed and hence 
any justification for a single network and a ”one-supplies-air situation was removed. 
Indeed, delay in the development of multimedia services in Europe was attributed, 
generally, to the restrictions that Member States imposed on the use of alternative 
infrastructure for the provision of those services and, specifically, to the restrictions 
on the use of cable TV networks.65
4.6.2 Attack From Operation O f Cable TV Networks
A "cable TV network" comprises any wired-based infrastructure approved by a 
Member State for the delivery or distribution of radio or television signals to the 
public.66 In fact, in many Member States, potential providers of multimedia services 
had to rely on transmission capacity ("leased lines") supplied by the
telecommunications organisations, which were often already engaged in the provision 
of such services, and hence competitors. Besides, the networks of the
telecommunications organisations, failed to meet all potential market demand for 
transmission capacity for the provision of such services.67 Hence, the mere obligation 
imposed on TOs to provide leased lines was not sufficient to avoid restricting access 
to the market in non-reserved services.68
It is essential to grasp the characteristics peculiar to the market for 
infrastructure.69 First and foremost, the market fo r  infrastructure is highly capital 
intensive. Taking into account the amount of investment needed to duplicate a 
network, there is an incentive to use the existing networks rather than to enter the 
market for provision of infrastructure, or to innovate: that is to say, high investment 
cost constitutes a potential barrier. Indeed, given the restrictions on the number of 
services which cable TV operators could offer, they often postponed investment in 
their networks and, especially, the introduction of optical-fibre which could be 
profitable, if they were to spread over a larger number of services provided. Secondly,
65 see para. 13 of Preamble to Directive 95/51/EC
66 this is the definition adopted in Article l(l)(b), Directive 95/51/EC
67 see Communication To The Council And The European Parliament On The Consultation On The 
Review Of The Situation In The Telecommunications Sector, of 28 April 1993, at p.5, point 2.
68 see para. 13 of Preamble to Directive 95/51/EC
69 see para. 13, Preamble to Commission Directive 95/51/EC
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asymmetry o f  information is a feature of the market. The telecommunications 
operators benefited from detailed information on telecommunications flows (such as 
the subscribers’ usage patterns and the price elasticity of demand in each market 
segment, such information being instrumental to target specific groups of users) which 
were not available to potential new entrants.
In response to the persisting reality in the market for high-capacity 
infrastructure, the European Commission directed that Member States should abolish 
all restrictions on the use of cable networks for the provision of telecommunications 
services. In compliance with this direction, Member States were further required to 
authorise the interconnection of cable TV networks with the public 
telecommunications network and abolish any restrictions on such direct 
interconnection by cable TV operators.70
Hence, the risk fo r  the incumbent TOs o f potential competition from  
alternative infrastructure operators and new services to which they should adapt their 
strategies. The MSG alliance is a classic example o f TOs adapting their strategies in 
anticipation to the realisation of this risk.71
4.6.3 Attack From Satellite Technology
Parallel to the regulatory reforms in relation to the operation of the cable-TV 
network, the European Commission aimed at introducing competition in the field of 
communications via satellite. At the time, there remained many Member States which 
maintained exclusive rights granted to the national public undertakings to engage in 
the importation, marketing, connection, maintenance of satellite equipment and in the 
provision of satellite communications services. The term "satellite communications 
services" encompasses services whose provision makes use, wholly or partly, of 
satellite network services. "Satellite network services" include the establishment and 
operation of satellite earth station networks; at a minimum, these services consist in 
the establishment, by satellite earth stations, of radio-communications to space
70 Article 1(2), Directive 95/51; further, see subsequent sub-scction of this thesis.
71 See Part [ III ].
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segment ("up-links") and in the establishment of radio-communications between space 
segment and satellite earth station ("down-links").72
Such special or exclusive rights were generally granted to the TOs that already 
enjoyed a dominant position in the provision of telecommunications services by 
making use o f terrestrial networks or to one of the subsidiaries of such organisations. 
Inevitably, they used to make their investment decisions with an awareness of their 
exclusive rights, which put them in a position to opt to give priority to terrestrial 
technologies: for instance, they would give preference to the development of optical 
fibre terrestrial links. "Satellite communications were used chiefly as a technical 
solution o f last resort" in cases where the cost of terrestrial alternatives were 
prohibitive or for the purpose of data broadcasting and /  or television broadcasting, 
"rather than being used as a fu lly  complementary transmission technology in its own 
right".73
The European Commission realised the need for allowing new entrants to 
exploit satellite technology and promote technical progress in the field. It decided that 
Member States should withdraw all exclusive or special rights limiting the number of 
organisations allowed to provide satellite communications services, provided the 
harmful interference between satellite communications systems and other space-based 
or terrestrial systems be avoided.74 Consequently, it directed the abolition of all 
existing exclusive rights in relation to satellite earth station equipment in so far as the 
essential requirement of "efficient use of frequencies"75 was satisfied. In turn, this step 
made it necessary to recognise the right to connect such equipment to the switched
72 NB: para. 17 of the Preamble to Directive 94/46/EC states that "the provision o f satellite network 
services fo r  the conveyance o f radio and television programmes is a telecommunications service" for 
the purposes of Directive 90/388/EEC. Instead, "voice telephony" via satellite, i.e. the direct transport 
and switching of speech via satellite earth station networks, is excluded from the "telecommunications 
services" for the purposes of Directive 90/388/EC. "Satellite earth station network" refers to the 
configuration of two or more earth stations which interwork by means of a satellite. See Article 2(l)(iv) 
Directive 94/46/EC.
73 see para. 14 of Preamble to Directive 94/46/EC
74 see para. 12 of Preamble to Directive 94/46/EC.
75 the avoidance of harmful interference between satellite communications systems and other space- 
based or terrestrial systems
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networks operated by the telecommunications organisations so that licensed operators
76could offer their services to the public.
Besides, at the time of issue of the Directive, the charges for using space 
segment capacity were still very high in many Member States because the capacity 
could be acquired only from the signatory for the Member State in question.76 7 Such 
exclusivity, permitted by some Member States led to a partitioning of the Common 
Market to the detriment of customers requiring capacity. To remedy this situation, the 
Commission required that Members ensure that any regulatory prohibition or 
restrictions on the offer of space segment capacity to any authorised satellite earth 
station network operator be abolished.78 79It was emphasized that "the best solution to 
avoid distortion o f  competition and to allow full use and best allocation o f the existing 
international, national and private space segment capacity would be to ensure that 
users obtain direct access to space segment capacity, while its providers should
JQ
obtain the right to market it directly to users".
Hence, the risk fo r  incumbent TOs o f potential competition in the fie ld  o f  
allocation and distribution o f a source, which becomes increasingly scarce as the 
demand fo r  it increases. The NSD alliance is a classic example o f TOs adapting their
RQstrategies to preempt such competition.
76 sec para. 9 of Directive 94/46/EC. See further, subsequent sub-section of the thesis.
77 Most of the available capacity is been offered by the International Satellite Organisations ("ISOs"), 
for example, Intelsat, Inmarsat, Eutelsat, Intersputnik.
78 see Article 2(3)(b) Directive 94/46/EC.
79 see "Towards Europe-wide systems and services - Green Paper On A Common Approach In The 
Field Of Satellite Communications In The European Community", COM(90)490 final, 20/11/1990. H. 
lingerer in "The Transformation O f The International Satellite Organisations - Some Aspects From A 
European Perspective" (speech published at httn://www,curopa.eu.int ) commented upon this step 
saying that "it was clear at the time, and it became clearer so during the subsequent period, that 
allowing International Satellite Organisations (ISOs) to act freely as commercial providers o f space 
segment, and to enter into competition with a growing number o f competitors in commercial fields, 
would require a fundamental transformation o f their Operating A g re e m e n ts .Restructuring of the 
ISOs took the form of privatisation. At the same time, Low Earth Orbiting Satellite systems and similar 
systems such as Iridium and ICO entered the market for space segment capacity. See "Market 
restructuring, alliances, mergers" - Satellite Communications - 6th Satel Conseil Symposium - 
Communications Satellites and Market Realities” by Dr Herbert Ungerer, 8/9/98, Paris.
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4.6.4 A ttack From Mobile Operators
It is interesting to consider the extent to which the core strength o f TOs in the 
operation of infrastructure and the provision of telecommunications services was 
affected by the introduction of competition from the mobile operators’ side. It is 
submitted that, gradually, competition from such operators will be disassociated from 
competition in the provision of telephony services; it will be seen to pervade in the 
field of multimedia, or TV-interactive, services as well.80 1
Initially, the Commission became concerned about two practices. First, some 
Member States had maintained exclusive rights for the provision of mobile telephony 
granted to the national telecommunications organisations, which already enjoyed a 
dominant position in creating the terrestrial networks. Secondly, other Member States 
restricted or disallowed the self-provision of infrastructure or the use of third party 
infrastructure, whilst they obliged mobile operators to use the leased line capacity of 
TOs for both internal network connections and for the routing of long distance 
portions of calls.
It was anticipated that in the former case, the investment decisions taken by 
the TOs, which enjoyed exclusivity, would be to prioritise fixed network technologies 
whereas new entrants would have the incentive to exploit mobile and personal 
technology, indirectly competing with fixed services, in particular as regards the local 
loop.
In the latter case, it was thought that, considering that the charges for leased 
line rental represented a substantial proportion of the mobile operators' cost base, TOs 
were enabled to have a considerable influence on the commercial viability and cost 
structure of mobile operators. Moreover, bearing in mind that the effectiveness of 
pan-European roaming for GSM relied on the widespread availability of addressed
80 See Part [ III ] of this thesis.
81 But note that at the moment cable TV networks are the ones can really be competitive in this field: 
“all other options such as wireless and satellite are still unable to reach the same interactive multi- 
media capabilities” ; see Dr H. Ungerer, “Infrastructure, Telephony And Competition: Developing 
Cable Networks Into Full-Scale Multi-media Networks -  Deregulation Features”, The Second World 
CATV Strategies Summit, 3/2/1999, speech available at Internet address http://www.curopa.cu.int.
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signalling systems, a technology which was not as yet universally offered by the TOs 
throughout the Community, the above mentioned restrictions on infrastructure was 
slowing down the development of mobile services. The Commission pointed out that 
to "to the extent that the competitive provision of mobile services is prevented because 
the telecommunications organisation is unable to meet the mobile operators demand 
for infrastructure or will only do so on the basis o f tariffs which are not oriented 
towards the costs o f the leased line capacity concerned, these restrictions inevitably 
favour the Telecommunication Operator's offering o f fixed voice services".*2
To remedy the situation in the former case, the European Commission directed 
the Member States to establish a licensing procedure within a reasonable time and in 
any case by 1 January 1998.82 3 It specified that Member States should give preference 
to the use of Pan-European standards in the area, such as GSM, DCS 1800, DECT and 
ERMES, in order to allow development and cross-border provision of mobile and 
personal communications services.84 856Of great significance is the explicit direction o f 
the Commission that, in adopting a licensing system in the context of the liberalisation 
of the market, Member States should take due account o f the requirement to promote 
investments by new entrants in these areas*5
In the latter case, it required Member States to lift the restrictions and grant, if 
requested, to the relevant mobile operators access to the necessary scarce resources to 
set up their own infrastructure including radio frequencies, on a non-discriminatory 
basis.87 Special and exclusive rights in respect of the establishment of cross-border
82 see para. 16, Preamble to Directive 96/2/EC
83 see Article 2{1), Directive 96/2/EC It highlighted that DECT was expected to provide an alternative 
to the existing local loop access to the public switched telephone network. Thus Member States were 
directed to establish a licensing procedure within a reasonable time-frame. The Commission explicitly 
stated that Member States should abstain from granting the TOs or any associated organisation a license 
for this mobile service.83
84 see para. 7 of Preamble to Directive 96/2/EC (n.47, ante.)
85 see para. 8, Preamble to Directive 96/2/EC. Thus the Commission explained that where a Member 
State would grant or had already granted DCS 1800 licenses, the granting of new or supplementary 
licenses for existing GSM or DCS 1800 operators should take place only under conditions ensuring 
effective competition. In particular, it directed that operators of GSM systems already present on the 
territory of a Member State should not be given priority to the granting of DCS 1800 licenses, if it 
could be shown that this would eliminate effective competition in particular by the extension of a 
dominant position.
86 see para. 15, Preamble to Directive 96/2/EC
87 see Article 3 Directive 96/2/EC inserting new Article 3c to Directive 90/388/EEC.
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infrastructure for voice telephony would remain unaffected by this Directive.
Hence the risk fo r  incumbent TOs o f potential competition from investors in 
mobile and personal communications technology and thereafter in mobile telephony 
with the consequence o f inflicting their main competence in fixed telephony services. 
The DT/FT/ENEL alliance reflects an attempt to preempt such competition even 
outside the TO s’ national market or else evidences the move towards convergence o f  
mobile and fixed  telephony.88
4,6,5 Attack On TOs* M ajor Strength: Voice Telephony
Albeit this Part of the thesis is interested mostly in identifying the avenues for 
potential competition with TOs, mainly as regards the provision of multi-media 
services, the author considers it necessary to refer to the opening up of "voice 
telephony" to competition in order to consider how the attack on the most traditional 
strength of TOs may have affected their strategic thinking. It was explained in the 
above sub-sections that the opening up of the market for infrastructure provision to 
competition was justified on the ground that new services, for which the TOs did not 
necessarily have the capacity, had to be developed. For TOs, this was not particularly 
problematic; it was still not difficult for them to exert their power / influence from one 
segment of infrastructure provision onto another or to deny access to their network 
which was essential for other infrastructures to run. On the other hand, introducing 
competition even in the area of services with which TOs were predominantly engaged 
could constitute a turning point. Especially because alternative infrastructure 
operators, which, so far, were single-point competitors, could now turn into multi­
point competitors.
"Voice telephony ” was defined as "the commercial provision fo r  the public o f  
the direct transport and switching o f  speech in real-time between public switched
88 See Part [ III ] of the thesis.
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network termination points, enabling any user to use equipment connected to such a 
network termination point in order to communicate with another termination point".89
The abolition of exclusive and special rights over the provision of voice 
telephony was envisaged to allow the current TOs from one Member State to directly 
provide their service in other Member States.90 Simultaneously, the HU 
telecommunications market opened to the US and the foreign telecommunications 
industry. To facilitate the advent of a competitive environment rather than the 
strengthening of a dominant position by the TOs in their home market, it was directed 
that new entrants should be granted free choice as regards the infrastructure required 
for the provision o f their services. It was explicitly warned that "reserving to one 
undertaking which markets telecommunications services the task o f supplying the 
indispensable raw material, i.e. the transmission capacity, to all its competitors would 
be tantamount to conferring upon it the power to determine at will where and when 
services can be offered by its competitors, at what cost, and to monitor their clients 
and the traffic generated by competitors, placing that undertaking in a position where 
it would be induced to abuse its dominant position".91 As a result, the Commission 
directed that Member States allow voice telephony providers to use their own and / or 
any alternative infrastructure of their choice.92
Hence the presence o f multipoint competitors in related industry segments.
4.6.6 Attack From Internet Technology
In the meantime, due to the development o f specific software it became 
possible to code, compress and transmit voice communications in such a way that it 
was viable to send them via the Internet to other Internet subscribers using the same or 
interoperable software and via gateways to standard telephones. This technological 
development has created the challenge of whether a new service, namely "Internet
89 Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996, published in OJ L 074, 22/03/96 P.0013
90 This should take effect as from 1 January 1998. With the exception of Greece, all EU Member States 
have by now fully liberalised their telecommunications sector.
91 see para.7, Preamble to Directive 96/19/EC
92 see Article 2, Directive 96/19/EC.
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telephony " need be recognised; whether such a service has already been dealt with 
under the head o f voice telephony which is now liberalised; and, whether such service 
should be regulated in the same framework as that applied to traditional provision of 
voice telephony. The European Commission detected the above development and it 
issued a Notice93 dealing with the questions identified above. The Notice considered 
situations where users are connected to the Internet via public switched (fixed) 
network termination points in order to communicate.94
With this focus, three distinct categories of voice communications making use 
of the Internet were identified by the Commission, from the user’s standpoint: first, 
computer to computer voice services - voice communications transmitted via the 
Internet between the PC of one user and the PC of another, both users having 
modems, compatible software, loudspeakers and microphones to communicate; 
secondly, computer to phone voice services - voice communications transmitted via 
the Internet between a PC of one user (with modem, software, loudspeaker and 
microphone) and another user using a traditional telephone connected to the public 
switched network (PSTN); thirdly, phone to phone voice services - voice 
communications transmitted via the Internet, but between users who both are using 
telephones connected to the PSTN, i.e. part of the communication is transmitted via 
packet means using Internet protocols instead of fully via the national and 
international PSTNs.
Pursuant to the definition of voice telephony * in Directive 90/388/EEC, voice 
communications on the Internet could only be considered as voice telephony, if each 
of the following criteria were met: (a) the communications are the subject of a 
commercial offer - i.e. the transport of voice is provided as a separate commercial 
activity with the intention of making a profit; (b) they are for the public; (c) they are 
from and to PSTNs; and, (d) they involve the direct transport and switching of speech
93 on the "Status Of Voice Communications On Internet Under Community Law And, IN Particular, 
Under Directive 90/388/EEC", published in OJ No. C 6 of 10/1/98, at p.4
94 The Notice does not consider the situations where the Internet is only used to dial up a call-back 
operator in order to set up a telephone call via the Public Switched Network (PSTN). Note, however, 
that if the call-back operator also provides, in addition to switching, direct transport of speech on own 
or leased infrastructure, then it will fall within the category of Voice Telephony providers: see footnote 
(2) to the Notice, ante.
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in real time. In conclusion, the Commission emphasized that, for the time being the 
Internet voice services could not be considered as Voice telephony’, and therefore they 
should be taken to have fallen within the liberalised regime even before the deadline 
set fo r  the implementation o f fu ll competition. It warned that the situation must be kept 
under review in the light of technological and market developments. In addition, it 
clarified that applications which allow, for example, stored data (such as Web Pages, 
e-mails or voice mails) to be retrieved in spoken form  are considered to be new 
multimedia services, notwithstanding the voice element within the overall service.
Thus, in principle, the risk o f potential competition imposed by Internet 
technology on TOs could be dated back to 1990. However, it is only recently that TOs 
have deployed their strategies in apprehension o f that risk. The 
Telia/Telenor/Schibsted alliance is an example.95 96This is not to say that they were late 
in any sense. It rather points out that they could afford that because o f their control 
over the public telecommunications network on which Internet access is based.
4 J  Access Control: The Strategic Challenge
The most important ring of the value-chain for the purposes of understanding 
the incentives for concluding SAs in the telecommunications sector -  especially in the 
post-liberalisation era - is the “access control” ring.
Set-top box, Local Loop
CA, API, EPG ADSL modem
What creates a strategic challenge in this context is the existence of a 
regulatory asymmetry: 96 access rules have been set only for telecommunications 
networks, such as the interconnection and open network rules;97 on the other hand, no
95 See Part [ III ].
96 This asymmetry was detected by the Green Paper on Convergence, ante., p. 17.
97 Reference to these rules was made in Section 4.6. “Interconnection” basically ensures that users can 
contact any other user and service providers can contact those users on fair, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate terms.
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access rules have been prescribed for the infrastructure used for broadcasting activities 
and albeit a framework of access rules exists for conditional access systems in relation 
to digital television, it does not apply to all types of digital services; further, even 
though the principles are broadly similar, the competition rules that are designed for 
access to the telecommunications networks are not the same for conditional access
98systems.
The author wishes to clarify that it is not within the scope of this thesis to 
discuss about whether the rules that are currently applicable to telecommunications 
and digital television conditional access infrastructures should be applied universally 
in the sectors affected by convergence in relation to every type of access channel. 
Rather; it is within the interests o f  the thesis to stress that such regulatory asymmetry 
constitutes a strategic challenge and a potential driver fo r  alliances between those 
controlling any o f those access channels.
On the one hand, where market players control the access to the customers 
either through ownership of the local loop or through control of conditional access 
technologies, they are able to discriminate in favour o f  their own services]; on the 
other hand, where the controlling player is required by law to grant access either to the 
local loop or to a conditional access system, that player will negotiate the terms of 
access as a matter for commercial agreement between market actors -  regulation does 
not go as far as to stipulate the terms of such agreements — and thus it has the chance 
to make its competitors aware o f and exert upon them, its stronger bargaining power. 
Hence, it is strategically attractive to extend one’s control over as many types of 
access channels as possible.
The reader should be able to discern the underlying strategic interest in 
concluding more and more interrelationships with those who control access channels 
outside one’s industry, as the technological convergence brings distinct industries 
closer and closer. To this end, the author will proceed on with demonstrating which 
are the access channels of significance for the purposes o f delivering convergence- 98
98 This point is made out by J. T. Lang, “Media, Multimedia And European Community Antitrust Law”, 
ante., p.439, footnote 110.
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driven services to consumers; and, simultaneously, which are the market players who 
control them.
4.7.1 Access To The Local loop
Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector led to the emergence of a 
distinct market, namely the market for access to facilities which are necessary for the 
provision of the liberalised services." In this sense, access can relate to a number of 
situations, including the availability of leased lines enabling a service provider to 
build up its own network, or interconnection to the public switched 
telecommunications network: physical access. In addition, a service provider may 
need access to other facilities in order to make end-users aware of its services: for 
example, access to directory information.
This brings us back to the question “has liberalisation been an effective attack 
on incumbent TO s* strengths?”. Where an industry emerges from a long period of 
strict regulation, it is likely that certain firms will inherit some of the advantages 
which arise out of special or exclusive rights granted previously. Thus it is not 
surprising that the incumbent TOs "control access to infrastructure on which 
competitors may have to rely, if they are to enter the market without undue 
handicap."9 100 The problem is that the incumbent TOs may be tempted to resist 
providing access to such infrastructure to third-party providers or other network 
operators, particularly in areas where the proposed service will be in competition with 
the service provided by the TO itself. The question arises whether the access provider 
should be obliged to contract with the service provider in order to allow the latter to 
operate on a new service. What is the legal position on this?
99 See para. 45 of the Commission Notice on the application of Competition Rules to Access 
Agreements, 1998 OJ (C 265) 002.
100 EC Commission, 21st Report On Competition Policy
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In principle, incumbent TOs should provide access to a new service provider 
where there are no commercially feasible alternatives to the access being requested.101 10234
The access to the facility in question must be “essentiaf  * for companies to compete on 
that market. It will not be essential merely because the position of the company 
requesting access would be more advantageous, if access were granted; refusal of 
access must lead to the proposed activities being either impossible or seriously and 
unavoidably uneconomic.
Considering that law can go as far as that point, the Commission 
acknowledged that in relation to the market of access, the Incumbent TOs will remain 
dominant for some time after liberalisation has taken place. Even where restrictions 
are lifted, competition in downstream markets will continue to depend upon the 
pricing and conditions of access to upstream network services that will only gradually 
reflect true competitive market forces. Besides, the incumbent TOs are enabled to 
sustain their dominance as long as they are not required to divest their interests in 
alternative infrastructure and as long as they are not required to unbundle the local 
loop;105 both of these regulatory gaps allow them to retain a firm bottleneck control on 
competition in the local loop.106
101 The principle was derived from the transport field mainly. The Commission relied also on the 
precedents of the ECJ in, inter alia, the following cases: Case 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents v 
Commission [1974] ECR 223; Case 311/84, Telemarketing [1985] ECR 3261; Case C-260/89, Elliniki 
Radiophonia Tileorassi [1991] ECR 1-2925.
102 For a very insightful presentation of the “essential facilities” doctrine, please refer to T. Cowcn 
(1995), “The Essential Facilities Doctrine In EC Competition Law: Towards A ‘Matrix 
Infrastructure’.”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute.
103 Sec para. 91, Commission Notice On The Application Of The Competition Rules To Access 
Agreements In The Telecommunications Sector -  Framework, Relevant Markets And Principles, 1998, 
OJ (C 265) 002-028.
104 See para. 89 ibid.
105 Indeed, some Member States granted to the same TO the right to establish both cable TV and 
telecommunications networks, thereby putting that TO in a situation where it had no incentive to attract 
users to the network best suited to the provision of the relevant service, as long as it had spare capacity 
on the other network. On the contrary, it had an interest in overcharging for use of the cable 
infrastructure for the provision of services other than voice telephony, in order to increase the traffic on 
their telecommunications networks (see para. 18, Preamble to Directive 95/51/EC). In a recent review 
concerning the joint provision of telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator, the 
Commission announced its intention to issue an amending directive requiring the legal separation of the 
cable television companies from telecommunications companies, (see CABLE REVIEW, Commission 
Communication published in O.J. C 71, 7/3/1998, p.4)
106 Dr Herbert Ungerer pleads this himself in his speech of 14th June 1999 on “Local Loop Unbundling” 
at London Business School; available at Internet address http://www.curopa.eu.int/comm/dg04/spcech . 
In conclusion, even though, by August 1998, a total of 526 network operators had been licensed to offer 
network services (192, national; 256, international; rest, local network services), the figures do not
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Unbundling the local loop entails the separate provision of access to the 
switch and to the copper wire: this allows alternative operators to use only the copper 
wire of the incumbent, to invest in their own switching equipment and thus bypass the 
switching infrastructure of the incumbent.* 107 108 Thus unbundling would allow 
competitors to invest in infrastructure which would upgrade the narrowband copper 
telecommunications network to broadband capability. At present only some 
Member States allow local loop unbundling, under specific conditions.109 In Germany, 
it is compulsory to grant competitors access to the local loop but the National 
Regulatory Authority (“NRA”) has not taken any final decision on the prices for the 
provision of customer access lines: interested parties identify this as a serious barrier 
to competition in the local loop. In Denmark legislation for unbundling the local loop 
came into force as from 1 July 1998. In the Netherlands, if competitors are unable to 
reach an agreement with KPN Telecom to obtain unbundled access, a decision may be 
requested from the telecommunications authority (“OPTA”). In Finland unbundling of 
the local loop was enforced legally in 1997 and competition has evolved well. In 
Sweden, the PTS is currently considering unbundled access to the local loop. In the 
United Kingdom, OFTEL has historically not mandated local loop unbundling for 
basic telephony because it was not viewed as helpful to network competition and also 
because there has been no demand for it in relation to such services. Nevertheless, it 
has launched a consultation on local loop unbundling in relation to the market for 
higher bandwidth services.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is interesting to note that the asymmetric 
pattern of regulation in the European Union provides the dominant TO in a Member 
State which directs unbundling of the local loop with the ability to form a SA with a 
TO which is dominant in a Member State where the local loop is still bundled, to the 
effect that the former TO is able to cross-subsidise its operations in the former State
necessarily reflect any diminution in the market share or market power of the incumbent TOs. The data 
on market impact from liberalisation is given by Annex 1 to the 4th Report on The Implementation Of 
The Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM (1998) 594 final, 25/11/98.
107 Kevin Coates, 1998, “Competing For The Internet”, published at the Internet address 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/DGIV/speech/eight/en/sn980xx.htm at p.5 of 10.
108 Ibid.
109 The following data was given in Annex 5 to the 4th Report on The Implementation Of The 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM (1998) 594 final, 25/11/98.
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through the monopolistic profits in the latter State. The same pattern was witnessed in 
relation to national markets still insulated from voice telephony competition and 
markets where full-competition had already taken place such as the U.K. and 
Scandinavia. T. J. Ramsey concludes that this should not only be seen as a strategic 
challenge for the TOs in the former States to conclude alliances with TOs in the latter 
States, but also as an issue for the Directorate-General for Competition (“DGIV”) of 
the European Commission: whether to subject strategic alliances ahead of the 1998 
deadline for Full Competition to its rules in order to prevent the individual anti­
competitive practices of incumbent TOs.no
4.7.2 Set-top box
In the case of digital pay-TV services, digital distribution requires, on the 
user’s side, either a set-top box along an analogue TV receiver or a fully integrated 
digital TV set. From a technical point of view, a set-top box is nothing more than a 
computer system with the main purpose of decoding digital into analogue signals. It is 
equipped with a conditional access system (“CA”), which prevents unauthorised 
signals from corrupting the decoder population and rendering it unaddressable. A CA 
system is the technical means by which content and service providers can recoup their 
investment either through subscriptions or charges for individual consumption.10 11 An 
electronic programme guide (“EPG”) and application programme interface (“API”) 
allowing the supply of interactive services are normally also required. EPGs represent 
the electronic “zappers” of the future, guiding viewers through a myriad of digital 
television programmes and channels.112 In other words, the EPG is a navigation 
system which lists channels and services and via which viewers are able to tune to 
different data signals, and thus to change channels or services. In contrast to browsers, 
EPGs are linked to the information accessed via them. Thus, exclusive arrangements
110 See (1995) “The EU Commission’s Use Of The Competition Rules In The Field Of 
Telecommunications: A Delicate Balancing Act”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute p.561
111 There are several conditional access systems available in Europe including SECA, Nabravision, 
Mediaguard, Videocrypt, Irdeto and Viacess. See further, J. T. Lang in “Media, Multimedia And 
European Antitrust Law”, ante, at p. 441
112 See Green Paper on Convergence, ante., p.24
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tying EPGs to particular services constitutes the unilateral firm  practice o f  bundling. 
The Application Programming Interface (“API”) is a set o f software in the consumer’s 
home terminal, resembling the operating system of a PC. It is used to manage 
interactive applications, including EPGs, carried by the terminal, and to provide a 
specified interface for the development of applications by third parties. There are a 
number of different APIs used in set-top boxes in Europe. The combined use o f  
proprietary APIs together with EPGs and conditional access may also constitute the 
unilateral firm  conduct o f bundling in so fa r as there is no particular technical reason 
fo r  tying them together.
The question “can television decoding systems be essential facilities to which 
competitors are entitled to have access” has been raised many times in Europe, but 
not directly in any complaint to the European Commission. It is up to the National 
Competition Authorities to rule upon it. The starting point of the proponents for an 
“essential facilities” treatment of these systems is that to establish a system for 
decoding pay-television signals requires a huge investment, and the company doing it 
has to persuade a large number of households to buy or to rent such relatively 
expensive equipment. Once this is done, it becomes uneconomic, or at least too risky, 
for any second company in the Member State to launch a competing system, and 
anyway the first one has an unbeatable first mover advantage. The counter-argument 
runs like this: a competitive advantage is not the same as an essential facility. The 
condition for recognising an essential facility rests on whether a normal reasonably 
efficient competitor following an appropriate strategy could be expected to provide an 
alternative facility or system itself. The mere fact that start-up losses are likely, the 
capital costs are large and the return on capital is delayed, is not in itself enough to 
create a duty to give access. In principle, if a reasonable owner of the facility who had 
no interest in any downstream operation would have a substantial interest, acting 
rationally, to refuse access, the owner is entitled to do so.
Eventually, the “Advanced Television Standards” Directive set out a 
regulatory framework for conditional access to digital television services, based on a 
requirement for those operating such systems to offer broadcasters technical services 
on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis. However, if  one addresses itself to
63
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the question “who might be interested in obtaining access?”, he / she discovers that 
in the television market there is, in addition to broadcasters, another distinct group, 
namely cable TV network operators who might be interested in access to such 
technical infrastructure. Hence the Advanced Television Services Directive creates a 
regulatory asymmetry by giving rights only to digital broadcasters: 1,3 this does not 
include analogue broadcasters;13 14 nor does it include cable TV companies, on the 
ground that the latter should not be regarded as broadcasters because they merely 
transmit programs they receive or obtain from outside their cable networks.1,5 Indeed, 
how different are these two categories? A broadcaster transmitting an encoded 
programme must arrange somehow for households to have decoders to sec its 
programmes. It thus needs access only to a suitably programmed decoder. A cable TV 
company, needs also access to programmes, and so it must have access specifically to 
the decoder of the broadcaster of those programmes.
It should be inferred from these facts that a cable-TV operator who wishes to 
enter the market fo r  pay-TV has a strong strategic interest in allying with a 
broadcaster. Further, considering that a digital broadcaster has one competitive 
advantage as regards the set-top box technology, but still needs to build on all the 
other capabilities that an analogue pay-TV broadcaster would already have, it is not 
surprising that cable-TV companies ally with analogue pay-TV broadcasters in order 
to create jointly the technical infrastructure for digital pay-TV and to offer jointly 
digital pay-TV services.
Another regulatory asymmetry, which has been created by the Advanced 
Television Standards Directive resides in the fact that it does not guarantee access to 
CA systems for the provision of interactive services, which albeit they are not 
television services as such, they may still have an important impact on the profitability
113 Article 4 of European Parliament And Council Directive No. 95/47 on the Use Of Standards For The 
Transmission Of Television Signals (“The Advanced Television Services Directive’’). 1995 OJ (L28I) 
051 directs: “Member States shall take all the necessary measures to ensure that the operators o f  
conditional access services, irrespective of the means of transmission, who produce and market access 
services to digital television services offer to all broadcasters, on a fair, reasonable and non­
disc riminatory basis, technical services enabling the broadcasters’ digitally-transmitted sen-ices to be 
received by viewers authorised by means o f decoders administered by the senice operators, and 
comply with Community competition law, in particular if a dominant position appears. ”
1,4 See J. T. Lang, ante, p.390.
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of cable companies and other carriers of television services in the near future.15 16 This 
asymmetry constitutes another strategic challenge fo r  alliances.
Even more interesting is the fact that the Directive applies only to CA systems: 
not to other similar kinds of facilities such as the API, the EPG, or the verifier 
system.117 It thereby creates a strategic interest for digital broadcasters in bundling 
CAs with proprietary APIs and EPGs. If they do so, they can get the benefits of both 
worlds. On the one hand, they have the first mover advantage entailed by being the 
first to exploit the technology for CA systems; they can sustain that advantage because 
of, first, the high investment cost that becomes a disincentive for competitors, and 
secondly, the access rules which recognise the first mover’s right to refuse to provide 
access to the EPG and API. On the other hand, considering that EPGs are linked to the 
information accessed via them, they enjoy the benefit of exploiting any other 
advantage they have in relation to access to content. From this last point, it can be 
inferred that there is a strategic interest in bundling the components o f a set-top-box 
and in allying with content producers or with market players who are in an 
advantageous position in respect with access to content.
4.7.3 AD SL modem and Navigation Systems
The provision of Internet services has created a distinct market for Internet 
access. Essentially, enjoying Internet services requires having a dial-up account with 
an “Internet Access Provider (“IAP”).118 This means that the user’s computer is 
connected via a modem (normally, a credit-card like piece o f hardware inserted into 
the computer) giving access to the Internet through the standard telephone network.119 
Hence the same principles apply here as with access to the standard telephone
115 ibid.
116 ibid.
1.7 ibid.
1.8 Dial-up Internet access consists essentially of the supply to subscribers of an Internet address, 
provision of the relevant software to enable messages to be sent and received in the correct electronic 
format used for Internet traffic, and connectivity, i.e. access to all other networks which together make 
up the Internet. See Case No. IV/JV. 1 -  Telia /  Telenor / Schibsted, para 17.
1.9 Alternatively, the end-user may have access to the Internet by means of a dedicated private line 
(dedicated access).
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network by any other service providers. Perhaps, more interesting is the fact that 
technology for that network is constantly improving in response to the Internet Service 
Providers’ demand by new entrants for faster access to the local loop.720 Their 
objective is to introduce xDSL technologies which multiply by 100 the capacity o f a 
twisted copper pair traditionally used in the local loop. The demand for fast access is 
also a major driver of backbone investments, potentially stimulating the wide-scale 
deployment of ATM switching.
Once the user has accessed the Internet, he faces the need to receive as much 
content as is possible. Browsers (e.g. Netscape, Microsoft Explorer) and search 
engines (e.g. Altavista, Yahoo), both known as navigation systems, are tools for 
exploring Internet web pages. Browsers do their job not on the user’s personal 
computer, which is linked to the network, but instead on a “host” computer. It is these 
host computers that are the true nerve centres of Internet access. Competition between 
browsers is thus fierce. Browsers give the user a selection of search engines. These are 
enormous compilations of information which is constantly updated. Access to search 
engines is free as search engines rely on advertising revenue to display or flash pre­
paid advertisements on the user’s screen. Browsers and Search Engines are inherently 
independent: that is to say, they are able to explore the Internet web pages without 
tying themselves to particular sources of information or to any particular operating 
software or hardware. If, therefore, browsers are packaged together with other 
software or as an integral part o f other software, this constitutes purely the unilateral
i'll
firm conduct known as bundling.
So the asymmetry in this context is that whereas there is free access to search 
engines and browsers, Internet access is not free as far as it involves the 
telecommunications network. The principles which were described in sub-section *12
,2t> for instance, Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN) and Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line 
(ADSL).
121 It is important to remember that, the user’s computer needs to run an operating system or software 
which is capable to organise the information accessed and / or retrieved and to respond to other 
computers communicating with it. Providing the software for computers has grown into a huge market: 
examples o f competing operating systems are Microsoft’s DOS (Disc Operating System), Microsoft’s 
windows and Unix. IBM’s OS/2 Warp did not manage to prevail over Microsoft’s programs.
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3.7.1 above still apply. Hence, the strategic challenge fo r  TOs to conclude alliances 
which bring them in the fie ld  o f  Internet-related services.
4.7.4 Access To Content
Expansions in the means of delivery brought about by improvements in 
technology and by convergence may shift the bottleneck from carriage and delivery to 
content. Shortages of content could inhibit new market entry and with it competition 
and innovation.122 Consider the Internet: it is a global information exchange vehicle. 
Content providers are the key players on the Internet as far as the ordinary user is 
concerned.123 Content can be real-time or downloadable. Real-time content is data that 
can be assessed, as if it were communicated at the same time as the user who is 
assessing it. A “discussion” taking place between Internet users takes place in real 
time because it is occurring as the users access the Internet. It is this type of content, 
which creates the major problems as it demands constant provision of data while the 
discussion continues. Then consider pay-TV: its success depends on the availability of 
a programme portfolio big enough to make it easy to create a variety of different 
specialised packages of programmes targeted at particular groups.124 125
It is very interesting to note that there is no regulation in relation to access to 
content. As a general rule, arrangements between content providers, rights’ owners 
and content carriers are a matter for commercial agreement. Exclusive agreements 
between content providers and content carriers may limit consumer choice by 
excluding access to content provided by competitors, especially until there is effective 
competition in the provision of delivery channels to the user. Thus possession of 
rights to key content such as major sporting events, may give market players particular 
commercial power. Hence the strategic challenge fo r  concluding alliances not 
necessarily with content providers but rather with any other market player well
122 See Green Paper On Convergence, ante,, p. 15.
123 see P. Ruttley , ante, held in his article at p. 189.
124 This is confirmed by the Commission* decision in the MSG case.
125 ibid., at p. 25.
125 This Thesis does not intend to go into any depth on issues related to rights to televising sports 
events, televising the catalogue of a film studio and the issues related to the protection of such rights. 
For a very good analysis of this, please refer to J. T. Lang (1997) pp. 377-448.
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positioned as regards content access. That is to say, TOs need not integrate vertically 
with Content Providers; they can ally with broadcasters either at the level o f  
infrastructure operation or at the level o f  service provision, so that they can defend 
competition at those levels and, simultaneously, cure their weakness at the content 
provision level through sharing the broadcasters’ strengths in content access.
4,8 Concluding Remarks: P A R T [ I I ]
•  In Part [ I ] the author concluded that competition is no longer about positioning: it 
is for manoeuvring whilst sustaining a leading position. The author submitted that 
many SAs are founded with this intent. A test was suggested for the purposes of 
identifying whether the parents’ intent is indeed defensive. This requires to 
identify, first, the potential avenues for manoeuvring: hence, the emerging value- 
chain specific to the telecommunications sector was identified (Section 4.4). The 
ability to manoeuvre depends on the actual and potential competitors’ position: 
hence the playing field, reflecting the sector-specific value-chain, was identified 
(Section 4.5). It became apparent that there is multipoint competition in the sector: 
this necessitates that competitor analysis must encompass each competitor’s entire 
portfolio of business units:127 hence the pattern adopted for depicting the playing 
field. Sustaining a leading position while manoeuvring is a function of the existing 
capabilities or strengths. Of particular interest to this thesis is to detect the TOs’ 
intents when concluding alliances, and therefore their strengths in each and every 
business unit or industry segment are analysed in detail (Section 4.6). The reader 
was addressed to the strength that is specific to incumbent TOs (Section 4.7.1).
•  Further, the author concluded in Part [I ] that there are certain factors which ought 
to reinforce the finding of a defensive strategic intent.
(a) the possibility that the parents may be aided with exercising bundling by 
means of the SA: hence Section 4.7.1 referred to bundling of the local loop,
127 This was the conclusion in Section 2.4.
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Section 4.7.2 revealed the potential for bundling the components of a set-top 
box and Section 4.7.3 referred to the potential for bundling Internet search 
engines with other software o f the user’s terminal. Normally these are 
unilateral firm practices which can however be implemented for the joint 
profit of the parents within the SA.
(b) The possibility that the parents may be aided with exercising the practice of 
cross-subsidisation by means of the SA: hence, Section 4.7.1 highlighted the 
potential for such a practice in the light of asymmetry in the implementation of 
liberalisation in the Member States of the European Union in two respects: 
before the 1st March 1998, in the context of voice-telephony competition; since 
the 1st March 1998, in the context of local loop unbundling.
(c) The possibility that the SA will give the parents technological leadership, 
which will be sustainable and will entail first-mover advantages: hence, 
Section 4.7.2 analysed the situation in relation to the development of technical 
infrastructure for digital pay-TV and the principles governing access to it by 
competitors.
(d) The fact that the SA brings together a firm which operates in a highly 
regulated industry with a firm operating in a non-regulated industry: this theme 
ran through Section 4.7.
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PART [ III ]
INSTRUMENTS OF EC COMPETITION LAW 
FOR THE CONTROL OF SAs
5.1 Introduction
This Part will examine the legal instruments available within the array o f 
European Competition law, which could be applied for the purposes of assessing 
cases of SAs. It need be stated that since a distinct concept of SAs has not been 
recognised by European Competition Law so far, the legal instruments which appear 
to be most relevant are those applicable to joint ventures. Of most interest in the 
context of SAs are the legal instruments applicable to full-function joint ventures 
("FFJV”), since it is more likely than not that the allies will choose this institutional 
form for their alliance in order to render it stable and durable enough.128 The notion o f 
FFJV is employed by the EC Commission to confer the meaning of a distinct legal 
entity set up to perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a 
lasting basis.129 European Competition rules in relation to FFJVs have changed over 
the years. Merely an outline of their evolution suffices for the purposes of this thesis.
Until the Is* March 1998, a FFJV was presumed to be a concentration falling 
within the ambit of Article 3(l)(b) of the EC Merger Regulation (“ECMR”) Council 
Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989. This presumption could be rebutted by the 
EC Commission, if it could prove that the creation of a FFJV, had as its "object”, or 
entailed as an “effect”, "the co-ordination o f the competitive behaviour amongst the 
undertakings which remained independent130", (hereinafter, “the behavioural
128 This point is deducted from Section 1 of the thesis.
129 See Commission Notice On The Concept Of Full-Function Joint Ventures Under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 4064/89 On The Control Of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1998 OJ C 66. Para. 12 
explains that, to that effect, the JV must have a management dedicated to its day-to-day operations and 
access to sufficient resources including finance, staff, and assets (tangible and intangible).
1301.e. amongst the parents of the JV or between the JV and its parents
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aspect”)}*1 A finding of such a behavioural aspect was taken to affect the very 
essence of the JV: even if it were set up to perform all the functions of an autonomous 
economic entity on a lasting basis, it would not be classified as a concentrative FFJV; 
it would be held to be equivalent to a cooperative arrangement between independent 
undertakings, and therefore it would altogether be assessed under Article 81 (ex 
Article 85) of the EC Treaty. Many differences in relation to the procedural rules 
being applicable were entailed by such classification.13 32 For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, it is more interesting to note the difference in the substantive test 
which would apply following that classification.
If it were classified as a cooperative FFJV, its effects would be assessed 
pursuant to Article 81(1) EC.133 Hence, the European Commission would look into 
whether “the object or effect o f the joint venture is to restrict appreciably competition 
between the undertakings concerned and, in turn, to affect trade between M ember 
S t a t e s If the SA were classified as a concentrative FFJV, its effects would be 
assessed pursuant to Article 2(2),(3) EC Merger Regulation (“ECMR”); hence the test 
would be whether "the concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position  
which significantly impedes competition in the Common market”.
The underlying rationale for this distinction between concentrative and 
cooperative FFJVs, over and above the distinction between FFJVs and partial- 
function JVs, was repeatedly challenged.134 The ECMR was eventually amended 
pursuant to Council Regulation 1310/97 of 7 July 1997. Since the 1st March 1998, the 
European Commission distinguishes merely between full-function and partial- 
function joint ventures. The approach it adopts is as follows. Upon finding that a 
FFJV has been created, the ECMR ‘dominance test’ is applied to assess the effects 
resulting from the fact that such a joint venture brings about a change in the structure 
of the undertakings concerned, that is to say the parents. If it is found that such a FFJV
131 See Article 3(2) of the ECMR.
132 For a very detailed analysis of these differences, please see F. E. GonzaIc2-Diaz, 1999, “Joint 
Ventures Under EC Competition Law: The New Boundaries“, not yet published.
133 The same test would apply to a partial-function joint venture.
134 Inter alia, by: Barry Hawk, “Joint Ventures Under EEC Law”, Fordham International Law Journal, 
1991, Vol. 15, p. 303; Pathak, “The EC Commission’s Approach To Joint Ventures: A Policy O f
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presents the behavioural aspect which was analysed above, only that behavioural 
aspect will be assessed under Article 81 EC. This is expressly dictated by Article 2(4) 
ECMR as amended.
The author welcomes the elimination of the distinction between cooperative 
and concentrative FFJVs. It constitutes a meritorious change in so far as it appears to 
appreciate that the behavioural aspect of a FFJV does not reduce the ability of such a 
JV to bring about a significant degree of economic integration, and therefore qualify
•  135as a concentration.
Having said that, the author wishes to review the European Commission’s 
decisions in the MSG, the NSD, the BiB cases and the Telia/Telenor/Schibsted, the 
FT/DT/ENEL and the NC/Canal+/CDPQ/ BankAmerica cases.* 13536 The review aspires 
at revealing whether we can safely rely upon the existing methodology of the 
Commission for the purposes of assessing cases of SAs. In particular, the following 
issue is addressed: the extent to which the model for detecting the strategic intent o f 
the parents that was suggested in Part [ I ] of the thesis and discussed further in Part 
[ II ], has been, already, either explicitly or implicitly employed by the European 
Commission. The author is of the opinion that it is worth exploring this question 
against the fact that Karel Van Miert, former Competition Commissioner, proclaimed 
that the Commission, in examining alliances, does embark upon detecting whether the 
underlying strategy of the alliance is a defensive one.137
In the concluding remarks to Part [ I ] it was clarified that the alliances which 
should raise serious concerns (and thus demand an insight into the strategic intents 
and the plausible strategies for their achievement) are those concluded between
Contradictions”, [1991] 5 HCLR, p. 171; Barry Hawk, “A Bright Line Shareholding Test To End The 
Nightmare Under The EEC Merger Regulation”, [1993] CMLR 30.
135 Gonzalez-Diaz, ante, at p. testifies this himself.
136 All the decisions which have been chosen for the purposes of this review relate to cases of SAs set 
up in the telecommunications sector. The author hopes that such choice enables the reader to build on 
the points made in Part [ I ] and put in context in Part [ II ].
137 "In principle, we take a positive attitude towards new vertical and horizontal partnerships and 
ventures, so long as we can be convinced o f the real synergies and benefits which should form the 
underlying logic fo r these moves. I f  on the other hand it looks more like a defensive strategy to sew up 
markets and shut out competitors, then the competition rules must be used without hesitation to block
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Ileading firms. Hence, the review examines the extent to which the HCMR test of 
“dominance”, which is based on “market power”, looks into all the strengths of the 
parents, in all of their portfolio activities: this was a central component of the model 
for identifying the strategic intent.
Besides, in Part [ I ] the reader was invited to address itself to the instrumental 
role that a SA can play for the advancement of its parents’ defensive strategic intent. If 
the reader is prepared to accept that the behavioural aspect of a FFJV actually reflects 
the instrumental role a SA can play for its leading parents, is it not wrong to dismiss 
the risk that the co-ordination of the firms’ competitive behaviour is intended to 
create or strengthen a dominant position? The author suggests that we reconsider 
whether “tf is good enough to assess the behavioural aspect separately, under Article 
81, rather than as a factor to be taken into consideration when applying the ECMR 
"dominance” test on the structural effects brought about by the creation o f the 
FFJV”. If the reader objects to applying a structure-oriented test to mere 
behavioural patterns, then he /  she is invited to consider whether Article 82 (ex Article 
86) of the EC Treaty ought to be the second-best alternative, and thus to assess 
whether the co-ordination of competitive behaviour is equivalent to abuse of the 
parents’ dominant positions.
Frequently, a JV agreement stipulates by way of an ancillary restraint that the 
parents will not compete any more in the activity for which they set up the alliance. 
Therefore when the Commission is confronted with the task of assessing a subsequent 
alliance between them, it finds that there cannot be any co-ordination of their 
behaviour in their activities outside the scope of this subsequent alliance since they 
are, by virtue of the ancillary restraint in the previous alliance, not competing anyway. *138
the agreement", see "Mapping the new open telecommunications marketplace", by Karel Van Miert, 
IIC Telecommunications Forum, Brussels, 7/7/97.
138 The author challenges the EC Commission and the EC Council for failing to take a chance which 
was open to them when the ECMR was amended. In F. E. Gonzalez-Diaz’s own words, “(t)he 
immediate consequence o f this modification o f  concentrative joint venture would normally have been 
to subject all full-function joint ventures not only to the procedures o f the Merger Regulation but also, 
and most importantly, to the dominance test. However, neither the Commission nor the Council wanted 
to go down this route. In order to prevent the exclusive application o f  the dominance test to full- 
function joint ventures, the Commission thus proposed to insert a new paragraph 4 to Article 2 o f the 
Merger Regulation..." (Gonzalez-Diaz, 1999).
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This brings the author to the ultimate issue: the extent to which we should take the 
“non-competition” between the parents (ancillary restraint) as a factor adding to the 
market power o f the parents. The author submits that we ought to detect when the 
market power of a market player increases by way of its participation in a network of 
alliances which exclude or prevent competition from its potential competitors.
5.2 Full-Function Joint Ventures & Strategic Intent
5.2.1 Creating Or Strengthening A Dominant Position
Article 2(1) ECMR provides that “concentrations shall he appraised with a 
view to establishing whether or not they are compatible with the common market". 
Article 2 (3) ECMR provides that a concentration “which creates or strengthens a 
dominant position as a result o f which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded in the common market or in a substantial part o f it" shall be declared 
incompatible with the common market.
The innovative point about the ECMR in the European legal order resided in 
the fact that it does not only prohibit the strengthening of a dominant position, but 
also the creation of a dominant position. This feature is very useful in so far as it 
entitles us to look into the position of the JV -  as a distinct full-function entity -  and 
evaluate whether it will enjoy a dominant position itself, and further, we are entitled to 
see whether the setting up of the JV will create a dominant position for its parents or 
strengthen their pre-existing dominance. Thus, in principle, the ECMR aides us with 
assessing whether the strategic alliance is an instrument for its parents, Nevertheless, 
it remains a matter of debate whether we can control joint dominance or at least 
whether the ECMR is the proper legal instrument for controlling the creation or 
strengthening of jo in t dominance of the parents or the parents and the JV.139 Having 
noted that, it is outside the scope of the thesis to indulge into that debate.
139 See the ECJ decision on this issue: Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France v Commission [1998] 4 
CMLR 829 on appeal from the EC Commission Decision in Case IV/M.308 Kali and 
Salz/MdK/Treuhand [1994] OJ (LI86) 38. The ECJ, adopting a teleological approach, held that the 
issue of joint dominance does fall within the ambit of the ECMR.
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“Dominance” is a structural concept and refers specifically to market power in 
the market investigated.140 Thus the Commission will consider ‘dominance’, only 
after having defined the relevant product and geographic markets.141 The classic 
definition of dominance was enunciated by the European Court Of Justice (“ECJ”) in 
the United Brands case: "a position o f economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently o f  
its competitors, customers and ultimately o f its consumers”.142 Thus dominance is 
bound to encompass both features specific to the structure of the relevant market and 
the behavioural feature of the “economic strength” or “market power” of the firm in 
question.
In Europe, “market power” is generally defined as “the ability to raise prices 
above long run marginal cost without significant loss in demand” or else, in less 
definite terms, as “power over price and other components o f  bargains”.143 In the 
United States, the classic definition of market power refers to the ability o f a firm or 
group of firms to raise prices profitably by reducing their own output.144 The 
economic theory underlying the need to control market power is reflected in that
140 Peter Crowther, (1996) “Product Market Definition In EC Competition Law: The Compatibility Of 
Legal And Economic Approaches, JBL, p. 177
141 See European Commission Notice On The Definition Of Relevant Market, 1997 OJ (C 372) 03. A 
relevant product market is taken to comprise “all those products and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable with, or substitutable for, the product in question by the consumer by reason of the 
products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use”.141 Interchangeability is assessed in terms 
of product characteristics, price and intended use. Substitutability is assessed as a function both of 
demand and supply conditions. Geographical market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas 
because of conditions are appreciably different in those areas (Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche v 
Commission [1979] ECR p.461). Homogeneity of conditions is interpreted predominantly in terms of 
trade barriers, consumer habits, transport costs and, a factor which recurs in the cases that will be 
reviewed hereinafter, linguistic differences. Further, conditions must be homogeneous enough for the 
economic power of the undertaking concerned to be able to be evaluated (See Case 27/76 United 
Brands Co. v Commission [1978] ECR 207). It is submitted that the identification of the relevant 
market for the purposes of assessing dominance should reflect the markets in which the parents to the 
alliance are active, if possible reflecting their entire portfolio.
142 Case 27/76 United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207; [1978] 1 CMLR 429, 
para. 38. The concept of ‘dominance’ had been employed already within the gulf of EC Competition 
law when the ECMR was first adopted. Thus, Richard Whish, ante., at p.717 stated that “case-law 
under Article 86 is clearly o f importance as to the meaning o f the term “dominant position ”.
143 Valentine Korah, 1997, An Introductory Guide To EC Competition Law And Practice, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing) p.8
144 Posner R., 1976, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perpective, p.8.
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definition. It is a fundamental premise of a Perfect Competition market that the 
quantity produced is exactly as much as the consumers are prepared to consume and 
thus the price equals marginal cost. In such a market the firm is a price taker. 
Allocation of resources is optimal. On the other hand, when a firm acquires market 
power, it becomes a price maker. It has the possibility to raise prices and restrict 
output, arranging production in a way that maximises its profits. As a result, some 
consumers who are prepared to pay more, will buy the product at a higher price, while 
others will not buy it at all. Unsatisfied customers represent a loss in consumer 
welfare. That loss is the economic cost of market power.145 146
Progressively, there grows a school of thought in the United States which 
argues that the focus of the “classical” market power enquiry is too narrow. According 
to that school, we should go on to assess the “exclusionary” market power: “the 
ability to exclude competition through cost-raising strategies “ because “some firm s  
that are unable to raise price solely by reducing their own output may nevertheless 
acquire or exercise market power by raising the costs or reducing the output o f their 
competitors“.146 The author contends that this perception o f the concept of market 
power is more appropriate in the context of assessing the market power of strategic 
allies. Indeed, the defensive strategies that were described in Part [ I ], are mainly 
aimed at sustaining one’s leading position by increasing the costs of potential 
competitors to the extent that it is no longer attractive for them to enter the market or 
to reposition, thereby excluding any potential competition.
Besides, the author suggests that the two definitions of the market power need 
not be read as if they are mutually exclusive but rather as complementary: that would 
resolve the ambiguity problem with the classic definition of ‘dominance” which R. 
Whish has detected. He highlighted that the definition contains two elements -  the 
ability to prevent competition and the ability to behave independently -  without 
explaining precisely how these two ideas relate to each other: “Does the Court mean
145 Schereer & Ross, 1990, “Industrial Market Structure And Economic Performance”, Houghton 
Mifflin, ch.2.
146 An adherent to this school of thought is Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 1986, “Anti­
competitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power Over Price”, 96 Yale L.J. 209.
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that they are cumulative, that is to say, that both must be proved? Or, is one idea 
parasitic upon the other, in which case which is the parasite?” 147
Furthermore, the author argues that the “exclusionary” capacity of market 
power is even more consistent with the notion of dominance that the ECMR seeks to 
prohibit. Albeit it is agreed that, as Frank L. Fine148 points out, “the ECJ’s definition 
o f dominance does not suggest that dominance shall entail the actual elimination o f  
competition; on the contrary the Court suggested that dominance does not preclude a 
lively competitive struggle”, it has been clarified already by Giuliano Amato149 that it 
is Article 82 (ex Article 86) EC Treaty which punishes that type of dominance. The 
remedy of a prohibition of a concentration pursuant to the ECMR was sought to 
address the difference between a dominant firm, which faces some competition, 
notwithstanding that it may be weak and a dominant firm, which enjoys an exclusive 
position (i.e. it does not face any competition at all any more, or it is not likely to face 
any competition in the reasonably foreseeable future because of contractual 
aggregation). In brief, it is foreclosure of the market that the ECMR prevents.
The author submits that the factors, which the European Commission appeared 
to consider when measuring the relevant undertakings’ market power, so far reflected 
the classical definition of market power. This thesis aims at revealing which other 
elements may be worth considering in the light of “exclusionary” market power.
The starting point for the assessment of market power has naturally been the 
market share of the undertakings concerned in the relevant market. Large market 
shares may evidence themselves a dominant position, provided they exist for some 
time.150 For example, a market share of 50% will be taken to be very large and, in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, it will in itself indicate dominance.151 If a firm 
enjoys a market share in the range of 40-45%, normally, additional factors will need
147
148
149
150
151
See ante, at p. 260.
(1994), Mergers And Joint Ventures In Europe: The Law And Policy Of The EEC, p.206.
At p. 78
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211
Case C-62/86 AKZO Chcmie BV v Commission, Judgment of 3/7/1991.
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be taken into account before concluding that it is dominant.152 Subject to the same 
proviso, dominance cannot be ruled out even where the market share in issue lies 
within the range of 20-40%.153 The 15th Recital of the Preamble to the ECMR, albeit 
not having legal force, suggests that, if the combined market share of the undertakings 
concerned after the operation, in the common market or a substantial part of it, is less 
than 25%, it will be a factor toward finding that the concentration is compatible with 
the common market; market power (and, in turn, dominance) will not be an issue. 
However, market shares cannot be the decisive factor since ex hypothesi they cannot 
indicate the competitive pressure exerted by firms not yet operating on the market but 
with the capacity to enter it.154
Which other factors have been taken to determine market power? ‘Barriers to 
entry’ were considered to be the most obvious factor on the ground that a firm with a 
large market share will be in a much better position to earn monopoly profits, if it 
knows that, in doing so, it will not attract new competition. There has been a great 
debate over what should be included within the term “barrier to entry”. One school of 
thought perceives many purported barriers to entry as entirely natural, being related to 
efficiency. They argue that a true barrier to entry is a cost to new entrants which was 
not applicable to the existing market operators when they entered the market.155 This 
narrow definition concentrates on the perceived ability of the market to rectify any 
inefficiencies without intervention from law. Thus they classify as barriers only legal 
provisions that restrict entry to the market. On the other hand, there is the school of 
thought which regards the barriers to entry much more broadly so as to comprise any 
factor which would tend to discourage firms from entering the market. Accordingly, a 
‘barrier to entry” is “any cost, which is higher for a new firm than for firms already in 
the industry”.156
The ECJ and the Commission have not attempted to lay down a general 
definition of the term. Nevertheless, they appeared to include within its ambit
152 Michelin Case, published in OJ [ 1981 ] (L 353) 33.
153 EC Commission, 10th Report on Competition Policy, point 50.
154 R. Whish, ante, at p. 263.
155 See R. Bork (1993) The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself (Oxford: Maxwell 
Macmillan).
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exclusive rights granted to a firm either by way of national legislation or 
governmental regulation or even by intellectual property rights. This is non- 
controversial as it complies even with the narrow view of barriers. Access to capital 
was also accepted to be a potential factor.156 7859 Economies of scale might also indicate 
dominance.160 Product differentiation is a barrier to entry which was first recognised 
by the economists. The underlying idea is that due to advertising or brand loyalty, 
consumers may perceive homogeneous goods as being different, and consequently it 
is more difficult for a new entrant to present its products as interchangeable, thereby 
competing with the existing players.161 1623
More interesting is the fact that evidence of superiority of a firm in technology 
can be adduced toward proving dominance. The relevance of possession of existing 
and potential access to future technology has also been acknowledged. Recognising 
technological advantage as a barrier to entry suggests that the ECJ and the 
Commission are prepared to adhere to the broader view of barriers. The same 
conclusion can be drawn from the fact that vertical integration and well developed 
distribution systems have been regarded as evidence of dominance. An undertaking is 
vertically integrated, if it controls upstream and downstream production facilities. The 
argument runs that integration allows an undertaking a much higher level of control 
over the way in which a product reaches the market. This provides the undertaking 
with commercial stability that constitutes a significant advantage over its competitors.
Regardless of the fact that the ECJ and the Commission have been ready to 
take a broad view of barriers to entry, it can still be claimed that such stance was 
justified on the ground that the firms could rely on those barriers in order to restrict 
their output and still raise their prices without sacrificing profits. The only occasion on 
which the ECJ looked into the “exclusionary” conduct of a firm and held that even
* 157
156 Stigler (1968) The Organisation o f Industry, (Chicago: Chicago UP), p.67,
157 Case 22/78 Hugin v Commission [ 1979] ECR 1869, [ 1979] 3 CMLR 345.
158 Tetra Pak I (BTG License) 19880J (L 272) 27, [1988] 4 CMLR 881.
159 See Continental Can case, ante.
160 Case T-6/89 BPB and British Gypsum v Commission [1993] ECR 11-389; [1993] 5 CMLR 32.
161 See United Brands case, ante., Hoffmann La Roche case, ante. Michelin case ante.
162 Ibid.
163 See Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche, ante.
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that could qualify as a barrier to entry has been in the AKZO case.164 The conduct in 
question was ‘predatory pricing’ exercised in order to eliminate competitors. The 
reasoning of the ECJ could be depicted as follows: “if an undertaking has a history of 
reacting to new entrants with exclusionary conduct, it will discourage potential 
entrants from attempting entry. (T)hey will be well aware o f the likely response of that 
undertaking”.165
The author submits that on the basis of ‘exclusionary’ market power, we 
should extend the ambit of barriers to entry to include competitive advantages which 
result from “competitor in te r re la tio n sh ip sThe latter have been defined and 
described in Section 2.4: they essentially refer to the multi-point presence of firms in 
different segments of an industry or in the same business unit of distinct industries. In 
simple words, they refer to links between firms. The reason for suggesting that they be 
considered as a barrier to entry derives from the fact that many SAs are formed with 
the defensive intent of combining interrelationships (links) so that potential 
competitors will only enter, if they are able to ally with other players, and thereby 
possess comparably strong interrelationships. Thus firms nowadays appreciate the 
power derived from such interrelationships. In fact, at intervals, the author highlighted 
that competitor interrelationships can nowadays play the same role as vertical 
integration: for instance, when it comes to controlling access to content (Section 
4.7.4), TOs will be tempted to ally with broadcasters in knowledge of the fact that 
they have strong interrelationships with content producers; they need not ally with the 
content producers themselves,
5.2.1. Case No 1V/M.469 - MSG: O.T L 364/1.31/12/94
The MSG decision is very important for the purposes of this thesis for the 
reasons that follow. First, the proposed joint venture was set up to operate in a market 
which did not already exist, a future market, namely the market for technical and 
administrative services required for the operation of digital pay-TV. Indeed, the 
parents relied on the premise that “as a consequence o f  the introduction o f digital
Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR 1-3359; [ 1993] 5 CMLR 215.
165 See Rodger & MacCulloch, ante. At p.90.
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television over the next fe w  years, the joint venture's downstream market fo r  pay-TV  
services will grow rapidly and other suppliers will enter the market, so it may be 
assumed that a market will develop fo r  the services offered by MSG, which will reach 
a substantial size in the foreseeable future".166 Secondly, it flowed from the aforesaid 
that the market share of the parents in the relevant services market was not available 
as an indicator of their market power and hence as an indicator going toward proving 
whether the joint venture would create or strengthen a dominant position in its market. 
Instead, the Commission enunciated that the parents’ competitive advantages in 
related but distinct markets /  industries would be the appropriate indicator of the 
parents’ market power. Hence the strength or weakness, the leadership or 
followership, of the partners in related business units or industry segments was taken 
into account. Thirdly, it was accepted, albeit not expressly, that convergence is what 
makes the advantages o f a company dominant in one market, relevant to the 
assessment of its plans in the other. Technological convergence is what makes two 
markets related enough for market power in one to be used in the other or in 
intermediate or in related markets. Fourthly, the Commission revealed that some 
links, interrelationships amongst competitors in neighbouring markets may prevent 
potential competition in the relevant market. Hence the Commission appeared to 
accept that the overall portfolio of each and every partner ought to be examined across 
the portfolio of potential competitors. Fifthly, by taking a firm stance that each partner 
to MSG had a business interest to enter independently on the market which was the 
target of MSG, the Commission managed to bring to the surface the underlying 
strategic intents of the partners.
The business object of the alliance
The object of the MSG alliance was the provision of the necessary technical 
infrastructure for the supply of mainly pay-TV and other communication services, 
including conditional access and subscriber customer management. 167
166 Para. 10 of Commission decision
167 J. T. Lang, ante. At p.403. He makes this comment in relation to several convergence-drived 
mergers, including the MSG case.

The parents’ business
The alliance was concluded between Bertelsmann AG (“Bertelsmann”), 
Deutche Bundespost Telekom (“DT”), and Taurus Beteilingungs GmbH, a holding 
company belonging to the Kirch Group (“Kirch”). Bertelsmann’s core business was 
book and magazine publishing, book clubs, printing, music publishing and sound 
recording; hence an electronic publisher. Kirch’s portfolio included, predominantly, 
the supply of feature films and television programming; a content creator and software 
developer. The core to DT’s portfolio was the provision of telecommunications 
services and the necessary technical infrastructure; clearly a TO. All entities were 
active primarily in the geographic market of Germany.
Relevant market
The Commission found that pay-TV was a relevant market for the purposes of the 
assessment of MSG’s impact on its parents’ position. For the same purposes, the 
Commission held the operation o f the Cable TV network to be a relevant market. In 
fact, the MSG agreement provided that DT would be in charge of the digitisation of 
the cable TV network in the hyperband area, that is an innovation market.
a. Alliance set up between to pre-empt potential competition in a new market
The European Commission found that MSG would be the first supplier of 
technical and administrative services for pay-TV in Germany. In the near future, it 
would also be the only supplier and thus have a monopoly. The Commission clarified 
that “although a monopoly in a future market that is only just beginning to develop 
should not necessarily be regarded as a dominant position within the meaning o f  
Article 2(3) o f  the Merger Regulation, the assumption that no market dominance 
exists presupposes in such a case that the future market in question remains open to 
future competition and that the monopoly is consequently only temporary" On the 168
168 para.55 of the Commission Decision.
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facts, one could expect that the market for the services to be offered by MSG would 
be sealed off by the establishment of MSG who, therefore, would be expected to 
acquire a long-term monopoly and, needless to say, enjoy a dominant position.
For the purposes o f this thesis, it is not as important to consider the parents’ 
intent in so far as it provided for the success of the alliance, but rather in so far as it 
aimed at pre-empting any competition between the parents in a new market that both 
would like to enter.
On its way to the conclusion that MSG would enjoy a dominant position, the 
Commission identified the most likely potential competitors in the provision of these 
services. From the experience in other countries, it inferred that pay-TV suppliers and 
cable network operators were the most likely potential competitors. Not surprisingly, 
the only pay-TV supplier at the time was Premiere, the analogue pay-TV operator 
controlled by Bertelsmann, Kirch and Canal Plus. The Commission identified a strong 
business interest for Bertelsmann /  Kirch to expand into setting up the technical 
infrastructure for digital pay TV due to the additional programme possibilities that 
digital television makes available precisely for pay-TV. 169 Besides, the Commission 
identified a strong business interest for DT to enter the pay-TV market and the future 
market of interactive higher-value services: the possibility would open up for DT to 
pursue a more strongly use-oriented policy in the broadband cable service area rather 
than a purely connection-related payments and charges policy.170
Detecting the strong business interests of the parties separately, the 
Commission expressed the opinion that, even if they were not involved in MSG, they 
would independently enter the market for the provision of a digitised infrastructure for 
the operation of pay-TV and also the market for the services necessary to its operation. 
The Commission rejected the argument that the risk of investing in digital 
infrastructure could only be assumed if shared with another, on the basis of the 
previous experience with the introduction of the mobile telephone system, GSM, in 
Germany. In that case, an infrastructure covering as much of the country as possible
169 Para. 57 of Commission decision.
170 Para.59 of Commission Decision.
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had to be set up; yet, it proved possible for two competing mobile telephony operators 
to undertake the task, and thus it was ensured that mobile telephony users could 
choose between two competing systems, that operated by DT and another operated by 
a private consortium. Further in this respect, the Commission revealed a contradiction 
in the parties submission: if M SG’s investment risk was so high that Bertelsmann / 
Kirch and DT would each be unable to take on the risk on their own, how could they 
argue that other competitors would consider it economically feasible to enter the 
market, once MSG was successfully established on it?171
Moreover, it is in the interests of this thesis to consider who else could be a 
potential competitor and why did DT not pick it up as a partner instead of 
Bertelsmann, Kirch. In fact, the parties informed the Commission that Selco 
Servicegesellschaft fuer elektronische Kommunikation mbH (“Selco”) was at the time 
known to be interested in offering the MSG-type services. Selco’s business was 
confined to the marketing of foreign-language programmes in Germany. If it 
embarked upon providing the MSG-type services, it would thus have to operate in a 
niche market with a limited subscriber base. Thus it could not be a particularly 
attractive ally.
An additional factor which is important to note is that there was already a link 
between Kirch and Selco. Selco constituted a joint venture between the private 
television broadcaster PR07 (50,1 % of shares) and News Corporation Ltd (49,9% of 
shares), which belonged to the Murdoch Group. However, 47,7% of the shares in 
PR07 were held by Mr Thomas Kirch, the son of the owner of the Kirch Group. In 
consequence, PR07 used to purchase to a large extent programme software from 
Kirch for use in its programmes. Thus, DT could get the best of both worlds by allying 
with Bertelsmann, Kirch considering that, first, they were realistically the most 
significant potential competitors and, secondly, they were already well interrelated 
with the rest of potential competitors, thereby reducing any appreciable risk from 
effective competition.
b. Alliance Set Up To Extend Parents* Market Power To Another Market
171 Para. 66 of Commission Decision.
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It is worth paying attention to the competitive advantages that Bertelsmann/ 
Kirch enjoyed in the analogue pay-TV market in Germany, which were likely to be 
extended to the market for digital pay-TV and which rendered them the most credible 
players in the latter market.
(i) Subscriber base
Bertelsmann / Kirch already had a subscriber base which they could also use 
in future digital pay-TV. This was material in the sense that the risk of 
investment in a digital infrastructure was significantly reduced, if the service 
provider could build on a subscriber base of analogue pay-TV customers. The 
requirement of a subscriber base is an inherent feature to pay-TV since there is 
a trade relationship only between the programme supplier and the viewer as 
subscriber, in contrast with TV funded by commercial advertising and public 
television financed partly through fees and partly through advertising where 
the trade relationship is only between the programme supplier and the 
advertising industry.172 73
(ii) Preferential access to programme software
Kirch was the leading German supplier of feature films and entertainment 
programmes for television. It had at its disposal a stock of about 15 000 
movies of all types and 50 000 hours of television programmes. It also had 
extensive production activities in the area of movies and television. Secondly, 
Kirch controled, jointly with Axel-Springer-Verlag, IS PR, which was the 
leading agency for sports broadcast rights. Similarly, Bertelsmann had access 
to attractive sports rights and film production activities through UEFA. 
Thirdly, both undertakings had holdings in free-access commercial television 
broadcasters: in particular, Kirch had a share of some 80% of television 
advertising revenue in Germany through its holdings in RTL, SAT 1, PRO 7,
172 Para. 62 of Commission decision.
173 Para. 32 of Commission Decision.
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RTL 2, VOX, Deutsches Sportfemsehen and Kabelkanal. Thereby, Kirch had 
the ability to bid for, and acquire, film rights or sports rights at higher prices 
than other competitors.174
(iii) Preferential access to potential distribution channels
Bertelsmann is the leading book operator in Germany with, at that time, six 
million book club members and experience in the customer management of 22 
million book club members worldwide. It was argued that this fact would add 
to the security of the customer base of MSG. Arguably, such book clubs 
constituted a potential distribution channel of pay-TV programmes. Yet 
Bertelsmann made assurances that it was not interested in steering the buying 
power of book club clients from the current club products towards other 
products, in recognition of the fact that this did not fit the culture budget of 
such customers.
The Commission addressed the question whether Bertelsmann / Kirch would 
extend their dominant position in analogue pay-TV to digital pay-TV.
The Commission appeared to be much concerned by their advantage as to preferential 
access to software. It explained that, because of that advantage, Bertelsmann and 
Kirch could put together different program packages, tailored to the requirements of 
specific target groups, which they would be able to offer at an attractive subscription 
price. This ability would be enhanced by the digitisation of pay-TV infrastructure. 
"Experience in other countries where pay-TV is at a more advanced stage reveals 
that the bringing together o f  individual programmes to form  programme packages is 
a key factor in achieving success on the pay- TV market. Pay-TV suppliers occupying 
a less important position on the market may be forced to include their programmes in 
the leading pay-TV supplier’s packages, thus giving it control over its competitors.175
174 Para. 77 of Commission Decision.
175 Para. 78 of Commission Decision.
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DT had a broadband cable network with over 13 million connected 
households, that is more than 90% of all cabled households in Germany (a total of 14 
million cable connections). The cable network was thus particularly important in 
Germany compared to satellite TV (the other basic means for transmitting pay-TV) 
which could only be received by seven million households. The Commission, relying 
on these figures, emphasized that it made sense to provide services relating to pay-TV, 
only if they related to pay-TV programmes that were also transmitted by cable; it 
would be unwise to provide satellite pay-TV related services except in case of special 
market segments such as that served by Selco. As a result, it could be inferred that any 
pay-TV provider was dependent on the use of the cable network of DT.
On the facts, the question arose whether and how DT’s position in the cable 
TV network, could be strengthened by the MSG alliance. The JV agreement provided 
that DT would be in charge of the digitisation of the cable TV network in the 
hyperband area. According to the information provided by the parties, digitisation of 
DT’s cable network would take place in 1995. It was expected that 15 channels would 
become available for the transmission of digital programme signals in the hyberband 
range of 300-450 MHz on DT’s broadband cable network. On each channel a total of 
four to 10 digital programmes was to become available. The Commission concluded 
that “DT would determine the gradual expansion o f the transmission channels fo r  
digital TV and could thus control the development o f transmission capacity fo r  digital
176
c. Alliance Set Up to Defend a Parent’s Position In the Innovation Market
* Aware of that consequence, the Commission managed to discern the strategic 
intent of DT in concluding this alliance. It intended to foreclose innovative use of the 
cable TV network before the cable TV network would be opened up to competition 
by means of the Community liberalisation scheme. It thus sought to safeguard its 
dominant position in anticipation of liberalisation in infrastructure provision. In this 
respect, the alliance with Bertelsmann and Kirch was defensive because it prevented 
them from being available as potential partners for other future cable TV network
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operators.176 77 In other words, DT sought technology leadership in order to enjoy first- 
mover advantages and interrelationships with competitors that future competitors 
would not be able to match.
It is interesting to consider why did Bertelsmann/Kirch not wait until other 
cable TV network operators would enter the market rather than rush into allying with 
DT? DT was well interrelated in the field of network operation! Not long before the 
MSG alliance, DT acquired a 16,6% holding in SES, the main European satellite 
operator, which reaches 6 million households in Germany via the Astra satellites. It 
thereby became the second largest shareholder in SES and collaborated with it “in 
order to ensure compatibility between the satellite network and the cable network in 
the digital television area”. This was important considering that satellite transmission 
could already be carried out in either analogue or digital form. Moreover, DT gained 
the ability to influence, albeit not to control, the allocation of satellite channels using 
the Astra satellites.
Besides, at the time of concluding MSG, DT was the holder of the monopoly 
for the fixed telephone network. Such network was particularly important in relation 
to interactive digital television, which being different from pay-TV in general, posed a 
commercial risk to broadcasters dealing with pay-TV only. The fixed telephone 
network was important because it could provide the return channel required for 
interacting. The use of the mobile phone network as a return channel, though 
technically possible, did not appear to be an appropriate alternative in economic terms 
at least for private households, at the time. Bearing in mind that even the broadband 
cable network could not for technical reasons be used at the time as a return channel, 
DT’s telephone network or its glass fibre network was all the more important as the 
only channel currently available for interactive television.
176 Para. 61 of Commission decision.
177 Para. 92 of Commission decision.
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iFinally, the Commission discerned the strategic intent of Bertelsmann /  Kirch 
as being to achieve first mover advantages on digital pay-TV market in the form of 
influencing the relative prominence given to competing channels in terms of channel 
allocation, electronic programme guides and slots on smart cards, as well as other 
informational advantages. They sought to achieve the defensive objective of ensuring 
that MSG’s terms and conditions and price structure were arranged in a 
disadvantageous way to their competitors’ programmes so that the choice left for 
future pay-TV competitors would be either to accept M SG’s conditions or to stay out 
of the pay-TV market. It seems that they were confident about achieving it, on the 
basis of the so-called “tipping effect”: the fact that customers are most likely to be 
attracted by players who have already achieved a market share substantially greater 
than their competitors. Surveys of enterprises confirmed that potential competitors 
took this message and indeed intended to withdraw their plans on future pay-TV 
supply in the digital area.178 980
, The reaction was realistic considering the nature and cost of the technical 
infrastructure in question. At the time, a digital decoder was expected to cost between 
DM 1 000 and DM 1 500. Facing this, it was anticipated that digital pay-decoders 
would be leased to, rather than bought by, viewers. The Commission dismissed the 
argument that, if MSG were to install a decoder base using a common interface, 
potential competitors would no longer need to invest in their own decoder base, and 
thereby surmount the technological barrier to entry on the market. The Commission 
detected a strategic move that was open to MSG to take: it could impose on viewers, 
by means of a term in the decoder lease agreement, the requirement that they should 
not use the decoder with modules o f other pay-TV or service providers without the 
consent of MSG. Such a restriction would deny M SG’s competitors free and 
unconditional access to the installed decoder base in spite of a common interface.181
d. Alliance Set Up to Give Its Parents Sustainable First-Mover Advantages
178 Para. 82 of Commission Decision.
179 See J. T Lang, ante, at p. 401.
180 Para. 101 of Commission Decision.
181 Para. 69 of Commission Decision.
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The Commission concluded that the MSG alliance would achieve a dominant 
position in the upstream market for administration and technical services that would 
enable the parents to create or strengthen a dominant position in the downstream 
market for digital pay-TV services in which they would be active.
B. Case No IV/M.490 -  NSD:182 1995 O.T fL 53) 20
NSD is a very important case. NSD would be in the business of providing 
transponder capacity and the transmission and distribution of satellite TV channels to 
the Nordic market (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland). It was set up with the 
aim to establish an attractive satellite position for transmission of TV signals to the 
Nordic countries. NSD would distribute satellite TV channels to direct-to-home users 
and to cable TV networks through the parents’ distribution companies Viasat and 
Telenor CTV and through the parents’ cable TV operators. Besides, NSD would 
create an integrated infrastructure for the distribution of satellite TV and other related 
services. Basically individual TV households would only need one decoder box 
irrespective of whether they received signals from cable TV networks or via a satellite 
dish antenna.
In rebutting the parties argument that the operation would lead to technical and 
economic progress, the Commission clarified that the problem resided not in the 
integrated character of the proposed infrastructure but rather in the vertical integration 
of the parents, which was not necessary for such infrastructure to be created. Further, 
the Commission held that in reality NSD would lead to reallocation of the already 
available transponder capacity to broadcasters in a way which favoured the interests of 
the parties whereas it would not add any capacity. The author is more interested in 
throwing light on the concept of potential competition and market power in a similar 
fashion to that adopted for the MSG case.
182 OJ (L 53) 20
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Transmission o f  a channel via satellite
The reader is introduced briefly to the process whereby a channel may be 
transmitted via satellite. It requires that TV signals be sent to an up-link station. Up­
link is the process of sending a TV signal from an earth station to a satellite. From the 
up-link station the TV signals are sent to the satellite that transmits them. Satellites 
used for TV are placed in a geostationary orbit position and are therefore able to 
maintain a constant beam on a given territory. Each satellite contains several 
transponders that are elements on a satellite used to receive and transmit TV signals.
The TV signals are received by satellite dishes on the ground. The receivers 
can be either direct-to-home households with smaller dishes, or cable TV operators 
with one or more much larger dishes or SMATV operators. The latter consist in 
entities receiving the TV signals using a satellite master antenna and retransmitting 
the signal within a smaller network. They will rarely contract directly with the 
broadcasters, but will normally be customers of local cable operators.
The diagram which follows has been drawn to give the reader a clearer insight 
into NSD’ s parents’ position. 91
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Distribution of TV Channels
Via Satellite Transponders Via terrestrial links Via Cable TV Networks
FilmNet
(Multichoice) (Viasat) (Telenor CTV)
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181 NT is a Norwegian company controlled by Telenor AS. The latter is the principal provider of 
telephone services in Norway. Further, it owns and/or leases transponder capacity from the satellites 
Thor, Intelsat and TV-Sat, situated at 1 degree West. NT owns, through a subsidiary, a large cable 
network in Norway. NT provides television distribution services to the direct-to-home market in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland and in Denmark through another subsidiary, namely Telenor CTV.1 Ki PTD is the Danish TO. It has the exclusive right to provide public voice telephony services and other 
related services in Denmark as wells as to install and operate the Danish public telecommunications 
network. TD owns a national broadband distribution network called the Hybrid Network, which is 
currently used for the transmission of radio and television signals to local distribution networks. TD ’s 
cable subsidiaries distribute TV channels to its own and other local networks.
tS5 Kinnevik is a private Swedish group of companies with activities mainly in forestry, farming, 
packaging materials. As regards television, media and telecommunications, Kinnevik owns companies 
which arc active in satellite television broadcasting and pay-TV channels, in distribution of satellite 
television (the Viasat companies), conditional access systems and radio broadcasting. Further, Kinnevik 
has a 23% shareholding in the commercial television channel TV4 and a 37,4% shareholding in 
Kablcvision AB, a cable TV operator in Sweden.
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a. Intent To Control The Allocation O f Transponder capacity (a scarce 
resource) And Hence The Distribution O f TV Channels Via Satellite.
Satellite: Thor
Transponders: five
▼
Telenor 
owns & 
operates it
Intelsat TV-Sat
ten fi\re
V 1r
Telenor Telenor
reserved leased it
all 10 from DT
Tele-X 
five
t  ▼
Kinnevik Kinnevik
& TD & TD
leased 4 leased 2
At the time there were five satellites in the position 1 ° W and 5° E.
Simus
five
Thus NSD and its parents would control directly or indirectly a large majority of the 
capacity available for the Nordic region. Out of a total of 30 transponders, NSD would 
immediately lease 19.
The parties claimed that Astra and to a lesser extent Eutelsat were actual 
competitors to the Nordic satellites since direct-to-home households in the southern 
part of Scandinavia could receive signals from some of their transponders, and in fact 
50 transponders were currently used for channels aimed at the Nordic households.
The Commission defeated their argument mainly on the ground that the 
satellites, which NSD would control, were aimed at Nordic viewers only whereas all 
channels on Astra and Eutelsat were in foreign languages and aimed at other non- 
Nordic countries; the fact that some of those channels, such as Eurosport and MTV, 
might be of interest to Nordic viewers did not render Astra and Eutelsat actual 
competitors to NSD’s satellites. In any event, all the transponder capacity on Astra
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and Eutelsat was occupied whilst the market was currently characterised by a rise in 
demand and a shortage o f supply.
The author places emphasis on the arguments substantiated by the 
Commission to dismiss any realistic possibility for significant competition from Astra 
or Eutelsat. In setting out its arguments, the author seeks to indicates the strategic 
relevance o f having Kinnevik as an ally, and also, the extent to which the Commission 
brings to the surface strategic aspects o f Kinnevik's market power.
(1) NSD’s link to Kinnevik (as broadcaster)
NSD would offer a package of 15 to 30 programmes including the TV3 
channels of Kinnevik. According to the parties TV3 could be watched by 
about 50% of all households in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The 
Commission went on to stress that four out of five Nordic transponders on 
Astra were already leased by Kinnevik and used for its channel TV3. Drawing 
from the parties* admission that most dishes in the area (70% of which were 
currently directed to Astra) would be turned towards the Nordic satellites as 
soon as TV3 would move to them from Astra, the Commission attached 
emphasis to Kinnevik channels’ “pulling power ” and concluded that there
would be no real competition from Astra.
The “pulling power ” of Kinnevik’s TV3 explains why NT and TD chose to 
ally with Kinnevik rather than any other broadcaster. Cable TV operators 
indicated that 70% of their viewers watched regularly TV3, and therefore it 
was the most important channel for them to carry on their cable network, apart 
from the national terrestrially distributed channels. The viewers* preference for 
TV3 could be also evidenced by the fact that they incurred a cable TV 
subscription fee to be able to which it, whereas for any terrestrially distributed 
channel they would avoid that cost.
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(2) NSD’s link to Kinnevik (as distributor of satellite TV channels)
In the Nordic area, most direct-to-home distributors sell the channels in 
packages (a bouquet of channels) of which some contain up to 25 channels of 
all types. There were currently three major distributors in the Nordic region: 
Multichoice, owned by FilmNet; Kinnevik, through its subsidiaries; and, NT, 
through its subsidiaries.
The NSD agreement which provided that a broadcaster transmitting from 
Astra or Eutelsat would be excluded from NSD’s packages. This would put 
broadcasters other than those transmitting their channels through NSD’s 
satellites in a very disadvantaged position. Two options would be open to 
those broadcasters: either to develop new packages competitive enough with 
those of NSD (but this would essentially mean competitive with Kinnevik’s 
TV3) and this was very unlikely; or, to get onto FilmNet’s package which 
could not be an attractive choice for a broadcaster once NSD would be set up.
The author draws the reader’s attention to this aspect of the alliance. It is the 
prime example of an alliance which intends, or at least will unavoidably have the 
effect, to block the channel access for a parent’s competitors. It is even more 
interesting to consider why it would not be an attractive option for such competitors 
to go through other channels. The author seeks to explain this by relying on the 
Commission’s observation that Kinnevik had appeared to exercise “exclusionary” 
conduct in the past against FilmNet, a competitor of Kinnevik in the market of 
distribution of pay-TV channels to households. In 1993, Kablevision, in which 
Kinnevik owned 37,4% of the shares, stopped distributing FilmNet’s pay-TV channels 
until the national competition authority had to intervene. Hence, the Commission 
emphasized that Kablevision’s potential competitors will have to take into account, 
before taking any action, Kinnevik’s influence over the strategies of its subsidiaries. 
The author applauds the Commission fo r being eager to go into incidents o f  the 
parents’ “exclusionary” market power. 186
186 Para. 88.
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The parties put forward another argument, namely that potential competition 
would rise in the future in the market for transponder capacity because of the expected 
net increase in transponders.187 Their major argument was that the introduction of 
digital technology would increase the capacity of a satellite by 5 to 10 times. It is 
interesting to consider how the Commission defeated this argument and at the same 
time spelled out the defensive strategy o f the parents. Digitalisation on a commercial 
basis would take place within the next one or two years. The Commission explained 
that since NSD would control the transponder capacity of the Nordic satellites, it was 
not evident why digitalisation would make it more attractive for a potential new 
supplier of transponder capacity to supply transponder capacity directed towards the 
Nordic area. Eventually, any increase in transponder capacity would be absorbed by 
NSD.
h. Intent to control access to T V  channels by cable T V  operators in favour o f  
its parents.
Besides, it is interesting to consider the third argument the Commission put 
forward to dismiss the likelihood fo r  competition from Astra and Eutelsat in so fa r  as 
it reveals the strategic significance fo r  Kinnevik o f  allying with TD and NT and o f  the 
timing fo r  such alliance. NT and DT controlled about 20-30% of approximately 5 
million households connected to cable TV networks and SMATV networks in the 
Nordic countries. The Commission concluded that a broadcaster transmitting from 
Astra or Eutelsat should anticipate the possibility of exclusion from a larger part of 
Nordic viewers connected to cable networks in the digital environment since NSD 
would effectively be able to control a much larger part of cable TV network in the
187 In addition, this increase was attributed to the following factors: (1) Astra had plans to launch a new 
satellite in 1995, which would increase its transponder capacity from 64 to 82, and another satellite in 
1996, which would increase Astra" capacity to 102 transponders. Eutelsat had similar plans. The 
Commission did not take this argument easily as it highlighted that it would only be after 3 to 4 years 
that such additional transponders could become available. (2) New parties could be expected to launch 
and operate new satellites. The Commission responded to this argument by stating that it usually takes 5 
years from the decision to build a new satellite until the satellite can begin transmitting. (3) Potential 
competitors could buy or lease an operative satellite in the second-hand market for operative satellites. 
Indeed, satellites situated between 1° W and 5° E at the time were second-hand. The Commission 
denied that it would be economically rational for a new company to enter the market for transponder 
capacity to the Nordic area by using second-hand satellites in the light of NSD’s "Hot Bird” with all its 
competitive programming advantages transmitting 15 to 30 TV channels of which several are not 
accessible but by NSD.
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Nordic region due to its role as a gate-keeper to the Nordic cable TV networks,188 
That function is described hereinafter. The market for access to, and operation of, 
cable TV networks is described in some more detail to show the position that TD 
enjoyed.189 It must be stated that the number of cable TV connections was expected to 
grow slowly in the coming years, since most of the areas where it was economically 
sensible to lay cables have by now been cabled.
In Denmark, the largest cable TV network was owned and operated by a 
subsidiary of TD, namely TD Kabel TV and supplied approximately 50% of all 
households connected to cable TV and SMATV. The second largest operator was 
Stofa AS, which is controlled by Telia, the Swedish TO. It had not been possible to 
enter the Danish cable TV market with full-scale operations as TD had a legal 
monopoly on the ownership of the commercial cable TV infrastructure and the 
transmission of TV signals by cable across municipal borders. According to the 
liberalisation scheme laid down by the Danish Parliament, by 1st July 1995 cable 
operators other than TD would have been allowed to own cable network infrastructure 
but, until 1st January 1998, they would have been excluded from offering cross­
municipal-border transmission of signals in their own infrastructure; they would 
merely get the right to make use o f TD’s infrastructure on a leased-line basis.
The Commission held that this feature of the Danish liberalisation scheme 
entailed the following advantages for TD and disadvantages for its competitors: (a) 
TD’s competitors were denied the economies o f  scale from which TD currently 
benefited; (b) TD was put in a position where it would obtain knowledge about the 
strategic considerations o f  their competitors, since all offers made by the competitors
188 That role was analysed by the Commission in para. 131 of its decision and will be analysed 
hereinafter.
189 Therefore, only the situation in Denmark is material. The situation in Norway: Telenor Avidi, owned 
by NT, was the largest cable TV operator with about 30% of all connections, but the second largest 
operator enjoyed a 22% market share and the third largest a 20%. Hence, the Commission accepted the 
Norwegian Competition Authority’s conviction that direct competition between cable TV operators was 
to a large extent possible, since about two-thirds of all connected households have the possibility of 
choosing an alternative cable TV supplier. Furthermore, the Norwegian TV market was expected to 
grow by 2-3% per year. The situation in Sweden: the Cable Act was adopted in 1992 and removed all 
legal barriers to entry. Svenska Kabel-TV AB, which is owned by Telia AB, is the dominant operator 
with approximately 50% of all connections. The second largest cable operator is Kablevision AB with 
18% of all connections. Two smaller cable operators (each with around 9% of all connections) entered 
the market.
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of TD would necessarily involve a contractual relationship with TD regarding the use 
of TD’s infrastructure, in contrast with TD itself, which could make an offer without 
being forced to negotiate the terms for using another’s company infrastructure. The 
Commission concluded that although the legal situation was expected to change, the 
heavy investment needed to build up a cable network, together with the dominant 
position already held by TD, made entry by competitors unlikely.
Of most interest is to consider how the creation of NSD would affect TD ’ s 
dominant position. The Commission noted that that due to the dominant position of 
NSD on the transponder market, cable TV operators would have to negotiate with 
NSD to obtain a TV channel rather than directly with broadcasters, as was the practice 
at the time. (This was reinforced by the fact that NSD would obtain exclusivity for 
some channels and thus even independent broadcasters will have to negotiate directly 
with it.) "The establishment o f NSD will therefore lead to an important change in the 
negotiating position o f cable TV operators*'.190 Further, it revealed that, albeit in 
principle they could get programmes from Astra or other satellites not controlled by 
NSD and in such a case they would negotiate directly with broadcasters, only non- 
Nordic language channels would be available on Astra or other satellites. The 
Commission held also that NSD would be in a position to price-discriminate or 
impose terms on independent cable operators in favour o f  the cable operators owned 
by the parents or in favour of its direct-to-home operations.191
Therefore, NSD would strengthen TD’s dominance.
c. Intent to control broadcasters’ access to cable T V  networks: the “gate­
keeper” function.
The reader need be introduced to the technical Infrastructure for satellite Pay- 
TV and the specific infrastructure that NSD would build up.
190 P a ra . 126 o f  C o m m iss io n  d e c is io n .
191 P a ra . 128, ib id . A nd  even  i f  th e re  w a s  n o  d isc rim in a tio n , N S D  w o u ld  still be a b le  to  e x p lo i t  its  
p o s itio n  on  th e  c a b le  T V  m ark e ts  d u e  to  its  d o m in a n t p o s itio n  on  th e  tr a n s p o n d e r  m a rk e t.
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In the Nordic area, all channels broadcast by satellite are encrypted in contrast 
to other parts of Europe. When encryption takes place, a datastream is inserted along 
with the TV signal for use by the conditional access system. To receive encrypted TV 
signals a consumer needs a decoder. If an open encryption system is used, a personal 
smart card is made available to the viewer which is inserted into the decoder to scan 
through the datastream that comes along with the TV signal to find out if its identity is 
present. If it does find it, then the TV signal is decrypted and passes onto the TV set. 
From the consumer’s standpoint, an open system means that decoders are available 
from many sources and that the consumer can, with the same decoder, receive TV 
signals in different open systems simply by changing the smart card. In contrast to the 
rest of Europe, in the Nordic region open encryption systems are used.192
It was the intention of NSD’ s parents to implement a joint Nordic encryption 
system and a joint Nordic head-end. NSD would control the system and the head-end. 
It planned to offer transparent transmission. Such a service would be economically 
attractive to many cable TV operators, since they could eliminate an encoding and 
decoding system in each head-end and thereby reduce technology. Some independent 
cable TV operators had hundreds of head-ends or more and need a decoder for each 
channel in each head-end, with current technology. Considering the economic benefits 
for cable households and the fact that subscribers connected to the cable networks 
would not notice any difference, if NSD provided transparent transmission, it would 
be difficult for a small cable TV operator to refuse such a solution.
The Commission concluded that it should be foreseen that by controlling such 
a system, NSD would be in a position to strengthen its function as a gate-keeper for 
broadcasters wishing to get access to the Nordic cable networks. It would be very 
difficult for a broadcaster without access to NSD’ s system for encryption to get 
access to cable networks, should such a system be developed.193 Thus, Kinnevik’ s 
position would be strengthened.
192 W h e re  a  closed  e n c ry p tio n  sy s te m  is u se d , it is n e c e ssa ry  fo r th e  c o n s u m e r  to  p u rc h a s e  o r  h ire  a  
sp ec ia l d e c o d e r  to  rece iv e  T V  s ig n a ls  e n c ry p te d  in th is w ay . In  tu rn , it  m ean s  th a t th e  h o u se h o ld s  h av e  
to  b u y  o r  ren t a n  a d d itio n a l d e c o d e r , i f  th e y  w an t to  re c e iv e  T V  s ig n a ls  w h ich  arc e n c ry p te d  in  a n o th e r  
sy s tem .
193 P a ra . 131, ib id .
99
1
5.2.2 Co-ordination O f Parents * Competitive Behaviour
So far, the Commission has been considering issues of conduct related to the 
multi-point presence of competitors separately from issues of market power. In 
particular, an issue which has caused concern consisted in the likelihood that the 
parents would co-ordinate their competitive behaviour in case they retained significant 
economic activities in markets which are upstream, downstream or neighbouring but 
closely related to the market wherein the JV is set up.194 Naturally, such likelihood of 
co-ordination should be anticipated to be greater the more linked the parents are: that 
is the more interrelationships they enjoy in common. Rather than employing the very 
framework of the ECMR for the control of such likelihood, traditional perception of 
competition law directed that Article 81 (ex Article 85) EC Treaty be adopted, on the 
ground that co-ordination of behaviour is a “behavioural issue”, and therefore outside 
the ambit of the “structure” oriented ECMR.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the Article 81 framework, the author 
wishes to submit that the limitation of this approach can be revealed by the already 
delivered decisions of the Commission. In none but one of the cases that are 
hereinafter reviewed did the Commission reach the conclusion that the creation of the 
J V was intended to, or would in effect, lead to co-ordination of the parents’ behaviour: 
this does not question the appraisal it carried out; rather, in the author’s opinion, it 
indicates that the prevailing objective of the parents in setting up the JV is formulated 
in terms of their position in the market and is targeted at reinforcing that position 
rather than to co-ordinate the way they conduct business. In the one and only case 
where the Commission identified a risk of co-ordination, co-ordination was over 
access to the market fo r  content.
Article 2(4) ECMR reads as follows: “to the extent that the creation of a joint 
venture constituting a concentration pursuant to Article 3 has as its object or effect the 
co-ordination of the competitive behaviour of the undertakings that remain
W Ê U l l À
independent, such co-ordination shall be appraised in accordance with the c r iK S ^ p f ^ ^  
Article 85(1) and (3) of the Treaty, with a view to establishing whether or not the 
operation is compatible with the common market”. Incompatibility with the common 
market will be upheld, if “the co-ordination, which is the direct consequence of the 
creation o f the joint venture affords the undertakings concerned the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products or services in 
question” .195
By definition, a FFJV is an undertaking which remains independent from its 
parents. Therefore, the above reference to ‘undertakings that remain independent' 
shall be taken to include each of the parents and the FFJV itself. The Commission 
defines candidate markets for co-ordination as those on which the JV  and at least two 
parent companies are active, or markets which are upstream or downstream to that of 
the JV and where at least two parents retain significant activities, or closely related 
neighbouring markets where at least two parent companies remain active.196 The EC 
Commission Notice On The Distinction Between Concentrative And Cooperative 
Joint Ventures (“hereinafter, the 1994 Notice”)197 clarifies that the co-ordination of 
the competitive behaviour between the parent companies and the JV  is relevant only 
in so far as it is an instrument for producing or reinforcing the co-ordination between 
the parent companiesJ9S The 1994 Notice goes on to explain that the Commission 
will be concerned about co-ordination between the parent companies in relation to 
prices, markets, output or innovation}99
194 A rtic le  2 (4 )  E C M R  as a m e n d e d , su b p a ra g ra p h  2 (a).
195 A rtic le  2 (4 )  E C M R  as a m e n d e d , su b p a ra g ra p h  2 (b ).
196 S ee  p a ra . 2 9  C o m m iss io n  D e c is io n  in  C a se  N o. IV /JV . 1 -  T e lia  /  T e le n o r  /  S c h ib s te d .
197 1994 O J  (C  3 8 5 ) 001 o f  3 1 /1 2 /1 9 9 4 . T h e  N o tice  h a s  n o t b e e n  su p e rse d e d  a s  re g a rd s  th e  n o tio n  o f  
“co-ordination ” o f  c o m p e tit iv e  b e h a v io u r  th a t the C o m m iss io n  in v e s tig a te s .
I9H S ee  p a ra . 17 H aw k &  H u s e r  (p o s t. ,  a t p .4 3 ), c o m m e n d in g  o n  th e  1994 N o tic e , sa id  th a t the  c o ­
o rd in a tio n  o f  th e  c o m p e tit iv e  b e h a v io u r  b e tw een  the  p a re n t c o m p a n ie s  an d  the  JV  w o u ld  in  a n y  ev en t 
in d ic a te  th a t th e  JV  w o u ld  m e re ly  b e  a  ‘s in g le -fu n c tio n ’ e n ti ty . T h is  re a s o n in g  is fo l lo w e d  in the 
C o m m iss io n  N o tic e  on  th e  c o n c e p t o f  F F JV s: p a ra g ra p h  14 d ic ta te s  th a t ’the strong presence o f the 
parent companies in upstream or downstream markets is a factor to be taken into consideration in 
assessing the full-function character o f a JV \ H o w e v e r , F . E . G o n z a le z -D ia z  (“JV s : T h e  N ew  
B o u d a r ie s ” ) u n d e rlin e s  th a t ‘'it was never argued that Article 85(1) did not apply at all and, in any 
event, reference was always made to co-ordination between companies remaining independent, thus 
leaving the door open to the possibility o f  taking into account this type o f spillover effect under certain 
circumstances. The practical result the same since the Commission never applied Article 85(1) 
simultaneously to these effects even i f  the possibility was there”.
199 S ee  p a ra . 17.
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It then suggests various scenarios which may raise concerns about the 
likelihood o f co-ordination. Amongst others, the following are noted:
(a) “ Where two or more parent companies have a significant activity in a
neighbouring market and this neighbouring market is o f significant 
economic importance compared with that o f  the JV, the collaboration 
o f the parent companies within the JV may lead to the co-ordination of 
the parent companies' competitive behaviour on this neighbouring 
market. ”200 -
In this context, a neighbouring market is a separate but closely related market to that 
of the JV, both markets having common characteristics including technology, 
customers or competitors.201 However, it should be clarified that a ‘neighbouring 
market' need not be in a different geographic market. Indeed, the scenario described 
above, appears in the 1994 Notice under the heading 3.1 on “Product Market” rather 
than under the heading 3.2 on “Geographic Market”. Hawk & Huser suggest that “the 
concept o f  ‘neighbouring market' may include complementary or fu ll line’ product 
markets exhibiting a high degree o f structural linkage with the J V’ s specific product 
lines“.202 “A separate ‘technology ' or ‘innovation’ market probably also fa lls within 
this concept“.203 Nevertheless, the NC / Canal+ /  CDPO / BankAmerica case, 
which will be discussed hereinafter, has been described as a “co-ordination in a 
neighbouring market” case, probably because it literally raised that concern in a 
geographically neighbouring market.
(b) “Where the parent companies or the joint venture specialise in 
segments o f an overall product market, unless these segments are o f  
minor importance in view o f  the main activities o f  the parent
200 S e e  p a ra . 18 , su b -p ara . 7  o f  th e  1 9 9 4  N o tic e . ♦ *
J01 Ib id .
202 (1 9 9 6 )  European Community M erger Control: A practitioner's Guide (K lu w e r  L a w  In te rn a tio n a l)  
p .5 8
203 ib id .; a t  fo o tn o te  20 8  th e y  e x p la in  th a t  in  C ase  N o . IV /M .2 6 9  S h e ll /M o n te c a tin i o f  3 /6 /1 9 9 4 , O .J . (L  
3 2 2 )  48  th e  C o m m iss io n  d e sc r ib e d  th e  ‘te c h n o lo g y ’ m a rk e t as ‘u p s tr e a m ’ b u t a p p lie d  the  
‘n e ig h b o u r in g ’ sp illo v e r m a rk e t a n a ly s is .
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companies or o f  the joint venture respectively or there are objective 
reasons fo r  the parent companies to retain the activities outside the JV, 
fo r  instance because o f the technology involved. In the latter case each 
o f the parent companies retains a genuine interest in their specific 
segments. The existence o f the JV does not normally o f  itself justify the 
assumption that they would co-ordinate their behaviour with regard to 
these activities. ”
The NSD case presents an aspect falling within this senario. The Commission 
found that there was competition between NT and TD (i.e. between two of the 
parents) in the market for TV up-linking services to the satellite. Both parents 
currently provided those services from their respective countries, but the 
insignificance of that market in economic terms was taken to show clearly that the 
operation had neither the object nor the effect of co-ordinating the activities of the 
parent companies with respect to services outside the field of the NSD alliance. The 
TELIA /  TELENOR /  SCHIBSTED case is also relevant in the context of this 
senario and will be discussed in some more detail.
(c) “Where a network o f  cooperative links already exists between the 
parent companies in the JV ’s market, the main object or effect o f the 
JV is to add a further link and thereby strengthen already existing co­
ordination o f competitive behaviour ”.
This paragraph goes deeper into the concept of “two or more parents remaining active 
in the JV’s market” by interpreting it to include situations where two or more parents 
participate not necessarily as sole companies but also as participants in pre-existing 
JVs operating in the JV ’s market. Pursuant to Article 2(4) ECMR, we should be able 
to extend the “JV’s market” to “markets which are upstream, downstream or 
neighbouring but closely related to the JV market”. Cases which appear to be relevant 
under this senario include the M SG case and the FT/DT/ENEL case and NC/  Canal+ 
/CDPO/Bank America.
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(d) " Where either o f  the parent companies and the JV are all in different
geographic markets, the Commission will examine closely the 
likelihood o f co-ordination between the parents. In doing so, it will 
consider the interaction between markets, and foreseeable 
developments in the emergence o f wider geographic markets, 
particularly in the light o f the market integration process in the 
Community”.204
The Commission was in fact faced with this scenario in the FT /D T / ENEL case, 
which will be discussed hereinafter.
The Commission has not as yet issued guidelines on the application of Article 
2(4), albeit it does intend to do so in the future.205 Pending the issue of such 
guidelines, the author will attempt to reveal the approach taken by the Commission in 
its already delivered case-law. For obvious reasons the decisions are discussed 
according to the chronological order of their delivery.
5.2.2.1 CASE NO. IV/.IV.l -  TELIA/TELENORÀSCHIBSTED. decision
delivered on 27 M ay 1998.206
The business object of the alliance
The JV company (“NewCol”) would take over the assets and activities of Telia 
InfoMedia and Scandinavia On-Line AB (SOL). It would be active in two markets: 
first, the Internet gateway services; and, secondly, the web site production for third 
parties and related programming. “Internet gateway services” essentially mean that 
through the gateway, consumers and businesses can have access to a range of services 
presently offered by SOL and InfoMedia, such as financial information, games,
204 See para. 19, sub-para. 1 of the 1994 Notice. And see: “The same applies where one o f the parent 
companies and the JV are in the same geographic market, while the other parent companies are all in 
different geographic markets. ”
205 See footnote 3 of EC Commission Notice On The Concept Of Full-Function Joint Ventures, 1998 OJ 
(C 066).
206 Available in the CELEX database document no. 398J0001
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business information, shopping, travel, ticket sales, etc. NewCol would produce its 
services in the Swedish language.
The parents’ business
Telia AB is wholly owned by the Swedish State and is the main TO in 
Sweden, providing a broad range of telecommunications services both in Sweden and 
abroad, including enhanced services through its shareholding in Unisource. It is also 
an Internet service provider (“ISP”). Internet services in the Swedish language are 
provided by Telia InfoMedia Interactive AB.
Telenor AS is the main Norwegian TO. Its subsidiary Telenor Nextel AS 
offers a number of Internet related services. It is a 33% shareholder in Telenordia 
(together with BT, TeleDanmark), which provides telecommunications services in the 
Swedish market. Telenordia’s subsidiary Algonet is an ISP on the Swedish market.
The Schibsted Norwegian group, is involved in a range of media-related 
activities such as newspapers, television, films and multimedia. Its subsidiary, 
Schibsted Multimedia AS, has a number of Internet related activities, including the 
provision o f content, in Sweden via Scandinavia On-Line AB, which is jointly owned 
by Telenor AS. Schibsted also has a stake in Aftonbladet, a newspaper in Sweden, 
which also has an Internet edition.
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In this case the Commission found that no concerns were raised about the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position, and therefore it proceeded with 
examining whether their was a risk of co-ordination of competitive behaviour.207
Relevant Markets For Co-ordination of Competitive Behaviour
Concerning the market for the provision of advertising over the Internet, it 
found that only Schibsted Multimedia AS remained active on it after the creation of 
the JV. Therefore it excluded it from the candidate markets for co-ordination.
Concerning the market for subscriber content provision over the Internet, it 
found that none of the parent companies would remain active on the same product 
market as the JV following the operation. Telenor Nextel AS and Schibsted 
Multimedia AS were active on it through Scandinavia OnLine AB (common 
subsidiary) but transferred all their activities to this JV. Therefore it excluded this 
market from the candidates for co-ordination.
However, the Commission found the market for the production o f web sites to 
be a relevant product market for co-ordination. The geographic market was confined 
to Sweden or Swedish-speaking territories. Two of the parent companies remained 
active on it: namely, Telia through its subsidiary Telia Promontor AB, and Telenor 
Nextel, through Bonnier Telenor Foretagsinfo AB. (InfoMedia, which was also active 
in this market, would be contributed to the JV.)
207 The Commission distinguished three markets as relevant for the purposes of applying the dominance 
test: first, content provision; secondly, advertising on the Internet; thirdly, the production of web sites. 
Eventually, the Commission accepted that since content provision would be offered for free than on a 
paid-for basis, it could be brought within the market for Internet advertising.207 The Commission 
identified a fourth market, namely the provision of access to the Internet to end users, in respect with 
which it held that "(t)he NewCol itse lf is no t present on this d ia l up Internet access market, bu t two o f  
its parents (Telia and Telenor) are , a n d  it is clearly closely related to N ew C ol’s markets. It is 
accordingly no t a relevant market fo r  the assessment o f  dominance, bu t it is considered fu r th e r  from  
the viewpoint o f  co-ordination  As regards the relevant geographic market, the Commission found 
that it was national in scope on a linguistic basis. Applying the dominance test to the operation in the 
context of Internet advertising, the Commission concluded that such market is a rapidly growing market 
with many actors, and therefore the parents’ market shares would not create or strengthen a dominant 
position.207 Applying the test in the context of web site production, the Commission reached the same 
conclusion.207 Hence the structural effects of the creation of the JV were declared compatible with the 
common market.
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Similarly, the Commission found the dial-up Internet access market to be a 
candidate market for co-ordination. Access to the Internet is a necessary prerequisite 
for the use of any Internet service. The dial-up Internet access market must therefore 
be considered as a market upstream to the JV’s market and, consequently, as a market 
closely related to the JV ’s. Both Telia and Telenordia (Algonet) provided dial up 
Internet access to users. The relevant geographic market was confined to Sweden.
Assessment of Co-ordination
The parties submitted that co-ordination of the competitive behaviour between 
the parent companies was not the object of the creation of the JV, In turn, the 
Commission held that “in the absence of clear indications to prove that such an 
object is pursued, an intended co-ordination o f the parent companies' behaviour 
cannot be established ”.
Thus the Commission proceeded on with examining whether the creation of 
the JV would have the effect of co-ordinating the parents’ competitive behaviour. It 
explained that “this question has to be examined separately fo r  the web site 
production market and fo r  the dial up Internet access market”.208 09
(a) The combined market share of the parent companies on the web site 
production market in Sweden would not exceed 5%. Nor would the JV ’s market share 
exceed 5%. It could therefore be inferred that, even if the parties were to co-ordinate 
their activities, any restriction of competition would not be 'appreciable *.210 21It flowed 
from this conclusion that it was “not necessary to establish a causal link between the 
creation o f the JV and the behaviour o f the parent companies outside the JV  on this
j  i  i
closely related market”.
208 See para. 38 of the Commission’s decision.
209 Ibid.
210 See para. 40, ibid.
211 Para. 41, ibid.
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(b) The dial up Internet access market is characterised by a high rate of growth 
(approximately 30%). This is due to the fact that there are relatively low barriers to 
entry: the costs of starting a small ISP providing a dial up service are low and small 
companies can and do provide dial up Internet access. Entry is possible both from 
local start-up ISPs and global ISPs entering the Swedish market. In addition, as the 
market is very price sensitive, in particular given the low switching costs, this would 
prevent higher prices through co-ordination from being sustained: any increase in 
prices would result in the parties quickly losing market share to rival companies as 
new subscribers opted for lower offerings. Telia has 25-40% of the market. Telenordia 
has 10-25% of the market. However, if the market share of Telenordia were to be 
attributed to Telenor (the holding company), their total market share would be 35- 
65%. The largest service provider offering dial-up Internet access market is Tele2, a 
telecommunications company which is a member of the Kinnevik Group, a leading 
Nordic media company: it has 40-50% of the market. Having said out these figures, 
the Commission concluded that “(m)arket shares are o f  limited significance on this 
growing market. In any case, the combined market share o f  Telia and Telenordia has 
fallen by between 15% and 20% o f  the total market over the last nine months”.212 In 
brief, the Commission held that uthe market structure is not conducive to co­
ordination o f  competitive behaviour” 213 214
Most interestingly, the Commission went on to consider the ‘likelihood’ of co­
ordination. It stated that “the relative size of the markets for Internet advertising, 
content and web site production (the markets of the JV) compared with that of dial-up 
Internet access is relevant to the likelihood of co-ordination”. Looking into this 
matter, it concluded that the dial-up Internet access market is substantially larger than 
the other markets mentioned above (the proportion of revenues from Internet access to 
other services was 93% to 7%), and therefore “the likelihood of co-ordination is 
reduced further”. The author attaches emphasis to this statement. It is meritorious 
in so fa r  as the Commission appears to take into consideration the economic 
relevance o f JV fo r its parents. But the author wishes to highlight that the above
2,2 Para. 43, ibid.
213 Para. 44, ibid.
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finding should also go toward confirming that the strategic relevance o f  the JV  fo r  its 
parents resides not in its effect on their behaviour but rather on their position vis-à- 
vis potential competitors.
5.2.2.2 CASE NO, IV /IV.2 -  ENEL /  FT / DT. decision delivered on 22
June 1998216
The business object of the alliance
The alliance, Wind Telecommunicazioni Spa (“Wind”), was concluded in 
order to provide a full range of telecommunications services, combining mobile and 
fixed line, in Italy in competition with the incumbent TO, namely Telecom Italia, and 
other new market entrants.
The parents’ business
FT is the main TO in France, providing a full range of services including 
analogue and GSM mobile services. DT is the main TO in Germany providing the 
same range of services. FT and DT do not have any direct telecommunications 
activities in Italy but they do operate in Italy through GlobalOne, a JV they had set up 
together with Sprint Corporation for the provision of advanced services to corporate 
users.
ENEL is the principal provider of electricity in Italy, both to domestic and 
industrial users. ENEL already owns and operates a telecommunications network 
along its electricity grid which it has been using still now for its own 
telecommunications needs.
216 Available in the CELEX database, doc. No.398J002
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The JV Agreement
The proposed operation consisted of the Shareholders’ Agreement, a Pooling 
Agreement between FT and DT, a Backbone Lease Agreement between ENEL and 
Wind, and a General Agreement for the Provision of Services. In the latter, the parties 
agreed that ENEL would outsource its telecommunications needs on an exclusive 
basis to Wind and that Wind would be appointed as the exclusive distributor of 
GlobalOne’s services in Italy.
Relevant Market For Co-ordination Of Competitive Behaviour
After having leased its telecommunications network to Wind, ENEL could no 
longer be regarded as a competitor on any markets. Thus the Commission stated that 
only the relationship between FT and DT demanded analysis. It noted that neither FT 
nor DT were active in the market for domestic and international voice and data 
telecommunications services in Italy. It held that in view of the substantial 
investments in Wind which the parties have already made or will have to make, it is 
unlikely that they would enter these markets on their own in the future. "This is 
reflected by their agreement not to compete with each other on these markets ”. It
then went on to identify the market for such services in France and Germany, where 
the FT and DT are in fact active, as markets closely related to that of the JV, and 
therefore falling within the ambit of Article 2(4).
Assessment Of Co-ordination
The Commission stated that both FT and DT are dominant in their national 
markets for domestic and international voice and data communications. FT and DT 
could be considered as (at least) potential competitors on the German and French 
markets, respectively. However, FT has not so far expanded its operations to Germany 
to any important degree since it sold its shares in Info AG in the context of the 
Atlas/GlobalOne transaction. Neither has DT entered the French markets to any 
noticeable degree. The Commission stated that this was their deliberate choice against
1 1 0
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the fact that there were possibilities for competing with each other in their respective
home markets because of liberalisation in the sector. “The lack o f competition on their
respective markets in the past therefore appears to stem from  a deliberate choice on
the part o f  these companies. It is not possible to claim with the requisite degree o f
certainty that such lack o f  competition (if it were to continue in the future) would be
218the result o f  the creation o f  Wind”.
Besides, the Commission acknowledged that both FT and DT would in the 
future be able to route their traffic through the network of Wind, and thereby they 
might be given certain advantages over their competitors. However, there was no 
indication that this would result in a co-ordination o f the competitive behaviour of 
these two companies.219 It concluded that there was no likelihood that the operation of 
the JV would lead to co-ordination of the competitive behaviour of the parties, and 
therefore it was not necessary to establish a causal link between the creation of the JV 
and the behaviour of the parent companies outside the market of the JV.
The author underlines that this case, too, goes toward demonstrating that the 
strategic relevance o f the JV fo r  its parents lied not in facilitating co-ordination of 
their behaviour but rather in strengthening the position o f the parents in their core 
markets and strengthening their interrelationships with competitors in peripheral 
markets where they met again.
The Commission’s line of reasoning appeared to be as follows: “no potential 
for competition exists” means that “potential competition cannot be eliminated”. It is 
the same thing as saying “You cannot steal something that does not exist”. The 
question should be, though, “why does it not exist?”. Obviously, “because of 
previously prescribed non-competition”. Is it fine to let it go then? We should pose the 
following question: is the lack of causal link more important for competition law than 
the addition of another non-competition instance? “Want this facilitate firms to 
interwove a network of SAs?” The author submits that we should rule upon such 2178
217 para.31 of Commission Decision
218 ibid., para.37.

cases more carefully, considering that it may be the strategic intent of the parents to 
actually create such a network in apprehension of multipoint competition.
Apparently, in the FT/DT/ENEL case the Commission adopted the same 
methodology as regards how to establish a causal link as it had done in Case No 
IV/M.469 -  MSG. Bertelsmann and Kirch, two of the three parents to the MSG 
alliance, had been already linked by way of sharing control, together with Canal Plus, 
in another joint venture, namely Premiere, which was established in order to operate 
analogue pay-TV and provide the services required for its operation. In particular, the 
partners to Premiere undertook ( “as a specific measure embodying their company -  
law obligations in the jo in t venture ”) not to participate in any other German-language 
pay-TV service for the duration o f their joint venture, without the agreement of the 
other partners. By way of the Premiere alliance, they both added to their portfolio a 
core strength in service provision as pay-TV broadcasters. The Commission originally 
accepted that the co-operation of Bertelsmann with Kirch, which resulted from the 
Premiere alliance did not necessarily implicate either that additional co-ordination of 
their competitive behaviour was intended or that, in effect, would be caused, by their 
participation in MSG.220 Rather, any future cooperation in the supply of pay-TV 
programmes would still be accruing from the “non-competition” clause in the 
Premiere agreement. There would be no causal link with MSG.
However, the following point is remarkable. The Commission came back to 
this issue, highlighting the importance of the clause in the context of the assessment of 
dominance. It explained that non-competition between Kirch and Bertelsmann is 
“perhaps less important in the case o f analogue television, since, given the shortage 
o f available transmission channels, the possibility o f new pay-TV programmes is in 
any event limited. However, with the increase in transmission capacities following 
digitalisation, both Bertelsmann and Kirch will have the possibility o f supplying a 
much larger range o f programmes on the market. Against this background, the 
competition ban acts as a restriction o f competition to a much greater extent than 
previously. ”22i
220 Para. 14 of Commission Decision.
221 Para. 80 of Commission Decision.
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In other words, the Commission appeared to accept that dominance resides in 
the ability of a firm to prevent competition (as a result of which it can act 
independently of its competitors); bearing this in mind, it detected the strategic intent 
of Bertelsmann and Kirch as being to defend the potential for competition between 
them that would be brought about by increase in capacity induced by digitalisation. 
The author finds it interesting that since the MSG case was decided under the ECMR 
before its amendment, and thus altogether under the dominance test, it is a case which 
evidences that we can place the right weight on the non-competition between the 
parents, if we read it in the light of the strategic intent underlying the creation of the 
JV rather than in the context of the causal link with the co-ordination of competitive 
behaviour of the parents.
S.2.2.3 CASE NO. IV/M.1327 -  NC/CANAL+/CDPO/BANK AMERICA,
decision delivered on 3 December 1998.
The business of the alliance
NCH,2 23 an already existing entity, would continue to operate on a long term 
basis in cable television services. Its cable networks would be used to provide high­
speed cable modem-access to the Internet and perhaps data and voice telephony 
services. It was expected that, if this transaction were approved, NCH would also have 
the resources to expand the scope of its activities in telephony provision.
222 Available in the CELEX database, doc. No. 398M1327.
223 The proposed operation consisted in the acquisition of joint control over NCH by Cana] +, CDPQ 
and BankAmerica. At the time the operation was proposed, Canal+ owned 99.9% of the share capital of 
NCH. The proposed transaction was therefore, in essence, an increase in NCH’s capital. In fact, 
BankAmerica and CDPQ entered the transaction through an acquisition vehicle, namely “Exante”. The 
resulting shareholdings were as follows: Canal+ 63%; Exante 37%. An interesting point in the light of 
this thesis is that control over NCH on the part o f Exante was justified on the ground that they would 
be in a position to veto rights, such as the Annual Budget and the Business Plan, which determine the 
strategic behaviour o f NCH. It is already recognised that control over strategy constitutes an 
ingredient fo r  establishing “concentration ”, (para. 8 of Commission Decision).
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The parents’ business
Canal + is a French company that, with its affiliates, is active mainly in pay 
television broadcasting, the distribution of television services by cable and satellite 
and the production and distribution of programming.
Canal+ owns jointly (with Prisa+) Sogecable: the latter operates in 
terrestrial/analogue pay-TV and in digital satellite pay-TV (Canal Satellite Digital).
BankAmerica forms part of the corporate group of BankAmerica Corporation 
which provides diverse financial products and services to individuals, businesses, 
government agencies and financial institutions throughout the world.
CDPQ is a wholly owned subsidiary of Caisse de dépôt et placement du 
Québec (henceforth «Caisse de dépôt»). The latter is a portfolio management 
company which invests the funds entrusted to it by Quebec public pension and 
insurance plans as well as various public bodies. The activity of CDPQ is to invest in 
companies operating in all areas related to communications, including audio-visual 
production, wireless technology, multimedia, publishing and media.
The BankAmerica and CDPQ’s groups have controlling interests in 
Cableuropa, a company which started providing cable pay-TV services in Valencia in 
September 1998 and has been granted licences to operate in Sevilla, Mallorca and 
other Spanish regions.
NCH’s sole asset is 99.9% of the shares of NC NumeriCable 
(“NumeriCable”), previously known as Compagnie Generale de 
Vidéocommunication), a French société en nom collectif. NumeriCable operates cable 
television networks in France through controlled subsidiaries.
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The Commission found that no concerns were raised about the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, and therefore it proceeded with examining 
whether there was a risk of co-ordination.224
Relevant Market For Co-ordination Of Competitive Behaviour
The Commission identified the pay-TV market in Spain as a relevant 
market.225 This was based on Article 2(4) second sub-paragraph of the ECMR as 
amended, which provides that in the assessment of co-ordination attention shall be 
paid to whether the parent companies retain to a significant extent activities in a 
neighbouring market closely related to the market of the joint venture.
The Commission noted the following: first, Cableuropa (a “child” of 
BankAmerica and CDPQ”), via the operation of cable networks, would be a future 
significant competitor to Sogecable (a “child” of Canal+) which enjoyed a very strong 
market position in the Spanish pay-TV market; and secondly, CableEuropa was a 
buyer of pay-TV rights from Sogecable (i.e. Cableuropa was vertically related with 
Sogecable). Since Cableuropa was under the joint control of Bank America and CDPQ 
and Sogecable was under the joint control of Prisa and Canal+, it was concluded that 
the parents of NCH did retain activities in Spain, a neighbouring market, and to a 
significant extent.
Assessment Of Co-ordination
Thus, the Commission decided to proceed with the assessment of whether the 
link created by the notified operation, i.e. the setting up of NCH as a joint venture,
224 The Commission defined the relevant market for the purpose of assessing the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position as being the pay-TV market in France or in French speaking 
territories in Europe (because NCH is mainly active in cable television distribution in France, whereas 
it is only experimenting to enter in the field of Internet access and telecommunications services. See 
para. 14 of the decision). It then found that the concentration would not have any negative effect on 
competition in the relevant product market: (a) there were competitors of approximately equal market 
shares on the market, such as France Telecom Cable (20-30%), Lyonnaisc Communications (20-30%) 
and ANOC (15-25%) -  NCH itself also had (20-30%). These figures were based on subscriptions. 
Hence, the Commission concluded that the concentration would only give the NCH an improved 
financial position.

would have an impact on competition in the Spanish pay-TV market and /  or in the 
Spanish market for the wholesale supply of films and sports channels for retail pay- 
TV.
Eventually, the Commission found that there was not enough evidence to 
support the conclusion that the acquisition of joint-control in NCH had the object of 
co-ordinating the competitive behaviour of Sogecable and Cableuropa. But it did not 
decline to say that it might have the effect of co-ordinating their competitive 
behaviour. The methodology it adopted in looking into this issue was the following:
(a) It examined the current structure of the pay-TV market and of the market for 
the wholesale supply of films and sports channels for retail pay-TV in Spain;
(b) It then assessed whether there was a risk of horizontal co-ordination between 
Sogecable and Cableuropa as a result of the operation;
(c) It went on to assess whether there was a risk of vertical co-ordination between 
them as a result of the operation.
On point (a), the Commission concluded that the current structure of the 
relevant markets in Spain was characterised by a very strong market position of one of 
its players, namely Sogecable, and a highly concentrated market with links among all 
market players in a number of joint ventures!
(i) Sogecable had by far the largest number of subscribers for terrestrial /  
analogue pay-TV (1-2 million) and for digital satellite pay-TV 
(100,000 -  lm.) vis-à-vis Telefonica with 100,000 -  500,000 
subscribers for digital satellite pay-TV and Retevision, which was just 
a new entrant in the sense that it was licensed to operate in cable pay- 
TV in the near future and thus it did not possess any market share, yet. 
It is repeated that Cableuropa could be the most significant future 
competitor of Sogecable as a cable pay-TV operator. Apart from that, 
Telefonica was licensed, and therefore was expect to enter the market, 
for the operation o f cable pay-TV.
225 See para. 15 of Commission Decision.
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(ii) Besides, Sogecable and its subsidiaries had control of the most 
important premium pay-TV contents, necessary to operate in the pay- 
TV market, stemming from exclusive contracts with most of the 
Hollywood major studios such as Paramount, Universal, 
Sony/Columbia, Warner, Fox. It further had control over the most 
important pay-per view football rights in Spain via Canal Satellite 
Digital and Audiovisual Sport.
(iii) Both Telefonica and Sogecable have shareholdings in Audiovisual 
Sport, which has the power to exploit the football rights for the Spanish 
Premier League; the exclusive rights’ holder, however, remains Canal 
Satellite Digital (subsidiary of Sogecable!).
(iv) Cableuropa and Retevision jointly control CTC in Catalonia.
On point (b), the Commission concluded that the possibility of horizontal co­
ordination between Sogecable and Cableuropa should be excluded.
(i) Cableuropa was a new entrant in the Spanish pay-TV market, and 
therefore it needed to get as many subscribers as possible in its start up 
phase; this fact alone should render unlikely any co-ordination with 
Sogecable on prices.
(ii) Cableuropa offered an unbundled package of services (internet, 
telephony, pay-TV) whereas Sogecable offered solely pay-TV services; 
this fact should render more unlikely a possible horizontal co­
ordination of their competitive behaviour.
On point (c) -  risk of vertical co-ordination - the Commission noted that 
“Cableuropa’s parents are now, and will continue in the future, co-financing the
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cable interests o f Canal+ in France via their JV, namely NC. The success o f N C ’s 
cable businesses is very important to Canal+ because o f new revenues from  voice, 
Internet, etc.”.226 278“Consequently”, said the Commission, "Cableuropa would have a 
very significant and real power to retaliate against Canal+ in France, i f  it was not 
given favourable conditions in the access to the audio-visual rights that it needs in 
order to develop itspay-TVactivities in Spain" 227 Credibly enough, the Commission 
felt justified to conclude that “as a result o f the NC deal” both companies have a
strong incentive to co-ordinate their competitive behaviour at least with regard to the
22$
“access to Sogecable ’ s content”.
* ; \ i i . * 1 •
The Commission added force to its findings by revealing that, indeed, some 
days after the NC deal was signed, Sogecable and Cableuropa reached a content 
distribution agreement, which, albeit on a non-exclusive basis, was only reached by 
Cableuropa.229 The parties invited the Commission to recall that Prisa is joint owner, 
together with Canal+, of Sogecable in Spain and that it would be against the interests 
of that partner, if Sogecable were to discriminate in favour of Cableuropa only. 
Remarkably, the Commission did not see any value in that argument. Instead, it said 
“aloud” that Sogecable's policy and strategy with regard to the chain o f operation o f 
audio-visual rights (production, management, distribution) is substantially 
determined by Canal+ France fo r  the whole Canal+ group [...] The competitive 
strategy o f Sogecable has always followed the policy o f the Canal+ Group, as 
illustrated by the launching o f Canal Satellite Digital in Spain following Canal 
Satellite in France" 230
In brief, in the above case, the only risk o f co-ordination that the Commission 
recognised consisted in a discrimination policy vis-à-vis other market players in their 
access to Sogecable’ s content. Consequently, the underlying incentive for such co­
ordination must have been the strengthening of links with the stronger of potential 
competitors and the foreclosure of all others from the market. .
226 Para.33 of Commission Decision.
227 Ibid.
228 The emphasis is added by the author of the thesis.
229 Para. 34 of Commission Decision.
230 Para. 36 of Commission decision.
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The author wishes to make the following remark. When assessing 
“dominance” under the ECMR in this case, the Commission found that “there are no 
affected markets within the meaning o f Form CO”23! on the ground that two of 
NCH’s parents (BankAmerica and CDPQ) were not operating in the pay-TV market 
(the relevant product market) in France or in other French speaking countries. It found 
that therefore, there was no horizontal overlap or any vertical link created between the 
parties (Canal+ and BankAmerica/CDPQ) as a result of the transaction.
Affected markets consist of relevant product markets where, two or more of 
the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same product 
market and where the concentration will lead to a combined market share of 15% or 
more: that is markets which do, and will, present horizontal relationships between the 
parties to the concentration. In addition, affected markets include relevant product 
markets were one or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business 
activities in a product market, which is upstream or downstream of the product market 
in which any other party to the concentration is engaged and any of their individual or 
combined market shares is 25% or more, regardless of whether there is or is not any 
existing supplier/customer relationship between the parties to the concentration: that 
is markets which do, and will, present vertical relationships.231 32
We just saw that on assessing the likelihood for co-ordination of their 
competitive behaviour, the Commission revealed that, Banc America and CDPQ were 
indirectly -  that is to say, through their shareholdings in Cableuropa -  involved in that 
very product market, but in a different geographic market. Considering that the only 
difference regarded the geographic market, which in itself does not appear as a 
criterion in the guidelines of Form CO as to what constitutes an affected market, was 
it not wrong to decide that there were no affected markets, in the first place? Did the 
Commission not admit itself that BankAmerica and CDPQ were indeed involved in 
the relevant product market, through their holdings in Cableuropa, by actually going
231 See para. 16.
232 The concept of ‘affected markets’ is defined in Section 6 of Form CO, published in OJ L 061 of 
2/3/1998.
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on to apply Article 2(4) ECMR as amended on the resulting relationship between 
Sogecable and Cableuropa? Was it not already decided by the Commission in Case 
IV/M.709 -  Telefonica/Sociedad/Canal+/Cablevision of 19th July 1996 - that 
Sogecable in fact raised serious doubts about its dominant position in the Spanish pay- 
TV market? Intrigued by the Commission’s finding under Article 2(4), the author 
queries into whether there is scope for interpreting the concept of “affected markets” -  
which is relevant at the stage of applying the Article 2(1),(2) ECMR test -  as broadly 
as actually is demanded by Article 2(4) ECMR as amended. This query is intended to 
be food for thought for the reader: due to the word limit of this thesis, it will not be 
analysed any further; but, in the author’s opinion, such interpretation would be more 
effective with controlling the parents’ strategic intent, which underlies the creation of 
the JV.
5.2.3 Non-Competition Between The Parents
The author has deduced from the above cases that reconsideration of the way 
we assess non-competition clauses may be necessary in the context of SAs. The 
legality of ancillary restraints has been approached in different ways by different 
academics. On the one hand, an ancillary restraint is described as “any clause or 
restriction in an agreement that is not appreciable and that is considered to fa ll 
outside Article 81 EC Treaty” .233 234On the other hand, ancillary restraints are said to 
comprise simply one category of restrictive agreements, amongst others, that do not 
fall within Article 81 EC. They are “a collection o f terms considered ‘objectively 
necessary’ fo r  the performance o f certain contracts that do not fa ll within the 
'commercial risk’ reasoning”.2*4 While ‘commercial risk’ clauses usually necessitate 
an economic analysis of the market to determine whether they are permissible, 
ancillary restraints do not require -  at least in European Competition Law -  a full 
economic analysis of the market. This is the case, notwithstanding the fact that they 
must still satisfy the proportionality test; that is to say, they must not go beyond what
233 V. Korah, 1994, EC Competition Law, (5th ed.) pp 148-9.
234 R. Whish, ante. At pp.210-1.
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is necessary for the transaction to occur. However, the explanation which has 
prevailed is that ancillary restraints are such restrictions as are necessary for the full 
preservation or full transfer of value in certain types of transactions. * Gonzalez- 
Diaz235 637 points out that “the European Commission articulated a version o f the 
ancillary restraints doctrine according to which the legality o f some restrictions may 
depend exclusively on their connection to the main transaction and not on their 
independent impact on competition
As regards ancillary restraints attached to joint venture agreements - in 
particular non-competition clauses — guidance on how the Commission had been 
evaluating them until the 1st March 1998 can be derived from the Notice it issued back 
in 1990.238 Non-competition clauses were considered directly related and necessary to 
the implementation o f the concentration in so far as they expressed the reality of the 
lasting withdrawal of the parents from the market assigned to the JV, and therefore 
their disappearance as actual or potential competitors of the new entity. It should be 
recalled that that was the crucial criterion for holding that a JV constituted a 
concentration. A proposal has already been made for the amendment of the Notice to 
take into account the redefinition of the “FFJV” concept and this should be taken to 
reflect the Commission’s approach since the 1st March 1998.239 It appears that the 
above ground for justifying non-competition clauses disappeared in line with the 
amendments to the concept o f FFJV. The proposed principles for their evaluation 
suggest that non-competition clauses may be necessary to reflect the need to protect 
the parents’ interests in the JV from competitive acts facilitated by privileged access 
to know-how and goodwill transferred or developed by the JV. The proposed Notice 
goes on to stipulate that, if the JV is set up to enter a new market, reference will be 
made to the products, services and territories in which it is called to operate under the 
JV agreement. The presumption will be that a parent’s interest in the JV does not need 
to be protected from competition from the other parent in markets other than those in
235 See Gonzalez-Diaz, 1995, “Some Reflections On The Notion Of Ancillary Restraints Under EC 
Competition Law”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham Coprporate Law Institute, p.329.
236 ibid., at p.328.
237 ibid., p.334, referring to the Commission’s decision in Reuters /  BASF, 1976 OJ (L 254) 40.
238 1990 OJ (C 203)05.
239 Avaliable at the internet address httn://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/ as a working document under 
the heading Mergers / Legislation.
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iwhich the JV will be active at its outset. Any departure from this principle will have to 
be justified by the notifying parents.
Indeed the above mentioned principles of evaluation of non-competition 
clauses do not seem to depart from the long established doctrine with respect to 
ancillary restraints which suggests that "their legality depends exclusively on their 
connection to the main transaction and not on their independent impact on 
competition ” ” 240. In all of the preceding cases the Commission declined to apply 
Article 81 EC Treaty to the ancillary restraints on the ground that they were necessary 
for the transaction, and consequently did not restrict competition. In the light of the 
remarks made in Section 5.2.4, should we not assess whether inserting such clauses 
may enhance the ‘foreclosure of actual/potential competition’ effect of a network of 
alliances?
It should be recalled that under Article 81 EC analysis, where an agreement 
does not have the object of restricting competition, it is still necessary to consider its 
effects. Barry J. Rodger & Angus MacCulloch say that when the effect of an 
agreement is considered it is important to examine the market in its economic 
context.241 They cite a passage from the ECJ decision in Brasserie de Haecht v 
Wilkin: “it would be pointless to consider an agreement, decision or concerted 
practice by reason o f its effect, if  those effects were to be taken distinct front the 
market in which they were seen to operate ”. Most importantly, the ECJ recognised 
that the effect of a single agreement may be negligible, but if that agreement 
constitutes one amongst a network of agreements, it is the effect of the network that 
need to be examined.243 Furthermore, it appears from the ECJ’s reasoning in the 
Delimitis case that not only account need be taken of the effects of the agreements on 
the existing market but also of its potential effects on the development of the market. 
In particular, the court emphasized the imminent risk of foreclosure of the market 
through a network of agreements and identified a number of factors to look into when 
assessing the effect. First, the possibilities for a new competitor to penetrate the
240 Gonzalez-Diaz, ante. Footnote 202.
241 Ante., at p. 141.
242 Case 23/67 [1967] ECR 407; [19681 CMLR 26, at para. 40.
243 See Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henniger Brau [1991] ECR 1-935; [1992] 5 CMLR 210.
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bundle o f contracts by acquisition of an established operator or the establishment of 
new outlets; secondly, the conditions of competition on the market, including the level 
of product saturation and customer loyalty. The Court clarified that we need to look 
into the extent to which an agreement contributes towards the effect carried by the rest 
of the agreements in the network. If its effect is insignificant, it will not fall within the 
Article 81 EC prohibition. The author thus suggests that there is room for examining 
ancillary restraints pursuant to Article 81 EC. Further, the principles which the Court 
has already developed appear to strike the necessary balance, and therefore the parties 
to a FFJV, which enter a non-competition agreement ought not to fear that it will be 
unduly stroke out thereby jeopardising the value of their transaction.
5.3 Partial-Function JVs & Strategic Intent
At this stage, the author wishes to illustrate a point which was made in 
Section 1.5 of the thesis, namely that the strategic intent of a SA is not necessarily 
reflected in the institutional form that the parents choose for it. The intent of the 
parents may still be the strengthening of their dominant position in the market by 
precluding potential competition, even if the alliance is not set up as a FFJV, and thus 
cannot be tested under the ECMR ‘dominance’ test. The JV agreement is assessed 
under Article 81 EC, instead. In the author’s view, the case presented hereinafter is a 
vivid example of an agreement concluded to strengthen the “exclusionary” market 
power of the undertakings concerned. Article 81 EC appears to be a lax legal 
instrument in such a case, in so far as it gives the parties the benefit of invoking the 
exemption under Article 81(3) EC Treaty in the name of “promoting technical and 
economic progress”.
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5.3.1 Case No IV/36.539 -  BiB. decision delivered on 21/10/98244
The business object of the alliance
The ultimate business object of BiB was to provide digital interactive TV 
services to consumers in the UK and Ireland.“ The BiB services would include home 
banking, home shopping, down-loading of games, learning-on-line, entertainment and 
leisure, sports, motor world. Any form of entertainment where viewing itself is the 
primary form of entertainment for the viewer, without the possibility of interactivity, 
such as video-on-demand entertainment services were excluded from its scope.
Basically, the BiB service would consist in allowing content providers to offer 
their goods and services directly to digital TV viewers and to complete transactions 
with such viewers. The service would combine both “broadcast content”, content 
broadcast via digital satellite, and "on-line content ”, content delivered via a standard 
domestic telephone line. In addition, the partners of BiB intended to enter into 
negotiations with a view to making the BiB service available alongside the digital 
broadcast entertainment services, which were transmitted on digital terrestrial and 
digital cable in the UK.
The primary object of BiB was to set up the technical infrastructure necessary 
for the provision of the above mentioned services. In particular, the BiB infrastructure 
was intended to allow both digital broadcast data signals and digital on-line data 
signals to be decoded by authorised viewers for display on the current generation of 
analogue television sets and future sets and to allow those viewers to interact in a safe 
environment. BiB would provide its infrastructure both to digital TV broadcasters and 
to providers of digital interactive services.
The BiB company was held not be an autonomous economic entity because it 
would not perform all the functions of such an entity; instead, it would rely on its
2W OJC 322/6,
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parents for a substantial part of its activities.246 Therefore, the Commission’s decision 
was delivered on the basis of Article 81 (ex Article 85) of the EC Treaty. Pursuant to 
Article 81(3) EC, BiB was granted an individual exemption taking effect as from the 
date that certain conditions would be fulfilled.
The parents’ business activities
BiB’s parent companies would be (1) BT Holdings Limited, (2) British Sky 
Broadcasting Limited (“BskyB”), (3) Midland Bank pic (“Midland”) and (4) 
Matsushita Electric Europe (Headquarters) Ltd (“Matsushita”). Of most interest is to 
consider the activities of the first two parents.247
(1) BT Holdings Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BT. After the 
liberalisation in the telecommunications sector in the UK, BT was licensed to run 
certain telecommunications services in the UK and to provide the technical 
infrastructure for such services. It remained dominant on the market.
(2) BSkyB’s core business activity is the broadcasting of analogue pay-TV 
services delivered by the Astra satellites for direct-to-home and cable reception in the 
UK and Ireland. BSkyB intended to expand its activities as a broadcaster by launching 
a digital pay-TV service during 1998. As an analogue pay-TV broadcaster, BSkyB 
operated both at the retail and at the wholesale level. At the retail level, it supplied 
wholly-owned BSkyB channels, channels in which it had an interest and third party 
channels to subscribers in the UK and Ireland. At the wholesale level, it supplied its 
own channels and a small number of third party channels to operators who supply 
packages of channels to viewers via other systems.
245 See para. 2.2.1 of Commission Decision: Digital TV interactive services are intcrnct-likc, on-line 
services, delivered via television screens. They include retailing, information services, game playing, 
‘walled garden’ internet access and adding interactivity to broadcast entertainment services.
246 Para. 2.1 of the Decision.
247 For the reader’s information, a description of the other parents is noted here. Midland is a public 
limited company authorised to carry on banking business by the Bank Of England. It belongs to the 
HSBC group of companies which provides a full range of banking and financial services. Matsushita is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Matsushita Electric Co. Ltd (ME1). MEI’s portfolio includes the 
designing, development and manufacture of electronic and electrical products and associated software 
and information technology for home, industrial and commercial uses. The MEI group operates in 
other EU Member States.
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It is important to know that BSkyB has been a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
British Broadcasting Group pic. The latter was formed by a merger between Sky 
Television Limited -  then a subsidiary of News Corporation -  and its then competitor 
British Satellite Broadcasting Limited. The BSkyB group brings together the 
following wholly-owned subsidiaries:
(i) Sky Subscribers Services Ltd (“SSSL”), which provides analogue 
conditional access and subscriber management services to BskyB;
(ii) Satellite Encryption Services Ltd (“SESL”), which provides analogue 
conditional access and subscriber management services to third party 
satellite direct-to-home pay-TV broadcasters using Astra transponders;
(iii) and Sky In-Home Services Limited (“SIHSL”), which is involved in 
the sale and installation of satellite dishes.
SSSL would perform both its current role and the role of SESL in respect of digital 
conditional access services.
BiB’s reliance on its parents248 
(a) BskyB Group
(i) BiB would sub-lease digital satellite transponder capacity from BskyB, albeit 
not exclusively; it could sub-lease it from third parties, too.
(ii) SSSL would provide BiB with conditional access services (“CA”) and access 
control services (“AC”)- The latter is the on-line equivalent to conditional 
access for broadcast services.
(iii) Thus, BiB’s digital interactive set-top box would embed BskyB’s proprietary 
CA and AC systems; since the Set-top box would not contain a common 
interface, it would, therefore be tied to BskyB’s CA and AC. But the BiB set­
top-box would include a digital satellite demodulator and would have
248 Midland would provide BiB with a transaction management system (“TMS”), that is a mechanism 
for authorising and undertaking financial transactions through the digital pay-TV platform. The TMS 
would interface with a merchant acquiring system, that is the processing of credit and debit card 
payments from retailers and from other vendors of goods and services. Midland would provide the 
TMS on a ten-year exclusive basis.
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interface ports, whereto digital cable, digital terrestrial and broadband 
telecommunications network (i.e. all transmission systems) side cars could be 
attached.
(iv) BskyB would agree with Open TV that the latter would enhance its 
application programming interface (“AIP”) and thereafter to supply it to BiB. 
In effect, the enhanced API would allow BiB’s set-top box, in which it would 
be inserted, to decode high quality still and moving pictures broadcast via 
satellite and improve the quality of sound.
(v) BiB would use BskyB’s Electronic Programme Guide (“EPG”). It was 
intended that for the first ten years from the launch of the BiB service, BskyB 
would only supply its EPG to BiB.
(b) BT
(i) The transmission to the up-link site and up-link of broadcast content to the 
satellite would be provided by BT.
(ii) BT entered into an agreement with Oracle with the effect that the latter would 
provide BiB with enhanced software for the broadcast server.
(iii) BT would supply BiB with “access to the on-line system”, that is with a 
network of access points throughout the UK, for three years.
Co-ordination of JV’s competitive behaviour with its parents’ behaviour
Basically, BiB would co-ordinate its competitive behaviour with BskyB only:
(i) The marketing services agreement of BiB with consumers would 
stipulate that purchase of a BiB subsidised set-top box would be conditional on the 
purchaser subscribing to BskyB’s digital pay-TV service for the minimum contract 
term of 12 months;
(ii) BskyB agreed, in the JV agreement, to use reasonable endeavours to 
ensure that all programmes broadcast on BskyB’s analogue satellite service be 
broadcast simultaneously on BskyB’s digital satellite service;
(iii) The parties to the JVA agreed that for so long as BiB would be 
subsidising set top boxes, they would only promote digital set top boxes which would
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be capable of receiving BiB services, subject to a proviso, that BskyB might promote 
any other set top box where the purpose of such promotion related to the use of such 
boxes in homes which already had a BiB subsidised set top box.
(iv) Moreover, the JVA required that certain advertising of the BiB be 
integrated with BskyB’s advertising.
Assessment Of The Effects O f BiB
The European Commission identified the following relevant markets: (a) the 
market for digital interactive TV services; (b) the market for retail pay-TV; (c) the 
market for technical and administrative services for digital interactive TV services and 
retail pay-TV; (d) the markets for the wholesale supply of films and sports channels 
for retail pay-TV; (d) the market for local loop infrastructure.
The Commission found that certain features of the notified agreements were 
incompatible with Articles 81, 82 (ex-Articles 85, 86) EC Treaty and imposed an 
obligation on the parties to amend the notified JVA and the agreements corollary to 
it, in order to be able to claim the benefit of an individual exemption. It explained that 
the amendments were required in order “to ensure that the impact o f the transaction 
on the structure o f the various markets would not be such as to prevent competition 
emerging or developing”.249 250 Where it considered it necessary, the Commission 
imposed a condition that the amendments be in a specified form.
In particular, the Commission was concerned that BT’s participation in BiB 
might lead to a reduced incentive in the short to medium term to invest in the local 
loop infrastructure in which BT was dominant. This might have a consequential effect 
on the supply of services which make use of that infrastructure. The Commission said 
that, if upon review of BT’s participation in BiB in the short to medium term, it 
appeared that competition was restrained, “B T might be required to choose between 
its continued participation in the BiB joint venture, and the provision o f unbundled 
access to its local loop infrastructure“. Eventually, BT agreed to divest its existing
249 See para. 5.1 of Commission decision.
250 See para. 5.3.5 of Commission Decision
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broadband cable interests in Milton Keynes and Westminster and also BT committed 
not to extend its broadband cable interests in the UK.251 25
Further, the Commission required the deletion of the term obliging purchasers 
of BiB subsidised set-top boxes to subscribe to BskyB’s pay-TV bundle.“ * This 
practice would have constituted bundling in the interests of BskyB and against the 
interests of the consumers. Thus the condition was necessary to ensure that BskyB’s 
dominance on the retail pay-TV market is not affected by its participation in BiB.
Following the same reasoning the Commission put a condition on BskyB, at 
the wholesale level of its activities, that it would offer to distribute its Film and sports 
channels either including or excluding (clean feed) interactive applications at the 
choice of the purchaser on a non-discriminatory basis.253 The Commission’s aim was 
to prevent BskyB from bundling interactivity at the wholesale supply level with its 
programming to the detriment o f both competitors to BiB on its digital interactive 
services, and its own competitors on the retail pay-TV level.
Another potential anti-competitive behaviour of BskyB which the Commission 
attacked was the exercise of its veto rights -  by virtue of the JVA - against any 
proposal to subsidise other set-top boxes. The Commission explained that since the 
companies requesting BiB to subsidise other set-top boxes would in practice be 
competitors of BskyB on its core market, "the condition was intended to address 
BskyB’s conflict o f interest in its decisions as a BiB shareholder and its interests as a 
retail pay-TV operator”.254
The author submits that this case raises a question as to whether Article 82 EC 
Treaty should be attributed a more important role in cases of strategic alliances, since 
it is a more appropriate legal instrument for controlling exclusionary market power. 
The conditions the Commission imposed seem to support the author’s opinion. Article 
82 EC is directed at the activities of a powerful single firm which is subject to weak
351 See Condition 6 attached to the Decision.
252 See Condition 2 attached to the Decision.
253 See Condition 5 attached to the Decision.
254 See Para 5.3.4.3 of the Decision and Condition 7.
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competition. An undertaking in a dominant position may use its market power to, inter 
alia, perpetuate its position or to extend its position into another market. Thus, Article 
82 prohibits the ‘abuse’ of a dominant position. Article 82 had been used in the past 
to control mergers. The ECJ held that it is an abuse for a dominant undertaking to 
strengthen its position in a market by merging with a competitor. Arguably the 
same should apply in the case of a joint venture in so far as the JV agreement would 
bring about an abuse o f the parents pre-existing dominant position.
255 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission [19731 ECR 215; [1978] 1 CMLR 199.
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CONCLUSION
•  On The ModeI For Identifying The Strategic Intent
The decisions of the European Commission appear to confirm the 
appropriateness of the model, which was suggested in the concluding remarks to Part 
[ I ] for the purpose of detecting the strategic intent of the parents of an alliance. The 
model was actually confirmed irrespective of the institutional form, which the allies 
have chosen. The BiB alliance sustained the same defensive strategic intent as the 
MSG alliance, notwithstanding the fact that the former was set up as a partial- 
function JV whereas the latter as a full-function JV. At the same time, the author 
believes that the insight into the characteristics of the telecommunications sector, 
which was given in Part [ II ], has indeed made the strategic reasoning behind who 
allies with whom much clearer. This suggests that to detect the strategic intent, one 
needs to be well aware of the structure of the market from the economists’ 
standpoint and moreover of the legal and regulatory framework within which that 
industry functions. It is out of legal and/or regulatory asymmetries that firms found 
the opportunities to deploy their defensive strategies.
The author feels obliged to pay much credit to the Commission’s decision­
making in so far as it appears to take into account the players’ strategic practices. In 
the MSG case, the Commission managed to disclose the strategic intent underlying 
the setting up of the JV by, for instance, looking into the business interest of DT. If 
the latter entered the pay-TV market and the future market of interactive higher- 
value services independently, the possibility would open up for DT to pursue a more 
use-oriented policy in the broadband cable service area rather than a purely 
connection-related payments and charges policy, which would render it more 
profitable. So, it was not a case where but for the JV, it would not have entered the 
market. The strategic intent was therefore to eliminate a potential competitor in that 
market. Further, in the same case, the Commission identified the parents’ strategic
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intent as being to achieve technological leadership in the digital pay-TV market, 
which could, however, only be secured by raising the investment costs of potential 
competitors. To confirm that such intent was plausible, the Commission pointed to a 
strategic move, which was open to MSG to take: it could impose on viewers, by 
means of a term in the decoder lease agreement, the requirement that they should not 
use the decoder with modules of other pay-TV or service providers without the 
consent of MSG, in spite of a common interface in the decoder. In the 
Canal+ZBankAmerica/CDPO case, it said “aloud” that Sogecable’s policy and 
strategy with regard to the chain of operation of audio-visual rights (production, 
management, distribution) was substantially determined by Canai+ France, its 
parent. “[...] The competitive strategy of Sogecable has always followed the policy 
of the Canal+ Group, as illustrated by the launching of Canal Satellite Digital in 
Spain following Canal Satellite in France”. Hence, the Commission appeared to raise 
the veil from subsidiary companies and hold that it is the parents’ strategies that 
prevail over the affairs of their subsidiaries. It thus opened the way to detecting the 
strategic intent of the parents even in markets which are neighbouring to that of the 
JV, if in such neighbouring markets they have subsidiaries which may implement, or 
benefit from, such strategic intent.
•  On The Way We Assess Dominance
Why is it so important to detect whether the strategic intent is anti­
competitive or defensive? Does it not suffice that the effects of the JV are 
themselves anti-competitive or defensive? One may reasonably come up with such a 
question. In fact, the ECMR “dominance test” does not comprise the criterion of “is 
it the parents’ intent to create or strengthen a dominant position?”. Only Article 2(4) 
ECMR requires that we examine whether “the creation of the JV has either as its 
object or the effect of co-ordinating the competitive behaviour of the parents”. Why 
then the author considers it useful to detect the strategic intent of the parents?
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The answer lies in the Introduction to this thesis. It was therein said that there 
is an increasing interest in bringing within the gulf of European Competition law the 
strategic behaviour of the parents. The author of this thesis has therefore sought to 
demonstrate that detecting the strategic intent of the parents enables us to gain a 
wider perspective on how the firms themselves perceive ways of creating or 
strengthening or extending their dominance. In turn, the author suggests that this 
should aid us with defining dominance in a more comprehensive way. As industries 
converge, the notion of dominance demands that we take into account competitive 
advantages which accrue from more than one industry. And the author has suggested 
that the game about dominance today is a game about surviving and winning over 
multi-point competitors. It is for this reason that the author invited the reader to 
focus its attention on identifying whether the strategic intent underlying the setting 
up of a JV relates to the strengthening of links between multi-point competitors. In 
particular where the strengthening of links takes the form of adding to a network of 
alliances (JVs) so that a potential entrant can only consider seriously entering the 
market if it can find an available ally; otherwise the costs of entry for such a 
potential competitor are significantly high.
In the same context, the author suggested that “exclusionary market conduct” 
should be taken into account to a greater extent when assessing dominance. Thus the 
author applauded the Commission’s decision in the NSD case for taking into account 
that back in 1993, Kablevision, in which Kinnevik owned 37,4% of the shares, 
stopped distributing FilmNet’s pay-TV channels until the national competition 
authority had to intervene. Hence, the Commission emphasized that Kablevision’s 
potential competitors will have to take into account, before taking any action, 
Kinnevik’s influence over the strategies of its subsidiaries. It is particularly 
important to control such type of “exclusionary market conduct” as it can be 
promoted by participation in a network of alliances.
•  On The Way We Assess Co-ordination Of Competitive Behaviour
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The author submits that since Article 2(4) ECMR itself allows us to consider 
whether it is the “object” of the creation of a JV to co-ordinate the competitive 
behaviour of the parents, strategic intent has a role to play. Before explaining at 
which point and how, the author wishes to summarise by way of the following 
two diagrams how the European Commission has been assessing the issue of co­
ordination of the competitive behaviour of the parents. The diagrams present the 
test, which the Commission has been applying.
EC COMMISSION PRACTICE 
ON ARTICLE 2(4) ECMR as amended 
A. IS IT NECESSARY TO APPLY ARTICLE 81 EC?
11: l! 
t
Apply Art. 81 
EC
to assess the 
effects of
B. HOW TO APPLY ARTICLE 81 EC ?
1. Is it likely that the parent companies will co-ordinate their 
behaviour?
(a) Would it constitute economically rational behaviour for 
the parents to co-ordinate their behaviour?
(Is the structure of the market, where this co-ordination 
could take place, conducive to co-ordination?)
(b) What is the relative size of the JV market(s) to the 
parents’ market(s) ? A: The larger the latter compared to 
the former, the smaller the likelihood of co-ordination.)
Not likely = Stop!
2. Would such coordination lead to an 
appreciable restriction of 
competition?.
/Q o o -  r o m h l n o H  M a rm o t
7 No = Stop!Continue! = Ye!
T
i
I
3. Will the restriction of competition
be caused by the creation of the
JV? w-
Q; Are parents Potential
Competitors? (Or, was the parents’
behaviour already non-comoetitive
Yes = remedy!
No = let it
« O b je c t Or E f fe c t»
• As it appears from the first diagram, « object » ought to be considered 
first. However, in all of the cases that appeared before it so far, the 
Commission decided that there was not enough evidence to support the 
conclusion that co-ordination of the competitive behaviour was intended. 
Therefore, it would proceed to the assessment of the « effect ». Thus the 
second diagram presents the test for the appraisal of whether it is the 
« effect » of the JV that the parents will co-ordinate their behaviour.
Likelihood Of Co-ordination
• In the Abstract of this thesis, F. E. Gonzalez-Diaz proclaims that 
Article 2(4) ECMR as amended shows that the adoption of the 
amending Merger Regulation constitutes a new and welcome point of 
departure for a more econom ically driven analysis. The author of this 
thesis warns that a point of departure has only been made, if what is 
econom ically ra tiona l for a firm to do is taken to include what is 
stra teg ica lly ra tiona l for a firm to do.
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1. How does Gonzalez-Diaz interpret « economic rationality » ? 
Commenting upon the Telia/Telenor/Schibsted case, he explains:1 
« The Com m ission has  thus recognised tha t despite the re la tive ly  high 
com bined m arke t sha res o f the pa ren t com panies and  the JV  
(betw een 4 5  and  60%  accord ing to some estim ates), the 
characteris tics o f the  m arket (in pa rticu la r low entry barriers, high 
grow th  and h igh  e las tic ity  o f dem and) w ere  such tha t co-ord ination o f 
the com petitive  behav iou r o f the paren ts  w ould no t be  p ro fitab le  and  
consequently  w ou ld  be  unlikely. » On the facts, the Commission found 
that ra ising p rices  and sustaining them through co-ordination would 
not be profitable because of the structural characteristics of the 
industry, Apparently, « economic rationality » is interpreted in terms of 
« how conducive the structure of the market is to sustaining 
profitability which is caused by co-ordination ». If the structure of the 
market is not conducive, then it will not be economically rational to co­
ordinate.
2. According to Gonzalez-Diaz, how does the Commission demonstrate 
its move towards a more economically rational analysis ? « Indeed, 
ra the r than p resum ing  that, g iven the ir com bined m arket share, the 
p a ren t com panies were like ly to co-ord inate the ir com petitive  
behaviour a n d  then exam ining w he ther th is  co-ordination w ou ld  have 
an appreciable e ffec t on com petition, as  it  has done in  seve ra l cases 
in the past, the Com m ission ha s  op ted  fo r assessing w he the r co­
ordination w ou ld  constitu te  econom ica lly  rational behav iou r a t all. 
Having considered  under the c ircum stances that th is was no t the 
case, there was no n e e d  to exam ine causa lity  o r appreciability .2 »
1 (1999), at p.41
2 ibid.
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3. The author admits that the Commission practice is meritorious in so far as it 
begins with an interest in seeking to prove the likelihood for certain 
behaviour occuring in real terms rather than presuming that it will occur and, 
especially, in so far as heavy reliance on market shares is avoided. At the 
same time the author emphasizes that the way economic rationality is 
interpreted may be flawed to the extent that the Commission solely looks into 
the structure of the industry. In fact, even when it comes down to co­
ordination in relation to prices or output, the structure of the market need not 
be such as to facilitate collusion for the firms to find it rational to co-ordinate. 
On this point the author relies on Reynolds & Snapps.3 They show that in 
markets where entry is difficult (this remains a condition), partial ownership 
arrangements, including small joint ventures, link the fortunes of actual or 
potential competitors, producing a positive correlation among their profits. 
They explain that such arrangements arise not out of increased opportunities 
for collusion, but rather out of the linking o f  profits, which gives each firm an 
incentive to compete less vigorously and adopt behaviour more conducive to 
joint maximisation than would otherwise be the case. In fact, increases in 
ownership interests may produce lower market outputs because such links 
‘internalise’ a competitive ‘externality’ -  namely, the benefits each firm 
generates for rivals as a result of unilateral output restrictions. Reynolds & 
Snapp cite as an example that if 5 Cournot competitors had 10% equity 
interests in each other, equilibrium market output would be 10% less than 
that which would occur without any partial ownership.
4. Indeed, the author has identified the parties’ strategic interest in co­
ordinating their behaviour not necessarily with an interest in co-ordinating 
their prices or the amount of their output but rather in co-ordinating their 
interrelationships, that is to say the links to competitors in other industry 
segments or industries that they possess. The underlying incentive for co-
3 (1986) ‘The Competitive Effects Of Partial Equity Interests And Joint Ventures”, Int. Journal Of 
Industrial Organisation VolA, p. 141.
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ordination may thus be the enjoyment of a better position as regards access to 
such an industry segment or market. This was illustrated by the 
NC/Canal+/BankAm erica/CDPO case.4 This suggests that the structure of 
the market need not necessarily be such as to facilitate collusion for the 
partiers to find it economically rational to co-ordinate. Instead, the author 
suggests that we should be assessing such likelihood in the light o f  the 
strategic intent o f  the parents as regards the creation o f  JV . If they intend 
to create or strengthen a dominant position, then we should look into whether 
co-ordination will pretty much take the character of increasing 
interrelationships (and thereby, e.g. ensuring better conditions for access to 
another’s market) at the cost of potential competitors. In fact, although not 
reproduced in the text of Article 2(4) of the amended ECMR, Recitals of the 
Regulation has taken on board the Commission’s proposal to consider that, if 
any effects of the creation of the JV are primarily structural, Article 85(1) 
does not as a general rule apply.
5. Further, the author is of the view that we should not be dismissing the 
likelihood of co-ordination between the parents too easily on the 
ground that the JV’s market is of small size compared to the size of 
the rest of the parents’ markets.5 In particular, if the size of the JV 
market is small, but, at the same time, such market is new, the latter 
characteristic ought to be more important. If we accept that the 
strategic intent behind the creation of the JV is to increase or 
strengthen interrelationships, then adding little by little the m eeting  
po in ts  for co-operation than competition, enhances the link ing  o f 
pro fits  of the joint venturers, which as Reynolds & Snapp indicate 
above, is the floor for co-ordination.
4 Section S.2.2.3, pp.l 13-120.
5 The Commission adopted this approach in 14 cases to date, including: Case JV.l 
Telia/Telenor/Schibsted of 27/05/1998, Case JV.2 ENEL/FT/DT of 22/06/1998, Case JV.3
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• With regard to Article 2(4), the focus of the analysis is the co-ordination 
between the parent companies exclusively, and not the co-ordination of 
the competitive behaviour of the parent companies and third parties.* 6 
This is contrasted with the wider ambit of the dominance test under 
Article 2(3) ECMR which goes on to examine whether the setting up of 
the JV would create or strengthen a dominant position for the parents or 
for the parents a n d  third parties.
• This difference in the ambit of the tests is reflected in the calculation of 
the « combined market share » which is made for the purposes of 
deciding whether co-ordination will lead to an « appreciable » restriction 
of competition. Normally, the inclusion of the market share of another JV 
concluded by the parents and third parties will not be included in the 
combined market share for the purposes of Article 2(4). However, in the 
TeliaVTelenor/Schibsted case, the Commission added to the market 
share of Telenor, the market share of Telenordia, a JV of Teienor, BT and 
TeleDenmark. Gonzalez-Diaz argued that although such practice is fully 
acceptable for the purposes of Article 2(3) ECMR, it should not be 
adopted for the purposes of Article 2(4) ECMR..7 In this author‘s opinion, 
the Commission may have felt the need to account for the presence of 
the parents in a network of JVs. This is a central issue in the context of 
appraising the effects of strategic alliances. It is doubted, however, 
whether it is good practice to account for them when we assess 
appreciability and to ignore them when we assess likelihood or causality.
Appreciability
BT/AirTouch/Grupo Acciona/AirTel of 08/07/1998, Case JV.5 Cegetel/CanaI+/AOL/Bertelsmann of 
04/08/1998, JV.6 Ericsson/Nokia/Psion of 11/08/98.
6 Gonzalez-Diaz (1999), p.40.
7 ibid, p.41, footnote 91.
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• The author has identified an aspect of the Commission’s methodology, which is 
problematic for the assessment of SAs whose strategic intent is to increase or 
strengthen interrelationships. The said aspect is that if any co-ordination of the 
parents’ competitive behaviour is found to be likely but such likelihood can be 
attributed to an earlier JV that the parents concluded between them and a third 
party, and in particular by virtue of a non-competition clause in that earlier JV 
agreement, then the Commission is ready to hold that there will be no causal link 
between the JV in issue and the likely co-ordination. In this way, non­
competition situations increase in parallel with a network of alliances which 
expands. The author has expressed her concern in the light of Case 
ENEL/FT/DT and even more the MSG case.
Causality/Co-ordination/Market Power
• In Section 5.3 the author has gone on to suggest which is the proper way we 
should be assessing ancillary restraints in the form of non-competition clauses. It 
has been argued that rather than examining their link with co-ordination of 
competitive behaviour we should be examining their link with the development 
of the market and hence with any increase in the foreclosure effect of the 
parents’ market power. Indeed, the author wishes to raise the following 
questions: (a) Will the parties be able to exercise collective market power, if they 
stop competing against each other and do not compete against the venture? Are 
the parties ready to contend that they will compete against each other and the 
venture through membership in other collaborations? Even if they contend so, 
will they have the ability and the incentive to join competing networks?
C an’t we extend the dominance test to all the effects o f  the JV?
The question then remains: how should we control the co-ordination of
competitive behaviour of the undertakings under European Competition law? In the
Causality
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author’s opinion, it ought to suffice to apply the ECMR dominance test to all the 
effects of the JV, as it is more likely than not that any co-ordination of the 
competitive behaviour (“the behavioural aspect”) will be intended to reinforce the 
position of the parents in the market (“the structural aspect”). What we had better do 
is to reconsider the definition of the relevant market, in the light of convergence, to 
cover for the markets where co-ordination is likely. This will, in fact, be more 
consistent with the way companies perceive their competitors, their potential 
competitors. Notwithstanding the specific industry in question, important potential 
competitors are the ones who have important interrelationships with market players 
at different levels of the value chain and thus in upstream, downstream and 
neighbouring markets. Why is this suggestion made at all? Because rather than 
adopting two filtering procedures which are narrow enough for the facts to fall 
outside them, a single filter which is deeper in ambit may capture the cases which do 
raise concerns in the light of multi-point competition and the firms’ strategies in 
response to that.
R. Whish has pointed out that “an im po rtan t question is whether 
Artic le  2 (3 ) contains one tes t o r two when considering i f  a m erge r is 
incom patib ie  with the com m on m arket”.8 It could be argued that the second 
idea ( “s ign ificantly  im peding effective com petition ”) is merely a description of 
the consequences of the first ( “creation o r s trengthen ing o f a dom inant 
po s ition ”) in which case it adds little.9 An alternative view is that the 
Commission has to satisfy both parts of Article 2(3), if it is to block the 
concentration in question: in this case the second test will provide a de 
m inim is exception. “A lso it cou ld  be tha t re fe rence to im peding effective  
com petition m eans that the Com m ission would take a dynam ic v iew  o f the 
m arke t a n d  consider w he ther harm  to com petition is like ly to be  trans ito ry  o r 
perm anen t: it  shou ld  ac t on ly  in the la tte r s itua tion ”.10 R. Whish concludes 
that “it  is  like ly  that the C om m ission w ill in te rp re t A rtic le  2(3) in  a flex ib le  way
8 “Competition Law”, 1993,3rd ed., Butterworths, London, at p.718
9 ibid.
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so that it w ill p rovide  it w ith a margin o f  d iscre tion fo r use in  appropria te  
cases”. 10 1 Considering the wording of Article 2(3) ECMR, the author contends 
that there is room for considering the behavioural aspect in order to 
determine whether effective competition would be impeded.
Otherwise, Article 82 EC Treaty might be a more appropriate tool to control 
the behavioural aspect. The existing list of practices, which have been recognised to 
fall within the ambit of Article 82 EC, includes a category within which we could 
assess the “behavioural aspect” of a FFJV: namely, the category of “limiting 
production or technology development” -  Article 82(1 )(b) EC. The suggested test 
could therefore be: “would the co-ordination of the parents’ competitive behaviour 
limit production or technology development and thereby be equivalent to abusing the 
parents dominant position?” Arguably, applying Article 82 EC will carry the 
advantage of capturing the situation where non-competition between the parents 
inside the market of the JV and in the markets of other JVs in which they are 
involved leads to an abuse of the dominance of the parents of the JV in issue 
cumulatively - collectively with their allies here and there. In principle, once we 
introduced Article 81 EC into the “ex-ante control” system of the ECMR, we should 
not face the question of whether it is legitimate to introduce Article 82 EC -  a 
classically “post-facto control” tool -  in the same system!
10 ibid.
11 ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
AMATO, G. (1997) Antitrust And The Bounds O f Power: The Dilemma O f Liberal 
Democracy In The History O f The Market (Oxford: Hart Publishing)
BORK, R. (1993) The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy A t War With Itself (Oxford: 
Maxwell Macmillan).
COOK, C. J. & KERSE, C. S. (1996) EC Merger Control (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell)
De SOLA POOL, I. (1990) Technologies Without Boundaries: Telecommunications In 
A Global Age, (Harvard: Harvard University Press).
FINE, F. L. (1994) Mergers And Joint Ventures In Europe: The Law And Policy Of 
The EEC, (London: Graham & Trotman / Martinus Nijhoff).
FRANSMAN, M. (1994) "AT & T, BT, NTT: vision, strategy, corporate competence, 
path-dependence, and the role of R&D" in POGOREL G. (ed.), Global 
Telecommunications Strategies And Technological Changes, (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland)
HAMEL G. & PRAHALAD, C. K. (1994) "Strategic Intent" in Global Strategies: 
Insights From The Worlds Leading Thinkers, Harvard Business Law Review (ed.)
HAWK, B. E. & HUSER, H. L. (1996) European Community Merger Control: A 
practitioner's Guide (Kluwer Law International)
HUFBAUER, G. C. & Wada, E. (eds.) (1997) Unfinished Business: 
Telecommunications After The Uruguay Round, (Washington D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics).
HULSINK, W. & OMMEN, G. T. (1996) Do Nations Matter In A Globalising 
Industry? The Restructuring O f Telecommunications governance regimes in France /  
Netherlands /  UK, (Deft: Eburon).
JONES, C , GONZALES-DIAZ, F. E., OVERBURY, C. (1993) The EEC Merger 
Regulation: Jurisdiction and Substance - Procedure, (London: Sweet & Maxwell)
KAY, N. (1990) "The Single European Market: Industrial Collaboration And The 
Single European Market" in LOCKSLEY, G. (1990) The Single European Market 
And The Information And Communication Technologies, (London: Belhaven Press)
KAY, N. (1993) “Industrial Collaborative Activity And The Completion Of The 
Internal Market” in HUGHES, K. (ed.) “European Competitiveness”, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).
ï; ¡
\L V
KNOTT, P. (1997) Multimedia: Strategic Implications For Telecoms Operators, 
(Cambridge: Analysys Publications), (http://www.analysys.co.uk/NEWS/mm.htm).
KORAH, V. (1997) An Introductory Guide To EC Competition Law And Practice, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing).
LITTLER, D. & SHARP, B (1990) "Prospects For Competition In A Pan-European 
Cellular Telecommunications System” in LOCKSLEY, G. (1990) The Single 
European Market And The Information And Communication Technologies, (London: 
Belhaven Press)
LLERENA, P. &. WOLFF, S. (1994) "Inter-firm agreements in telecommunications: 
elements of an analytical framework" in POGOREL, G. (ed.) Global 
Telecommunications Strategies And Technological Changes, (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland)
LORANGE, P. & ROOS, J. (1992) “Strategic Alliances In International Business - 
Conceptual Framework Of Strategic Alliances” and “Emerging Challenges” in 
Strategic Alliances: Formation, Implementation and Evolution, (Cambridge- 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers).
OHMAE, K. (1989) "The Global Logic O f Strategic Alliances", Harvard Business 
Review, 67, March-April.
PERLMUTTER, H. V. & HEENAN, D. A. (1994), "Cooperate to Compete 
Globally",.", in Global Strategies: Insights from the World's Leading Thinkers, A 
Harvard Business Review Book, pp. 143-54.
PORTER, M. E. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating And Sustaining Superior 
Performance, (New York: The Free Press).
RODGER, B. J. & MacCULLOCH, A. (1999) Competition Law And Policy In The 
European Community And United Kingdom (London-Sydney: Cavendish Publishing 
Limited).
SAPPINGTON, D. E. M. & WEISMAN, D. L. (1996) Designing Incentive Regulation 
For The Telecommunications Industry, (Cambridge: The MIT Press & The AEI 
Press).
SAUTER, W. (1997) “The Compatibility of Industrial and Competition Policy: the 
Case of Telecommunications” in Competition Law and Industrial Policy In The EU, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 163-219
SCHEREER & ROSS (1990) Industrial Market Structure And Economic 
Performance, Houghton Mifflin.
STIGLER (1968) The Organisation o f Industry, (Chicago: Chicago UP).

WELFENS, P. J. & YARROW, G. (eds.) (1997) Telecommunications And Energy In 
Systemic Transformation: International Dynamics, Deregulation And Adjustment In 
Network Industries, (Berlin: Springer).
WHISH, R. & SUFFRIN, B. (1993) Competition Law  (London: Butterworths), p.717
ARTICLES
ALONSO, J. B. (1997) “Vertical Aspects O f Mergers, Joint Ventures And Strategic 
Alliances”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
p.129.
AMORY, B. E. (1997) “Vertical Aspects Of Mergers, Joint Ventures And Strategic 
Alliances”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
p.147
BRIONES, J. (1995) “Oligopolistic Dominance: Is There A Common Approach In 
Different Jurisdictions? A Review Of Decisions Adopted By The Commission Under 
The Merger Regulation”, European Competition Law Review, pp. 334-347
BUIGES, P. & JAQUEMEN, A. (1989) “Strategies Of Firms And Structural 
Environments In The Large Internal Market”, 28 JCMS 53.
BURNSIDE, A. (1996) "Dance of the Veils? Reform of the EC Merger Regulation"
European Competition Law Review  Vol.7, p.371
COATES, K. (1998) "Competing for the Internet", EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 
February 1998.
COWEN, T. (1995) “The Essential Facilities Doctrine In EC Competition Law: 
Towards A ‘Matrix Infrastructure’”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute, p.521.
CROWTHER, P. (1996) “Product Market Definition In EC Competition Law: The 
Compatibility Of Legal And Economic Approaches, JBL, p. 177
DENNESS, J. (1998) "Application of the new Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation - 
a review of the first ten cases", EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 1998, No.3, p.30.
GONZALEZ-DIAZ, F. E. (1999) “Joint Ventures Under EC Competition Law: The 
New Boundaries”, not published yet.
GONZALEZ-DIAZ, F. E. (1995) “Some Reflections On The Notion Of Ancillary 
Restraints Under EC Competition Law”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, p.325.
t-
HARBISON, J. R. & PEKAR, P. JR., “Institutionalizing Alliance Skills: Secrets Of 
Repeatable Success”, (New York: Booz-Allen & Hamilton) (Available at the internet 
address which follows:- http://smartalliances.com)
HARBISON, J. R. & PEKAR, P. JR., "Cross-Border Alliances In The Age Of 
Collaboration", Source: Booz-Allen & Hamilton (Available at the internet address:- 
http://smartalliances.com)
HARBISON, J. R. & PEKAR, P. JR., "A Practical Guide To Alliances: Leapfrogging 
the Learning Curve; A Perspective For US Companies”, Source: Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton (Available at the internet address:- http://smartalliances.com)
HAWK, B. (1991) ’’Joint Ventures Under EEC Law”, Fordham International Law 
Journal, Vol. 15, p. 303
HAWK, B. (1993) “A Bright Line Shareholding Test To End The Nightmare Under 
The EEC Merger Regulation”, Common Market Law Review, p.30.
HENDRICKS, K. J. (1995) “The Information Technology Revolution: The Next 
Phase”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
p.549.
KEMP, J. (1999) “Recent developments and important decisions", EC Competition
Policy Newsletter, February 1999, No.l, p.40,
KEMP, J. & EMBERGER, G. (1998) “Recent developments and important
decisions", EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 1998, No.3, p.33,
KRATTENMAKER, T. G. & SALOP, S. C. (1986), “Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power Over Price”, 96 Yale L J . 209.
LANG, J. T. (1997) “Media, Multimedia And European Community Antitrust Law”, 
International Antitrust Law And Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, p.377.
MANKEY, B. (1998) "Competition laws and their effect on a European Union / 
United States telecommunications merger", Communications Law, Vol.3 No.4, p,140.
McCALLUM, L., (1999) "EC Competition Law and Digital Pay Television", EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter, 1999 No.l, February, p.4.
McFALLS, M. (1998), “The Role And Assessment Of Classical Market Power In 
Joint Venture Analysis”, Antitrust Law Journal American Bar Association, Vol.66, 
Issue 1, p.651.
PATHAK, (1991) “The EC Commission’s Approach To Joint Ventures: A Policy Of 
Contradictions”, European Competition Law Review, Vol.5, p. 171.
1
PINA-CASTELLOT, M. A. (1995) “The Application Of Competition Rules In The 
Telecommunications Sector: Strategic Alliances”, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 
Spring 1995, No.4, Vol. I.
PONS, J.-F. (1998) "Innovation And Competition: A View From The European 
Commission", EC Competition Policy Newsletter, February 1998.
RAMSEY, T. J. (1995) “The EU Commission’s Use Of The Competition Rules In 
The Field Of Telecommunications: A Delicate Balancing Act.”, International 
Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, p.561
RAVAIOLI, P. & SANDLER, P. (1994) “The EU and Telecommunications: Recent 
Developments In The Field Of Competition”, The International Computer Lawyer, 
Part I: p.2; Part II: p.20
REYNOLDS, M. J.& SNAPPS (1986) “The Competitive Effects O f Partial Equity 
Interests And Joint Ventures” , International Journal O f Industrial Organisation 
Vol.4, p.141.
REYNOLDS, M. J. (1997) “Mergers And Joint Ventures: The Vertical Dimension”, 
The International Antitrust Law And Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, p.169.
RUTTLEY, P. (1998) “EC Competition Law In Cyberspace: An Overview O f Recent 
Developments”, European Competition Law Review, p. 186.
SCHAUB, A. (1996) “Competition Policy In The Telecommunications Sector”, EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Spring 1996, No. 1, Vol.2
SMITH, R. & ROUND, D. (1998) “Competition Assessment And Strategic 
Behaviour”, European Competition Law Review, p.225.
UNGERER, H. (1995) “EU Competition Law In The Telecommunications, Media 
And Information Technology Sectors”, International Antitrust Law & Policy, 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, p.465.
VAN DEN BERG, R. (1996), “Modem Industrial Organisation Versus Old-Fashioned 
European Competition Law”, European Competition Law Review, pp. 75-87.
WERDEN, G. J. (1998), “Antitrust Analysis Of Joint Ventures: An Overview”, 
Antitrust Law Journal American Bar Association, Vol.66, Issue 1, p. 701.
SPEECHES:
(Available At The Internet Address: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/speech/)
LANG, J. T„ (17th October 1996), "European Community Antitrust Law - Innovation 
Markets And High Technology Industries", Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New 
York.
1
UNGERER, H. (20th March 1996) "Clarifying How Recent EU Policies and Decisions 
will foster effective competition: Who should Be Europe’s Digital Gatekeepers", 
European Cable & Satellite 96 Conference, Paris.
UNGERER, H. (8th September 1998) "Market restructuring, alliances, mergers - 
Satellite Communications”, 6th Satellite Conseil Symposium on uCommunications 
Satellites and Market Realities", Paris.
UNGERER, H. (3rd February 1999) “Infrastructure, Telephony And Competition: 
Developing Cable Networks Into Full-Scale Multi- Media Networks -  Deregulation 
Futures”, The 2nd World CATV Strategies Summit, 3-5th February 1999, Cannes, 
France.
UNGERER, H. (9th February 1999), "Managing the Strategic Impact of Competition 
Law in Telecoms", Keynote Address Outlining EC Plans For The Further 
Development O f Europe's Telecoms Regulation Framework, Brussels.
UNGERER, H. (1st April 1999) "The Transformation O f The International Satellite 
Organisations - Some Aspects From A European Perspective", Brussels.
UNGERER, H. (14th June 1999) “Local Loop Unbundling”, Keynote Address at 
London Business School, London.
Van MIERT, K. (7th July 1997) "Mapping the new open telecommunications 
marketplace", IIC Telecommunications Forum , Brussels.
PONS, J.-F. (12th April 1999) "The liberalisation of telecommunications in Europe 
and the role of regulators", Rome.
VERRUE, R. (27th January 1999), “Telecoms Liberalisation: Future Key Issues From 
The European Point Of View”, Verband Altemativer Telekom-Netzbetreiber (VAT), 
3rd Forum, Vienna.
STUDIES PREPARED FOR TH E EC COM M ISSION
“The 4th Report on The Implementation O f The Telecommunications Regulatory 
Package” [COM (1998) 594 final], 25/11/98.
“The Effect Of Conglomerate Mergers On Competition”, 1990, (CM-59-90-039-EN- 
C).
“Competition And Integration: Community Merger Control Policy” (1994) Brussels, 
(CM-AR-94-057-EN-C).
"The Competitiveness O f European Enterprises In The Face Of Globalisation - How It 
Can Be Encouraged" (20/01/1999) Brussels, (COM (98) 718 FINAL)

COMMISSION COMMUNICATION To The Council And The European Parliament 
On The Consultation On The Review Of The Situation In The Telecommunications 
Sector, of 28 April 1993.
COMMISSION GUIDELINES ON "Services O f General Interest In Europe" 
European Commission, OJ (C 281 ) 003 of 26/09/96
COMMISSION GUIDELINES ON The Application Of EEC Competition Rules In 
The Telecommunications Sector, European Commission, OJ C 233, 6/09/91
FURTHER BIBLIOGRPAPHIC REFERENCES
DE MEYER, KATAYAMA, KIM, 1996, "Building Customer Partnerships As A 
Competitive Weapon: The Right Choice For Globalisisng Competition?", INSEAD.
DOZ, HAMEL, 1995, "The Use Of Alliances In Implementing Technology 
Strategies", INSEAD.
LEIBLEIN, REUER, 1999, "Building A Foreign Sales Base: The Role Of Capabilities 
And Alliances...”, INSEAD.
WILLIAMSON, 1995, "Corporate Restructuring Through Transitory Joint Ventures", 
INSEAD.
ZOLLO, REUER, SINGH, 1998, "Post-Formation Dynamics In High-Technology 
Alliances", INSEAD.
EU LEGISLATION
Treaty o f Rome 1957
EC Merger Regulation, Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 On The 
Control Of Concentrations Between Undertakings as amended by Council Regulation 
1310/97 of 7 July 1997.
SECONDARY EU LEGISLATION
The Terminal Equipment Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988, 1988 OJ (L 131) 73
The Telecommunications Services Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990, 1990 OJ 
(L I92)10
The Satellite Communications Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994, 1994 OJ (L 
268)15
W WWWW
1 1 f  I
■ J )
■ O i - r  .
¡V
EC COMMISSION PUBLICATIONS
GREEN PAPER ON “A Common Approach In The Field O f Satellite 
Communications In The European Community", COM (90)490 final, 20/11/1990.
GREEN PAPER ON “The Convergence O f The Telecommunications, Media And 
Information Technology Sectors, And The Implications For Regulation”, COM(97) 
623 final, Brussels, 3/12/1997.
GREEN PAPER ON “The Review Of The Merger Regulation”, COM(96) 19 final, 
Brussels, 31/01/1996
COMMISSION NOTICE Regarding Restrictions Ancillary To The Concentration 
1990 (C 203)05
COMMISSION NOTICE ON “The Distinction Between Concentrative And 
Cooperative Joint Ventures Under Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings” , 1994 (C 385) 01
COMMISSION NOTICE ON “The Concept Of Full-Function Joint Ventures Under 
Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 On The Control Of Concentrations 
Between Undertakings” , 1998 OJ (C 066) of 02/03/1998
COMMISSION NOTICE ON “The Application Of The Competition Rules To Access 
Agreements In The Telecommunications Sector -  Framework, Relevant Markets And 
Principles” , 1998 OJ (C 265) 002
COMMISSION NOTICE ON “The Concept O f Concentration Under Council 
Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 On The Control O f Concentrations 
Between Undertakings”, 1998 OJ (C 066) of 02/03/1998
COMMISSION NOTICE ON “The Definition Of Relevant Market”, 1997 OJ (C 372) 
03.
COMMISSION NOTICE ON “The Status Of Voice Communications On Internet 
Under Community Law And, In Particular, Under Directive 90/388/EEC", 1998 OJ (C 
006) of 10/1/98.
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON “The Convergence Of The 
Telecommunications, Media And Information Technology Sectors, And The 
Implications For Regulators”, Results Of The Public Consultation On The Green 
Paper, COM(97)623.
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON “The Review Under Competition Rules Of 
The Joint Provision O f Telecommunications And Cable TV Networks By A Single 
Operator And The Abolition Of Restrictions On The Provision Of Cable TV Capacity 
Over Telecommunications Networks”, 1998 OJ (C 071) 004.

Cable TV Network Directive 95/51/EC of 18 October 1995, 1995 OJ (L256)
European Parliament And Council Directive No. 95/47 on the Use Of Standards For 
The Transmission Of Television Signals (“The Advanced Television Services 
Directive”), 1995 OJ (L281 )
The Mobile And Personal Communications Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996, 
1996 OJ (L 020) 59
The Full Competition Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996, OJ (L 074) 13.
ECJ DECISIONS
Case 23/67 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin [1967] ECR 407; [1968] CMLR 26 
Case 4 1 / 6 9  Quinine, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 619.
Cases 48, 49, 51-57 / 69 ICI v Commission, Dyestuffs [ 1972] ECR 619.
Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215; [1978] 1 CMLR 199. 
Case 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223.
Case Suiker Unie v Commission (Sugar) [1975] ECR 1663.
Case 27/76 United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207.
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461 
Case 22/78 Hugin v Commission [1979] ECR 1869, [1979] 3 CMLR 345.
Michelin Case, published in OJ [1981] (L 353) 33.
Case 311/84, Telemarketing [1985] ECR 3261.
Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, Judgment of 3/7/1991.
Commission Decision (86/398/EEC), 1986 OJ (L230) 001
Tetra Pak I (BTG License) 19880J (L 272) 27, [1988] 4 CMLR 881.
Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi [1991] ECR 1-2925.
Case C-234/89 Delimitis v HennigerBrau [1991] ECR 1-935; [1992] 5 CMLR 210. 
Case 56/65 STM v Maschinenbau Ulm [1996] CMLR 357.
Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France v Commission [1998] 4 CMLR 829.
COMMISSION DECISIONS
Case No. IV/M.269 Shell/Montecatini of 3/6/1994, O.J. (L 322) 48 
Case IV/M.308 Kali and Salz/MdK/Treuhand [1994] OJ (L186) 38.
Case No IV/M.469 - MSG; OJ L 364/1,31/12/94 
Case No IV/M.490 - NSD; OJ L 53/20
Case No. IV/JV.l -  Telia / Telenor / Schibsted, of 27/5/1998, available in the CELEX 
database document no. 398J0001
Case No. IV/JV.2 -  ENEL / FT /  DT, of 22/6/1998, available in the CELEX database, 
document no. 398J0002.
Case No IV/36.539 - BiB; OJ C 322/6, 21/10/98
Case No. ÏV/M.1327 -  NC/Canal+/CDPQ/Bank America, of 3/12/1998, available in 
the CELEX database, document no. 398M1327
j n ^ im i wwmi ww fliw itwm Him
i
^ ^ mhhmuwjijihhwwwiwwhwwhhw^ ;!;-!; W ^H í®5ÍS?í?!Wí
1
w a m « i m a *
I
I[

|g|jmHWMJHMI.IU>- 1 ‘ il ..........................................................................................................................
H D


